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ABSTRACT
The thesis contributes to the development of a theoretical framework of economic 
diplomacy by employing ‘levels of analysis’ proposed by Hollis and Smith. In order 
to assess Taiwan’s economic diplomacy, three levels of analysis are employed: 
changes in the international system, contradictory decision-making at the government 
level, and the efforts of political elites and business networks. Only this neutral 
heuristic tool can analyse the roles of Taiwanese business people and the role of the 
Taipei government in the post-Cold War era.
The author analyses Taiwan’s diplomacy from an economic perspective, thereby 
making up for the insufficiencies of those conventional approaches which have 
tended to focus exclusively on the political and military dimensions. The central 
theory that Hollis and Smith choose is Neorealism because it serves best the 
interlinking function between international system and states. In so doing, I also 
want to dig deeper and improve Neorealism, by modifying the level of international 
system to incorporate both the level of state and the level of individual. After I 
enrich ‘levels of analysis’ by emphasising the roles of Taiwanese business people in 
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy, this thesis, therefore, makes substantial contributions 
to international relations as a discipline beyond the account of Hollis and Smith. 
Viewed from the bottom up, explanations in terms of the decisions and actions of 
Taiwanese business people seek understand their influence on the international 
political economy beyond Taiwan per se.
Taiwanese investment in China has since relaxed tension across the Taiwan Straits. 
Investment by Taiwanese business people has made it easier for the Taiwanese 
government to enter into formal relationships with countries in Southeast Asia. In 
addition, Taiwanese business people have retained research and development in 
businesses in Taiwan. Taiwanese business people also promote régionalisation and 
globalisation in East Asia. They have been proactive, independent rather than at the 
beck and call of the Taipei government, and have even put pressure on the 
government to change its policy to permit cross-Straits trade. They serve as 
pioneers, surrogates, intermediaries and hindrances in Taiwan's economic diplomacy. 
In general, Taiwanese business people play a major role in Taiwan’s economic 
diplomacy, while the Taipei government plays but an auxiliary role in the field.
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TRANSLITERATION
Where there are references to Chinese names, in most cases, the system of 
Romanisation of Chinese characters used in this study is Mandarin (the pin-yin 
system). This is because the pin-yin system is widely used by the academic field. 
The only exceptions are proper names and places in Taiwan (e.g. ‘Taipei’) and the 
names of some famous people such as Lee Teng-hui and Su Chi. The author also 
Romanises names according to each person’s preference. Therefore, Wade-Giles 
system is employed when the person chooses her/his name by herself/himself. 
Following the Chinese convention, some famous names in the text and notes are given 
with the family name first followed by the given name, e.g. Deng Xiaoping. 
However, if the name is widely used in its own style, sometimes the given name is 
followed by the family name (e.g. Samuel C.Y. Ku). In the bibliography, for both 
English and Chinese authors, the family name is given first, followed by the given 
name after a comma (,).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.0 Introduction
With the advent of the Communist revolution in Mainland China, relations between 
the “People’s Republic of China” and Taiwan (otherwise called the Republic of China) 
have remained strained and often hostile. This hostility was heightened during the 
period of the Cold World, with each side of the political divide aligning with a 
different block of ‘cold warriors’. While the People’s Republic of China managed a 
rather tempestuous relationship with the defunct Soviet Union for strategic purposes, 
the Republic of China (Taiwan) found a willing ally in the United States. Despite a 
number of military skirmishes across the Taiwanese Straits, both the governments of 
Mainland China and Taiwan have somehow managed to maintain a fragile but stable 
relation. However, while scholars continue to focus on the military strategic aspect of 
this fragile relationship, less attention is given to the plethora of other unofficial ties 
that help sustain this relationship. This work attempts to fill this lacuna. The aim of 
this work is to explore the role of Taiwanese business people in sustaining this
relationship.
1.1 The Major Findings of the Thesis
In the late 1980s, Taiwanese businesses increased their investment both in Southeast 
Asia and in China. The Taiwanese government encouraged investment in the former 
by promulgating the so-called ‘Southward Policy’ and by providing assistance (when 
it concludes international agreements with other governments) to businesses investing 
in that region. It was much more cautious about investment in Mainland China, 
however, urging a policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ in order to restrain what it saw as 
the abiding irresponsibility of the business community.
Taiwanese business people are the pioneers of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy, but 
they are also often regarded by the Taipei government as traitors or betrayers of 
Taiwan by investing in Mainland China. Therefore, this thesis will attempt to 
determine what roles Taiwanese business people actually play in the development of 
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. Taiwanese business people largely ignored the 
policies of Taiwan in order to pursue profits. How, then, have they contributed to 
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy? Sometimes, we can see that Taiwanese business 
people have helped to relax the tensions across the Taiwan Straits. However, in the 
Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1995-1996, they did not work to stop the crisis. Only when 
the US intervened did the crisis finally die down. Therefore, this thesis also aims to 
define the impacts of the international system on Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. 
Because foreign policies are typically devised by state leaders, there is a need to 
review these policies. How do they impact on Taiwan’s economic diplomacy?
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Taiwan’s policies are devised both by the presidency and the cabinet. Therefore, we 
need to explore to what extent these two institutions are consistent with each other. 
Do they always go hand in hand, or are they sometimes mutually contradictory? If 
contradictory, what would be the best solution for resolving the disagreements and 
conflicts between them?
This thesis aims to contribute to the field of International Relations by providing a 
comprehensive three-level analysis of Taiwan’s external relations. It also aims to 
analyse Taiwan’s diplomacy from an economic perspective, complementing the more 
conventional approaches, which are often insufficient, inasmuch as they tend to 
concentrate on political and military aspects only. Viewed from the bottom up, 
explanations in terms of the activities of Taiwanese business people clarify their 
influence on the international political economy beyond Taiwan per se. The activities 
of Taiwanese business people entail significant economic implications, thus becoming 
a special object and source of explanation of analysis. Taiwanese business people are 
a distinct source of the ‘shoving and shaping’ forces, playing alongside those of the 
structural level. Thus it is insufficient to offer analyses exclusively from the 
perspective of states and political elites. The bottom-up influence of Taiwanese 
business people cannot be ignored. Conversely, any study that would concentrate 
exclusively on Taiwanese business people could not hope to provide a complete or 
thoroughgoing analysis of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. However, combining these 
three levels (viz. the system, state and individual levels) may provide a 
comprehensive analysis of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy as a whole.
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My thesis defends the following claims:
• The Taiwanese business community invested in Mainland China in spite of 
government caution and even put pressure on the government to change its 
policy so as to permit cross-straits trade beginning on 5 August 1987.
• Government policy suffered from multi-track decision-making, with the result 
that it contained some contradictions. Business people, by contrast, were on 
the whole more clear-sighted.
• Taiwanese business people undoubtedly benefited in some respects from 
government help in investing in Southeast Asia, but they followed their own 
agenda, used their own initiative, and did not increase their investment in that 
area to the extent that the government had hoped.
I characterise the triple role of the business people vis-à-vis the government under the 
following headings:
• Surrogates: their dealings with other nations sometimes took the place of 
inter-governmental links.
• Middlemen: their activity sometimes proved useful to the government when it 
finally came round to seeking informal links with other governments.
• Hindrances: the business community at times acted against government policy 
(for example, when choosing to ‘Go west’ rather than to ‘Go south’).
However, the self-interested policy of business people did coincide with the
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government’s call to ‘root enterprise in Taiwan’, because even the companies which 
transferred most of their manufacturing operations to other countries retained 
important research and development functions in Taiwan.
1.2 Methodology
Among the three levels of analysis, every level introduces elements of bias into the 
explanations it provides. In terms of the system level, the unit or state level 
overstresses the distinction among states, and undervalue the impact of the system on 
the actions of states. In terms of the state level, the system level supposes that states 
are more identical than they are and overestresses the impact of the system on the 
behaviour of the units (states). However, the two levels of analysis are both crucial 
and complementary perspectives which must be taken into account in any 
comprehensive analysis of the behaviour of the system as a whole. It is not possible 
to establish a neutral theory. Even the most thorough and persuasive attempt at a 
wholly systemic account of international relations by Waltz cannot get rid of all state- 
level causes. Following Hollis and Smith, we propose three broad reasons why states 
must be credited with contributing to the behaviour of the system.1
The first is that international power cannot easily be conceived by 
analogy with natural force. Although power can be a structural feature, 
power is also a resource to be used by agents, which means that they have 1
1 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 118.
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to know how to use it. Secondly, a wholly systemic account would need 
very strong notions of function and structure. However, since the 
structure shows itself only in the behaviour of the units, and since 
functional explanations must involve purposive behaviour by the units, 
there is no way of inferring that the units are only dependent. Thirdly, 
changes within and between the units are the only plausible explanations 
of changes in the system.
Even Kenneth Waltz also recognises that the ‘shaping and shoving’ of structures may 
be effectively resisted, even though structures ‘shape’ and ‘shove’.2 Thus, we have 
also to look at the state level. The absence of government in the international system 
makes it extremely different from domestic politics, strongly suggesting that the units 
affect the shape of relations, no matter how firm the shove is.
Similarly, we have found reasons to doubt whether ‘national interest’ is defined well 
enough in order to serve as a clear and compelling goal for the units of international 
relations. Therefore, we should open the box. Debate on this layer of the problem 
cannot proceed without also taking into consideration the individuals who engage in 
the actual processes of a decision-making.
2 Kenneth Waltz, “Reflections on Theory o f  International Politics: A response to my Critics”, in Robert 
O. Keohane, ed„ Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia university Press, pp. 343-44.
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Correlation of world forces is the most important factor at the level of system. The 
merit of state-level analysis is that we can analyse international relations in greater 
depth than if we limited ourselves exclusively to the system level. However, foreign 
relations should be understood not only as the extension of domestic politics but also 
in terms of reactions to the broader international environment. To over-emphasise 
domestic politics would be to become guilty of a fallacy, because the analysis of 
domestic factors necessarily involves the evaluation of the international environment, 
from which it cannot ever be fully extricated. The problem with relying exclusively 
upon the levels of system and state is that it tends to provide an over-rationalised 
account that fails to take into account the constraints imposed upon the rational 
capabilities of decision-makers in terms of scarcity of information, times limitations, 
and various other internal and external pressures. Therefore, we have to turn to the 
level of the individual, where we may examine the personality, worldviews and biases 
of state leaders, as well as the impact of business people on national politics. Only 
the theory of ‘three levels of analysis’ approach, which we employ to analyse 
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy is sufficiently comprehensive.
At the international system level, the changing international environment — which 
provides the setting of Taiwan’s Economic Diplomacy — will be analysed. At the 
state level, Taiwan is also included. The third level consists of Taiwanese business 
people and political leaders.
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1.3 The Research Development of the Thesis
The argument of this thesis is that in the Post-Cold War era, Taiwanese business 
people have played a major role in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. The Taiwanese 
government has played merely a complementary or auxiliary role — when it 
concludes international agreements with other countries in order to protect Taiwanese 
business people’s interests, for example. It is an exaggeration to state that, since the 
beginning of the 1990s, Taiwan’s economic diplomacy has achieved significant 
international space. Taiwan does use foreign trade, foreign investment and foreign 
aid in order to break out of its diplomatic isolation and obtain some degree of 
international recognition. However, this has not resolved the question of sovereignty. 
Although Taiwan’s international standing has been ameliorated to a certain degree, 
this has proved to be only ‘bubble diplomacy’.3 Sometimes the Taipei government 
tried to improve bilateral trade and economic cooperation, and then endeavoured to 
cultivate political connections. Very frequently, Taiwan’s entrepreneurs have served 
as pioneers and intermediaries in setting up the links, and it is in the footsteps of these 
pioneers and intermediaries that the China External Trade Development Council 
(CETRA) and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) have made contact with 
foreign government officials or non-official partners. The CETRA, established in 
1970, had signed 129 bilateral trade cooperation agreements with 47 countries up to 
1991.4
3 See Chapter 4.
* Wei Ming, The Bilateral Diplomacy of the Republic of China. Taipei: Institute for National Policy 
Research, 1991, p. 49. ( l i R . 4’< B B 6 S g ) l f l % .f tJ b :B < » 'C M 9 9 1 . p. 49.)
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As Robert Gilpin puts it, “In every area of international economic affairs, economic 
and political issues are deeply entwined.”5 Françoise Mengin adds that there is an 
interweaving at the national level of the economic and political spheres in the nature 
of the decision-making mechanism.6 After the establishment of economic relations, 
many countries have by degrees allowed these ties to develop naturally into political 
links with Taiwan.
At the international system level, as the Cold War ended and the structure of the 
global system fundamentally changed, the debacle of international communism led 
Western countries to become more concerned about their general domestic 
unemployment and declining military-industrial complexes than with security issues.7 
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) declining political leverage in the 
international society was enhanced by the coincidental Tiananmen Massacre, as a 
result of which it was perceived as failing to abide by international humanitarian 
norms. Meanwhile, the prominence of economic issues offered Taiwan a good 
opportunity to deploy its accumulated wealth as a tool to achieve its international 
space. The relaxation of tensions across the Taiwan Straits also encouraged foreign 
countries to re-evaluate their relations with Taiwan, because the PRC’s ‘engagement’ 
with Taiwan — the second major investor in Mainland China — undermined
5 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy o f International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987, p. 24.
6 Françoise Mengin, "The Prospect for France-Taiwan Relations”, Issues & Studies, vol. 28, no. 3 
(March 1992), p. 46.
7 Linjun Wu, “Does Money Talk? The ROC’s Economic Diplomacy”, Issues & Studies. December 
1995, pp. 28-9.
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Beijing’s attempts to stop other countries making official contact with Taiwan. Also, 
the growing prominence of “Greater China8” made Taiwan an attractive partner to 
Japan and Western countries, which saw Taiwan as a useful bridge to Mainland China. 
These countries, technologically highly developed and world-renowned multi­
nationals, were attracted by the prospect of combining these assets (via Taiwan’s 
capital and management personnel) with Mainland China’s massive market and its 
cheap land and labour.
However, some scholars and politicians believe that integrating the PRC in the 
international system is the best strategy for maintaining international order. 
Proponents of this view include John King Fairbank, Michael Oksenberg, Andrew 
Nathan, Robert B. Zoellick, Richard Nixon and Edward Heath.9 This point of view 
tends to produce a more conservative attitude towards Taiwan and is apparently 
unfavourable to Taiwan’s economic diplomacy.
At the state level, the pragmatic diplomacy of Taipei pushed for dual recognition and 
a substantive relationship between Taiwan and foreign countries. Beijing’s 
diplomacy regarding economic issues was becoming more pragmatic through its 
coexistence with Taipei within international organisations such as the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The
8 “Greater China” as used here comprises Taiwan, the Mainland, and the Hong Kong and Macao areas. 
For a conceptual analysis of Greater China, see David Shambaugh, ed., Greater China: The Next 
Superpower? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
’ Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power -  US Relations with China since 1949. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997, p. 223. Also interview with Shaun Breslin, May 1998.
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démocratisation of Taiwan has led to both a promotion of its international image and 
to greater interaction with Western countries, which often take democratic progress 
and respect for human rights into account when dealing with bilateral relations.
In order to break through its diplomatic isolation, Taipei has used its great financial 
resources and economic strength to win friendship. The ‘Six-Year National 
Development Plan’ (1991-96), which involved investments of US$300 billion, 
attracted many suitors, including foreign companies and high-ranking visitors. 
Consequently, many countries competing for economic favours have been upgrading 
their Taipei trade offices. However, the Plan created only ‘bubble diplomacy’ in 
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. When Lien Chan succeeded Hau Pei-tsun as the 
premier of the Executive Yuan in 1993, he cut the budget of the Plan considerably. 
The Western countries left, thus proving themselves to have been fair-weather friends.
Foreign aid is a technique of economic statecraft, by which aid is used as an 
instrument of policy in order to achieve certain goals. Foreign aid implies a 
relationship between two actors that may be designated on the one hand as ‘donor’ 
and on the other as ‘recipient’. In a nutshell, foreign aid may be regarded as a factor 
in a form of power relationship. Hence, the donor must possess a capability that can 
be converted into an aid relationship. The exact political functions served by aid 
relationships are not always easy to determine. The most apparent political function 
of aid will be clear from an examination of the conditions as laid down by the donor. 
Foreign aid relationships can also serve a coercive function. A reward, once offered
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and accepted, can seem subsequently to be punitive if the donor threatens to withdraw 
or cease rewarding the recipient in the future. Because the aid relationship exists over 
time, the opportunity for the donor to assume an intrusive and even coercive role vis- 
à-vis the recipient will increase. Moreover, the donor may attempt to link the aid 
relationship with other foreign policy issue areas.
In 1961, the Committee of International Technical Cooperation (CITC) of Taiwan 
was established to provide agricultural technical assistance to African and Latin 
American countries. In 1988 Taipei’s government set up the International Economic 
Cooperation Development Fund of the Republic of China (IECDF), amounting to 
about US$1.2 billion, to assist friendly developing countries in their economic 
development and to intensify bilateral economic cooperative relations. Offered 
through the IECDF, Taiwan’s economic assistance package consists largely of loans, 
technical assistance on a project basis, and technical training. In 1996 the 
International Cooperation Development Fund (ICDF) was set up and subsequently 
incorporated the IECDF. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) also replaced the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) as the leading institution in distributing the 
fund.
Taiwan’s foreign aid programme rests on the decision-making process of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). 
Although the assumption is that both the MOFA and the MOEA hold joint 
jurisdiction over decision-making, each ministry regards the issue of aid from a
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slightly different perspective. The MOEA regards it more from an economic 
viewpoint, examining aid proposals carefully in order to ensure the efficient and 
effective use of money. However, the MOFA is more concerned with aid as a 
diplomatic lever, without denying the need for wise planning of aid for the business 
interests and development needs of recipients. Aid programmes are sometimes used 
as an expedient political instrument to win diplomatic favours, thereby taking 
advantage of changing international circumstances oi sustaining relationships with 
countries deemed ‘politically correct’ and important to Taiwan. As a result, the 
MOFA has played a more important role than its predecessor (the MOEA) in the 
decision-making process.
Since the late 1980s, Taiwan’s foreign aid to Pacific Asia has concentrated on 
countries that have formal relations or substantive relations with Taiwan. In 
Southeast Asia, only Brunei, Laos and Cambodia have not received Taiwan’s aid. As 
applied to Southeast Asia, the foreign aid programme was designed to facilitate and 
reinforce the ‘Southward Policy’, by concentrating on improvements in infrastructure 
(e.g. industrial parks, roads, and export processing zones) that would help Taiwanese 
companies that invest in the countries concerned. (However, Taiwanese business 
people did not reap much benefit; instability in the political economy of Indonesia and 
the Philippines made it impossible to operate profitably in those countries.)
In addition, since 1978, when China initiated its economic reform, its economic 
growth has boomed, and its economy has become potentially the most dynamic in
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East Asia. In the same period, China proposed extremely beneficial conditions for 
foreign direct investment, thus attracting Taiwanese business people. In response to 
pressure from Taiwanese business people, the government of Taiwan permitted cross­
straits trade effective on 5 August 1987.
On the other hand, due to the change of the objective environment in the late 1980s, 
in order to avoid economic over-dependence on Mainland China or the possibility of 
Beijing taking unfavourable measures against Taiwan, as well as to create a suitable 
environment for Taiwan’s investment, the Taipei government not only requested that 
Taiwanese business people abide by the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’, it also 
called for the Southward Policy, encouraging them to concentrate and develop their 
economic activities in Southeast Asia.
These two policies, which were against the interests and inclinations of the business 
community, were produced by the presidency. They were inconsistent with the 
attempt to establish Taiwan as an Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centre (APROC), 
which was the plan of the Executive Yuan. This double-track decision-making led to 
confusion and rendered the government less effective and successful in economic 
diplomacy than the entrepreneurs who follow their own economic interests.
Foreign aid helps Taipei to reach its Southward Policy objective only to a rather 
limited extent, through economic cooperation with the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, 
Indonesia, etc., although this competes with Beijing peacefully in the international
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diplomatic arena. When the heads of Southeast Asia's central banks held a summit 
meeting in Indonesia in February 1998, Taiwan also promised to provide a loan to 
countries in Southeast Asia in order to tide them over during a period of financial 
crisis. In spite of the Taiwanese government’s assistance and encouragement, the 
total investment projects and capital of Taiwanese business people in Southeast Asia 
did not increase as expected.
On the one hand, Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP) had shrunk from US$272 
billion in 1995 to US$269 billion in 1998. Its economic confidence has now been 
undermined to some extent, leading to the declining effectiveness of its economic 
diplomacy. On the other hand, since the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1995-96, Beijing has 
been more alert to Taipei’s economic diplomacy and has thus taken a tougher stance 
against it. Obviously, Beijing is increasingly sensitive to the gains which Taipei has 
recently made. President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University made Beijing 
believe that Taipei’s economic diplomacy had crossed the line it had set. Accordingly, 
the PRC held missile exercises in order to force Lee to back down and to prevent him 
from achieving a greater international presence. Thus came the Taiwan Straits Crisis 
of 1995-1996. The Beijing government will continue to be a major factor in Taiwan’s 
foreign relations, and it is still difficult for other countries to cross the line set by the 
PRC.
At the individual level, Deng Xiaoping enjoyed privilege and charisma in China after 
the economic reform. Deng Xiaoping’s ‘southern inspection tour’ during January-
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February 1992 — which included visits to Shanghai and Guangzhou, as well as the 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai Special Economic Zones — set the course of economic 
development in China in the first half of the 1990s because it confirmed that 
economic ‘reform’ was a successful policy which should be carried further.10 As a 
result, in 1993, Taiwanese business people started to pour their investment into China. 
Within ten years, most Taiwanese foreign investment centred on China. In addition, 
individual entrepreneurs have been crucial elements of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. 
They have served as pioneers to cultivate countries without official relations. 
Political elites, too, have been important: they have played a complementary (albeit 
still crucial) role in encouraging Taiwanese private trade associations to hold 
conferences and sign agreements with foreign business organisations. These 
associations include the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce, the 
Euro-Asia Trade Organisation, the General Chamber of Commerce of the ROC, and 
the ROC-USA Economic Council.
Taiwanese political leaders have also had a significant influence on the developments 
outlined in this thesis. Sometimes, this influence has been negative -  as when the 
politicians attempted to curb investment in Mainland China in order to avoid 
economic or political absorption by the PRC. However, the capacity of Taiwanese 
leaders to negotiate and compromise has also proven important. President Lee Teng- 
hui and Premier Lien Chan (also Vice-President) have both visited foreign countries
10 Robert F. Ash & Y.Y. Kueh, ed„ The Chinese Economy Under Deng Xiaoping. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997, p .l.
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in order to enhance Taiwan’s international standing and to help and protect Taiwanese 
business people. Although these visits have sometimes provoked the hostility of the 
PRC, their general effect has been constructive for Taiwan’s diplomacy.
It is clear that only profit-making enterprises can last over the long term. Although 
the Taipei government tried to curb the ‘Go west’ trend, investment in China proved 
more profitable. The overlapping and multi-track decision-making of the Taipei 
government proved relatively futile. The obsessive concentration on security led to 
policies which were against the inclination of Taiwanese business people, who had 
already increased their investment and involvement in Southeast Asia before they had 
been urged to do so by the Taiwanese government. Taiwanese business people 
continued to invest in Southeast Asia as usual, regardless of governmental directives. 
They also rooted their enterprises in Taiwan, making Taiwan the potential Asia- 
Pacific Regional Operations Centre (APROC). Vietnam and China became the new 
popular destinations of Taiwanese investment. Generally speaking, Taiwanese 
business people were proactive in investing overseas rather than investing at the beck 
and call of the Taipei government, and they used the networks they built with the 
local overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and China. The encouragement and help of 
the Taipei government in signing bilateral investment guarantee agreements and 
double-taxation agreements played a complementary role at most. Meanwhile, in 
relation to Taiwan’s economic diplomacy, Taiwanese business people served as 
surrogates (people whose dealings with other nations take the place of govemment-to- 
govemment links), middlemen (people whose activity proves useful to the
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government when it finally comes round to seeking diplomatic links), and sometimes 
‘hindrances’ to Taiwan’s economic diplomacy (by insisting on ‘Going West’ at a time 
when the government were explicitly urging them to ‘Go South’).
In this work, these three distinct but complementary levels of analysis will be 
employed to analyse the achievements and restrictions of Taiwan’s economic 
diplomacy (including foreign aid, foreign trade and foreign investment) since the 
beginning of the 1990s. The relationships between the government and the business 
people will be assessed. Chapters 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 will comprise the 
distinctive contribution which this thesis hopes to make to politics and international 
studies as a discipline.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.0 Introduction
There are three sections in this chapter. To clarify my approach, this chapter will 
re-examine several related approaches in the first section, so that I can justify my 
choice. I have taken the approach of ‘levels of analysis’ proposed by Hollis and 
Smith, which is based on Neorealism.1 This is because Realism/Neorealism has 
been dominant in international relations, especially in analysing East Asia. Waltz’s 
systemic explanations can serve as the theoretical framework because Neorealism 
(Waltz’s theory) offers a means to integrate different levels of analysis. Therefore, 
‘levels of analysis’ has been the best approach so far. However, the approach of 
Hollis and Smith is not perfect. In this thesis, the roles of Taiwanese business people 
are emphasised because they serve as pioneers, intermediaries and surrogates in 
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. In addition, they are promoters of régionalisation 
and globalisation in East Asia. This section also reviews the relevant theories of 
Realism/Neorealism, Liberalism/Neoliberalism, Fukuyama, Constructivism, the 
Business approach, and Developmental State approaches.
However, Realism/Neorealism cannot fully address the roles of Taiwanese business
1 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992.
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people. Liberalism/Neoliberalism is very weak and powerless to deal with system 
account. Fukuyama fails to predict the demise of Communism system. The 
Business approach proposed by Susan Strange is limited when it applied to the roles 
of Taiwanese business people. Developmental State Approaches are already out of 
phase when they ignore the structural conflict of the Taipei government. The 
structural conflict is the contradiction between the cabinet and the presidency.2 
Following all this analysis, the section will come to a theoretical conclusion.
The second section is the review of empirical studies. This starts with more 
traditional and ‘Realist’ account of Taiwan’s foreign policy and interpretations of 
Cross-Straits Relations, which include Gao Lang’s account of the evolution of 
Taiwanese diplomacy and Suisheng Zhao’s account of the importance of nationalism 
in Chinese foreign policy. The next part fills gaps in the ‘Realist’ approach with 
non-official diplomacy. Following the non-official diplomacy, this chapter 
highlights the existing studies of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy, which focus upon 
non-security factors in Taiwan’s external relations. This includes sub-sections on the 
role of foreign aid, and the role of business investment and/or trade. It also includes 
an account of the analyses of Hsin-hsing Wu, Gerald Chan and Teh-chang Lin. The 
third section, in conclusion, identifies issues arising from the analysis of the existing 
literature, and sets the agenda for the rest of the dissertation.
2 See ‘double-track' decision-making in Chapter 6.
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2.1 Theory Review
In the book of Hollis and Smith, Waltz’s systemic theory is chosen and given a great 
deal of space.3 This thesis follows Hollis and Smith by using levels of analysis. 
This is because Realism/Neorealism has been a leading theory in international 
relations, especially in East Asia. Waltz’s systemic explanations can therefore serve 
as the theoretical framework because Neorealism (Waltz’s theory) offers a means to 
link different levels of analysis, although the aim of this dissertation is actually to 
extend the theory to complete this type of work which Waltz never tackled.
2.1.1 Realism/Neorealism
Realism is sometimes called the ‘power-politics’ school of thought. Political realism 
has been the mainstream of both academic thinking on international relations and 
conceptions of policy-makers and diplomats. As a theory, or a proposition about the 
individual, the state, and the system, Realism is dominant among the entire theoretical 
field. Especially in the Anglo-American world, in the years after 1940 when it 
emerged to explain the ‘lessons’ of appeasement and the beginning of the Cold War 
period. Afterwards it was tested by behavioural or social science approaches. 
Realism came back in the mask of Neorealism in the 1980s.4 Neorealism thus 
emerged as a structural Realism, explaining international relations with a refined 
structural theory.
3 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992.
4 Graham Evans & Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: 
Penguin Group, 1998, p. 465.
21
Neorealism define power in a different way. For many Realists, the desire for power 
is based on the nature of man. Morgenthau’s objective laws state that ‘the desire to 
attain a maximum of power is universal’ among nations. The laws have their roots 
in human nature.3 Realists regard power as both means and end. Neorealism does 
not regard power as an end in itself. Neorealism believes that either too much power 
or too little power will lead to risks, so power is only a useful means.5 6
Neorealism has two major concerns. The first is an attempt to correct Realism’s 
powerlessness to deal with economic issues. Morgenthau has been criticised for 
trivialising economic factors. Therefore, notions of ‘hegemony’ and ‘regimes’ are 
introduced to rectify this. Neorealsim thus used ‘hegemonic stability’ as the 
mechanism to interpret economic perspective. Therefore, realism has become able 
to deal with the economic issues in international relations in the end. The other 
major concern is to develop a thoroughgoing structure in the international system. 
He asserts that other Realists define their so-called systems based on the capabilities 
of the units (states) composing the system. They are merely ‘reductionists’. Waltz 
asserts that the behaviours of states can be only explained at the level of international 
system. The intention or capabilities of states, or the human nature of their national 
leaders should be all excluded from the explanations.7
5 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1972, p.36.
6 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, in Robert L Rothstein, ed., The Evolution 
of Theory in International Relations. Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina Press, p. 36.
1 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith. Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 36-37.
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Waltz asserts that a system is a set of interacting nation-states having behavioural 
patterns and identities over time. Its structure defines the ordering of its divisions. 
Structure involves an ordering principle, differentiation of the functions of different 
divisions, and the distribution of capabilities. The ordering principle is anarchy, 
which means the absence of a higher government beyond states. There is no 
differentiation of capability, because states perform similar functions. The 
distribution of capabilities (bipolar or multi-polar) determines all the variety in states' 
balance-of-power behaviour. Kenneth N. Waltz’s influential Theory o f International 
Politics is the most far-reaching theoretical attempt to re-establish the central tenets of 
Realism.8
Neorealism is able to explain how structures affect performance and outcomes despite 
the consequences of features attributed to power and status.9 Waltz argues that the 
international system functions like a market that is interposed between the economic 
players and the results they produce. The international system conditions the 
calculations, behaviour and interactions of the units.10 Robert Cox and Richard K. 
Ashley complain that Neorealism has appeared as a ‘problem-solving theory' and lost 
the interpretive strength of classical Realism.11 However, there is no central 
government in the international society. There is no supreme power beyond 
nation-states, so anarchy makes every individual state able to wield its power to
8 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
9 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Reflections on Theory o f  International Politics: A Response to my Critics’, in 
Keohane, ed., Nwrcalism and its Critics. P- 344.
10 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 89-98.
11 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Neorealism and Neoliberalism”, World Politics. Vol. 40, No. 2, January 1988, pp. 
241.
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influence the shape of international relations. The Holist explanations like that of 
Waltz cannot prevent other theorists from having their say. Reductionists are also 
sometimes convincing. Waltz also admits that his holist approach cannot explain 
everything.12 Therefore, we still need to look at the state level when we examine 
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy.
Moreover, the Realist/Neorealist perspective on economic statecraft cannot fully 
explain the political economy between Taiwan, Mainland China and Southeast Asia. 
The Realist/Neorealist school of thought on international political economy argues 
that states are the only important actors in the world economy. In an anarchic 
international society, relative gains in wealth and power are the targets of those actors. 
The structure of bipolar power, either in political or economic terms, determines who 
wins and loses in the international arena. Foreign trade and investment policies can 
therefore be employed as instruments to increase national interests. The policy 
implication following this analysis is that coercive and exchange-oriented ‘economic 
statecraft’, such as economic aid sanctions, should be based on a careful calculation of 
foreign policy goals. From this perspective, economic interaction between Taiwan, 
China and Southeast Asia would be utilised to serve political goals. If the state can 
effectively control the pace of and developments in economic interaction, trade and 
investment can be reduced or expanded to a great extent according to the decision 
makers’ political judgment.13
12 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Reflections on Theory o f International Politics: A Response to my Critics’, in 
Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics, pp. 322-45.
13 Leng, Tse-Kang, “Dynamic ofTaiwan-Mainland China Economic Relations -  The Role of Private 
Firms”, Asian Survey. Vol. 38, No. 5, May 1998, p. 494.
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However, the Realist/Neorealist assumption cannot fully interpret the interactions 
between Taiwan, China and Southeast Asia. Because internationally oriented firms 
occupy strategic positions vis-à-vis bargaining with home and host countries, states 
have to adjust their roles regarding promoting or restraining economic transactions. 
Many Taiwanese business people have long escaped governmental restrictions and 
launched new investment projects on Mainland China and Vietnam based on their 
own calculations of economic profits. They actually have to negotiate with the 
governments of host countries rather than the Taipei government. Taiwan’s 
regulative policies have not proven to be very successful in restraining trade with and 
investment in the PRC.14
2.1.2 Liberalism/Neo-Liberalism
There are four major strands of classical Liberalism: (1) ‘commercial Liberalism’, 
which expresses the peaceful dimension of trade (theories which link free trade with 
peace); (2) ‘democratic Liberalism’, which asserts the pacific effects of republican 
government (theories linking democracy and peace at the unit level of analysis); (3) 
‘regulatory Liberalism’, which expresses the significance of rules and institutions in 
affecting relations between countries; and (4) ‘sociological Liberalism’ (theories 
asserting the transformative effect of trans-national contacts and coalitions on national 
attitudes and definitions of interests as well as international integration).
14 Leng, Tse-Kang, “Dynamic of Taiwan-Mainland China Economic Relations -  The Role o f Private 
Firms”, Asian Survey. Vol. 38, No. 5, May 1998, p. 495.
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Neoliberalism, composed of all the four categories, is generally thought to be a theory 
to challenge Realism/Neorealism in conventional international theory.15
Joseph Nye asserts that systems can have two dimensions. They are structure and 
process. In Neorealism, ‘structure’ refers to the distribution of capabilities among 
units. On the other hand, ‘process’ refers to the ways in which the units relate to 
each other. Liberalism has traditionally stressed two features of ‘systemic process’: 
‘non-power incentives’ and ‘variations in the capacity to communicate and cooperate’. 
Liberalists thus often emphasise how ‘trade and economic incentives’ may change 
states’ behaviour. Likewise, Liberalists often emphasise ‘the effects of increased 
transnational (and transgovemmental) contacts on attitudes and abilities to 
communicate’. ‘Institutions and norms have played an important role’ in Liberalism 
all the time.16
Although Nye attempts to establish a Neoliberal systemic theory, thus integrating with 
Neorealism, he appears to be not very convincing. He asserts that Neorealism would 
be very suitable a structural theory at system level while Neoliberalism could be very 
productive at the ‘process level’ of system theory. However, when we apply this 
theory to East Asia in the 1990s, it is not very fruitful. Although a systemic process 
could allow states to communicate with one another and could reach mutually
15 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Neorealism and Neoliberalism”, World Politics. Voi. 40, No. 2, January 1988, p. 
246. Also, Graham Evans & Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, 
London: Penguin Group, 1998, p. 361.
16 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Neorealism and Neoliberalism”, World Politics. Voi. 40, No. 2, January 1988, pp. 
250.
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beneficial agreements, thus changing their political outcomes17, all the communication 
channels were cut off from the two governments across Taiwan Straits in the 1990s, 
and they did not reach any significant agreements at all. Before Taiwanese business 
people went to Vietnam, conducting investment and trade, no agreements between 
Taiwan and Vietnam had been concluded. Also, much of Liberalism only focuses on 
the effect of domestic politics rather than the effect at the system level. Therefore, 
this thesis does not employ Neoliberalism at the system level. The author uses levels 
of analysis based on Neorealism at the system level in this thesis to strive to better 
analyse the economic diplomacy of Taiwan in the 1990s in order to fill this gap.
Fukuyama
The prominent economic issues after the end of the Cold War have also been gaining 
ground and have attracted academic commentary. As one scholar puts it, “Almost 
overnight, the phrase ‘end of history’ was used as a synonym for the ‘post-Cold War 
era’; and Francis Fukuyama, hitherto almost unknown amongst students of 
international relations, became an instant intellectual celebrity”. 18 By ‘end of 
history’, Fukuyama does not mean that politics, war or conflict would no longer take 
place. His argument is essentially normative. At the end of the twentieth century
“  Martin Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations. London: Routledge, 1999, p. 68.
At the same time, Lee Kuan Yew from Singapore still emphasised that Asian people were professedly 
satisfied with authoritarian government, attempting to justify his 'Asian values’. China's leaders also 
emphasised that to enable 1.2 billion people in China to survive the best way is to support human rights, 
thus refusing political reform and continuing to abuse human rights. Fukuyama without doubt states 
that many Asian societies have paid ‘lip service to Western principles of liberal democracy, accepting 
the form while modifying the content to accommodate Asian traditions’. See Fukuyama, The End of 
History and the Last Man. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992, p. 243. Cited in Martin Griffiths, Fifty 
Kev Thinkers in International Relations, p. 71.
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the fusion of liberal democracy and capitalism has proved better than any other 
political/economic system. This is because the combination is able to satisfy the 
fundamental drives of human nature, which consists of two basic desires. One is for 
material goods and wealth, the other for recognition of worth as human beings by 
those around us. Capitalism is the best economic system for maximising the 
production of goods and services and for exploiting scientific technology to create 
wealth. Nonetheless, economic growth is not everything. Only liberal democracies 
can meet the fundamental human need for recognition, political freedom and 
equality.19
Therefore, Taiwan’s démocratisation and liberalised economy conducted since the late 
1980’s made it more acceptable and praiseworthy for Western countries. Even 
before Fukuyama’s theory came out. Western countries had been prone to take 
democratic improvement and protecting human rights into account when they 
assessed bilateral relations, although démocratisation has never been the only criterion 
in decisions whether or not to establish bilateral ties with Taiwan or allow it to 
upgrade representative offices in Western countries.
Unfortunately, unlike other theories, Fukuyama’s liberal democracy has not been 
realised throughout the world. China and Vietnam have sustained their own political 
systems while at the same time pursuing capitalism. However, this enables Taiwan 
and Taiwanese business people to wield more economic power in the international
19 Martin Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations. London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 69-72.
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arena as these states have opened to business from Taiwan. Taiwanese business 
people can still invest in China and Vietnam and deal with local officialdom, 
promoting régionalisation and globalisation in East Asia.
2.1.3 Constructivism
Alexander Wendt’s constructivist myth, that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’, is 
reassuring. That is, states view the international system from several perspectives. 
This is because states meet one another by not one, but three societies of international 
‘anarchy’. The first is a ‘Hobbesian anarchy’, where states regard other states as 
‘enemies’ and where conflicts happen all the time, as in the pre-1648 age. The 
second is a ‘Lockian anarchy’, where states interpret other states as competitors, but 
obey the rules of ‘live and let live’ and respect each other’s right in order to coexist, as 
in the Westphalian system of sovereignty after 1648. The third is a ‘Kantian 
anarchy’, where states cooperate with one other and where the ‘self-help’ of a 
‘Hobbesian anarchy’ yields to an ‘other-help’ notion based on a ‘collective-identity’, 
and where war is put out of place in support of sincere cooperation -  a situation that 
supposedly characterises the world after 1945.20
The myth claims to build a bridge between Neorealists and Neoliberals. Neorealists 
indicate that ‘anarchy is the cause of war’, implying that anarchy means that 
international politics tends to be conflictual. Neoliberals believe ‘there is an
”  John M. Hobson, “Social Theory of International Politics by Alexander Wendt (Review)”, American 
Journal of Sociology. Vol. 106, No. 2, September 2000, pp. 520-521.
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international society', implying that, reconciled by international society, anarchy 
could be cooperative. Wendt asserts that anarchy is necessarily neither conflictual 
nor cooperative. Therefore, there is no permanent nature to international anarchy. 
If states behave conflictually towards one another, then it appears that the ‘nature’ of 
international anarchy is conflictual. If states behave cooperatively towards one 
another, then it seems that the ‘nature’ of international anarchy is cooperative. It is 
what states do that we must focus on to understand conflict and cooperation in 
international politics. Therefore, we should not focus on the made-up ‘nature’ of 
international anarchy. States determine the ‘nature’ of international anarchy.21
Construcivism argues what states do rely on what their identities and interests are, and 
identities and interests change. It also maintains that identities and interests in 
international politics are not constant. Therefore, they have no predetermined nature. 
This is true for the identity of the sovereign nation-state. This is also true for the 
identity of international anarchy. The important thing is to look at how identities and 
interests are constructed. We need to look at how they are made through specific 
international interactions. Therefore, Constructivism’s myth that ‘anarchy’ is what 
states make of it appears to ‘build a bridge’ between Neorealist ‘truths’ and Neoliberal 
‘truths’.22
Wendt classifies some IR theories, including Neorealism, as ‘materialist’. This 
21 Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory -  A Critical Introduction. London, Routledge, 2001,
p. 60.
“  Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory -  A Critical Introduction. London, Routledge, 2001,
p. 60.
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classification is important because he relies on it to argue that constructivist IR is 
characterised by not being ‘materialist’.23 ‘What makes a theory materialist’ is that it 
explains phenomena by power rather than by ideas. Neorealism counts as a 
‘materialist theory’ because it identifies regularities that link the international 
distribution of power to state behaviour.24 Wendt’s argument is that the international 
system should be regarded as a normative sphere (or international society). States 
are governed by a sense of ‘obligation’ but do not compete with one another. Wendt 
criticises the notions of ‘interest’ of being a ‘rationalist’ or a ‘materialist’. 
‘Materialist theory’ presupposes that interests are created before social interaction. 
Therefore, once formed, interests never change. However, Wendt argues that state 
interests are shaped by their identities.25 26
Identities are socially constructed by international cultures. International cultures 
can exist at any given time. Because international cultures are different over time, 
state identities and interests are thus different. Therefore, this has essential 
consequences for interstate behaviour and ‘structural change’ in world politics. This 
approach is a fruitful alternative to the Neorealism definitions of the ‘international’ 
that pass through historical sociology. 6
23 David Dessler, “Social Theory of International Politics By Alexander Wendt (Review)”, American 
Political Science Review. Vol. 94, No. 4, December 2000, pp. 1002-1003.
24 Alexander Wendt. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999, pp. 97-103.
21 Dale C. Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay”, 
International Security. Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall 2000, p. 187.
26 John M. Hobson. "Social Theory of International Politics by Alexander Wendt (Review)’’, American 
Journal of Sociology. Vol. 106, No. 2, September 2000, p. 521.
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Wendt asserts that Waltz’s theory is based on a de facto individualism (whether or not 
intended as such) because Waltz takes the properties of his units of analysis as 
predetermined rather than deals with how these are produced by interaction.27 
Although Wendt is fruitful in addressing international system, 1 agree that Wendt 
admits that we can disagree about the agent-structure problem while agreeing on the 
levels of analysis. That is, the two problems are, in fact, two different problems. 
We can regard ‘levels of analysis’ as questions about what drives the behaviour of 
predetermined states. Then we regard ‘agent-structure’ as questions about what 
constitutes the properties of those states in the first place.28
The period following the end of the Cold War has witnessed the resurgence of 
nationalist and separatist demands in the international political economy. Recurring 
tensions in the Taiwan Straits in the past ten years are a good example. In 
November/December 2003, Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian stirred up tensions 
with the Mainland by calling for a referendum that might take Taiwan a step closer to 
formal independence. This led to an annoyed reaction from China and a censure 
from the US. This question comes up regarding why the Taipei government appears 
to be pursuing a policy which will eventually lead to direct confrontation with the 
PRC. Meanwhile, the Taipei government may drive its ally, the US, into a position 
which may make it necessary to reconsider its assurance to defend Taiwan. In order 
to understand Taipei’s behaviour, we need to examine the dynamics of the
31 Alexander Wendt, “Levels of Analysis VS. Agents and Structures: Part 111", Review of International 
Studies. Vol. 18, No. 2, 1992, p. 183.
31 Alexander Wendt, “Levels of Analysis VS. Agents and Structures: Part IIT, Review of International 
Studies. Vol. 18, No. 2. 1992, p. 18S.
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globalisation process and its impact on the development of a Taiwanese national 
identity. According to the constructivist approach, the globalisation process has 
influenced Taiwanese identity-building. The constructivist asserts that identities and 
interests of international states are shaped through interactions and processes (such as 
the globalisation process). This enables us to link globalisation and identity. Uwe 
Wunderlich has conceptualised globalisation and its influence on national identities, 
thus providing a theoretical framework to apply to domestic developments in Taiwan 
in the post-Cold War era.29 However, Wunderlich has not mentioned how firms play 
in the interactions and processes in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy in East Asia. He 
only emphasises the issue of Taiwanese national identity, not at all the roles of firms.
2.1.4 Business
Research on economic statecraft indicates that coercive tactics such as sanctions do 
not work well after new actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
multinational corporations (MNCs) have emerged.30 A home country government 
cannot easily influence multinational corporations that acquire their capital, 
technology, and sales through the international market. As overseas connections 
become more important to these businesses, it is host country laws rather than home 
country policies that do influence the everyday operations of MNCs. As a result of 
market internationalisation, there will be much stronger competition among states for
29 Uwe Wunderlich, “Globalisation and Identity Building: A Constructivist Approach to 
Sino-Taiwanese Relations” , Paper Presented in the European Association of Taiwan Studies Conference, 
SOAS, 18 April 2004.
30 Kenneth Rodman, "Public and Private Sanctions Against South Africa”, Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 109, No. 2, 1994, pp. 313-34. Also see Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Elliot, 
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Economics, 1990.
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world market share. This competition will compel states to bargain with MNCs to 
establish operations within the territory of the state and with national firms not to go 
abroad.31
Susan Strange maintains that in this day and age, leaders of states are maybe the last 
to recognise that they no longer have the authority over national societies and 
economies which they used to have. The heads of the Soviet Union and the states of 
central Europe stepped down because of their disillusion. However, the disillusion is 
not limited to socialist systems. In almost all capitalist countries, popular 
disappointment with the national leaders is growing, including the US, Great Britain, 
Italy and France. Like Japan and South Korea, Taiwan is a state with a strong 
government that has successfully used the necessary means to circumscribe and 
control foreign trade and foreign investment, and to allocate credit and guide 
corporate development in the private sector. Nonetheless, in the Cold War, Taiwan 
benefited from the US economic and military aid. Together with its extremely high 
domestic savings and low consumption, Taiwan made profit successfully. In 
addition, Taiwan was free from the pressure of abiding by the norm of free trade and 
was also given access to US markets, and later to European ones. Last but not least, 
Taiwan could also somehow obtain necessary technology at that time. However, the 
Cold War is over, and under the pressure of the US and other Western countries, 
Taiwan can no longer be exempted from introducing a more liberal
31 Susan Strange, “States, Firms, and Diplomacy”, International Affairs. Vol. 68, No. 1,1992, pp. 
10- 12.
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non-discriminatory trading regime (although Strange disputes this term).32 To sum 
up, the exceptionalism of the Asian countries, including Taiwan, has been 
significantly worn away and will continue to be. In almost all the Asian countries, as 
in other areas, there will be contention for control over the institutions and agencies of 
government. There will be contention among factions of political parties, and 
between vested interests in the public and the private sectors. There will be power 
struggles among divisions of the state bureaucracy. It is inevitable that both the 
unity and the authority of government will suffer.33 The government can no longer 
command but has to suffer, negotiate and compromise. I admit Susan Strange is 
successful by stating the above, but she fails to point out that Taiwanese business 
people also play essential roles in promoting régionalisation and globalisation of East 
Asia, including Taiwan, China and Southeast Asia.
2.1.5 Theory on East Asia/Developmental State Theory/Neo-Statism
The term ‘developmental state’ was coined by Chalmers Johnson.34 His purpose was 
to distinguish between the state typical of the region of Asian capitalism and that 
common in the realms of Anglo-American capitalism.35 The importance of strong 
state control over economic affairs is emphasised in East Asia, including Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan.36 Chalmers Johnson argues there were still many ‘socialist’ essentials
32 Susan Strange, “Cave! hie dragones: a critique o f regime analysis” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed.. 
International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, 337-54.
”  Susan Strange. The Retreat of the State -  The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge, 
1998, p. 7.
34 Chalmers Johnson. M1T1 and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy. 1925-1975. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982.
33 Linda Weiss & John M. Hobson, States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical 
Analysis. Oxford: Polity Press, 1995, p. 149.
34 This article later argues that there are differences between Taiwan and Japan.
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within the industrial strategy of these Capitalist Developmental States (CDS). Late 
1980 economic theory could not deal with Japanese-style economies. Leading 
thinkers ignored the success and achievements of these systems by regarding them as 
exceptions in order to fit their theories. Chalmers Johnson argues that the success of 
the Japanese economy is neither random nor a function of culture. However, it is 
due to policy, particularly to Japanese industrial policy.37 In his book, Johnson 
rejects neoclassical economic theory and convergence theories of political and 
economic development. According to Johnson, the Japanese economy was guided 
by the state in guidelines that the state wanted it to go. Japan has a political 
economy different from that of the Anglo-American countries. It is Japan’s ‘elite 
state bureaucracy’ that governs the country. Johnson argues that although Japan is 
not under the democratic guidance prevalent in the West, the Japanese state is still 
able to wield grand strategy.38
Johnson might have been true in the earlier post-war era for Japan. However, this 
perspective is not consistent with the present situation of Taiwan. This thesis argues 
that while the Taipei government used to play a key role in economic policy planning, 
its influence has been on the wane; and that particularly where economic diplomacy is 
concerned, it plays a more auxiliary role. Taiwanese business people play a major 
role in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy.
37 Chalmers Johnson, "The Japanese Political Economy: A Crisis in Theory”, Ethics and International 
Affairs, Voi. 2, pp.79-98.
31 Chalmers Johnson, Japan, Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State, London: Norton & 
Company, 1995.
36
Robert Wade’s book on Taiwan builds on former work by Chalmers. In terms of the 
accomplishment of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, Robert Wade argues that it is 
neither free market principles nor government intervention that achieves the success. 
He asserts that the combination between markets and administration works. Wade 
has made a good case for his view that while market forces have done a great deal in 
the economic development of Taiwan, the Taipei government has also played a key 
part.
Rejecting the neoclassical account, he highlights the contribution of the governed 
market approach. Wade spends a whole chapter in detailing the areas where 
Taiwan’s economic strategy matches the neoclassical account.40 However, he 
expatiates on state intervention in Taiwan from chapter 4 to chapter 6. He outlines 
the all-encompassing role of state-owned enterprises and the use of the financial and 
fiscal system to employ resources. He also describes the trade regime and the 
neoclassical account of export-led growth. Although exporters benefited from a free 
trade regime for inputs, the domestic market for final products was protected in many 
ways up to the 1980s. In addition, exporters were given support that went beyond a 
favourable exchange. Wade also emphasises the political foundations of Taiwan’s 
economic development. According to Wade, Taiwan is different from Japan because 
of the weakly developed political linkages between the state and the private sector. 
He states that Taiwan has an interesting model that stresses the ‘governance’ of the
39 Wade, Robert, Governing the Market -  Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian. 
Industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Wade. Robert. Governing the Market -  Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
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market.
This thesis doubts Wade’s emphasis on the role of government because when several 
state-owned enterprises and party-owned enterprises did ‘Go South’, as had been 
urged by the Taiwanese government, they suffered a serious setback. Many polices 
of the Taipei government proved to be awkward. When the government intervened, 
very often Taiwanese business people became confused. In the end, Taiwanese 
business people as a whole are usually more clear-sighted than the government. The 
bottom-up forces by the collective businesses demonstrate themselves to be fruitful, 
promoting régionalisation and globalisation in East Asia. Wade is also wrong when 
he chooses to characterise the political system as ‘corporatist’.41 He is again wrong 
when he asserts the decision-making is cohesive because it is actually inconsistent and 
contradictory.
This thesis, while arguing for the importance of the role of Taiwanese business people, 
is not unaware of that fact that the government and institutions still matter. The 
author tries to apply Wade’s theory to Taiwan’s economic diplomacy in the 1990s, 
with efforts made to fill the gap left by Wade. Taiwanese business people can make 
great contributions to cross-border politico-economic activities. In terms of this, 
Taiwanese business people’s impact on East Asia has been far greater than that of a 
mere developmental state. On the other hand, the government’s role is still
41 Stephan Haggard, Book Review: Governing the Market -  Economic Theory and the Role of 
Government in East Asian Industrialization by Robert Wade. Comparative Politics. Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 
280-281. Wade is right when he specifies the significance of Taiwanese authoritarian political 
structures.
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necessary to help them to cultivate Taiwan’s foreign relations with its neighbours in 
East Asia by concluding international agreements with the latter.
Linda Weiss strongly challenges the view that global economic interdependence is 
eating away the modem state. Weiss refutes the argument that in the face of 
globalisation, the national governments have become less relevant. She emphasises 
the state-informed and state-embedded institutions for governing the economy. The 
impact of external economic pressures is to a large extent domestically determined.42 
She argues that states that are able to deepen economic interdependence can also build 
sophisticated and flexible relations with domestic groups. Moreover, responding to 
globalisation will probably make states become more efficient and capable, 
strengthening their ability to direct domestic economic policy. According to the 
current orthodoxy, states are merely victims of changes that cross their borders and 
are beyond their control. However, Weiss asserts that although modem globalisation 
is the most significant force in the world, the state is as much midwife or perpetrator 
as victim.43
Linda Weiss and John M. Hobson argue that neoclassical orthodoxy is wrong. They 
assert that states in East Asia have played a major part in building industrial prowess 
and export competitiveness. The NIC states of Korea and Taiwan deepened their 
infrastructural power. Therefore, they can shift resources from agriculture to
42 Nan» Pnlfu. The Myth of the Powless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era by Linda Weiss 
(Review)”, pacific Review. Vol. 11, No. 4, 1998, pp. 584-585.
43 GJ. Ikenberry, “The Myth of the Powerless State:Ooverning the Economy in a Global Era by Linda 
Weiss (Review)”, Foreign Affairs. Vol. 78, No. 2, March-April 1999, pp. 140-141.
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industry; and from domestic to export production. Therefore, the combination of 
market-orientation and active state involvement is crucial to the narrative of their 
success.44
According to Weiss and Hobson, in Taiwan, liberalisation was a highly managed affair. 
Import controls were not removed, but constantly reshaped and redirected. Thus 
Taiwan maintained a protective system. However, this system became able to 
promote import substitution for export production. In general, the ways of the 
economies in East Asia handling their trade are different from those of many 
developing countries.45
In both Taiwan and Korea, government intervention has been crucial to the operation 
of labour markets. Such intervention is categorised into many forms, from 
repression of organised labour to legal restraints on trade union activity. 
Governments in Korea, Singapore and Taiwan tried to prevent the organised 
mobilisation of labour. This is not because they are afraid of a sudden wage increase. 
However, they are afraid of national security caused by a domestic uprising in the 
Cold War era.46 The free trade regime was politically constructed up to the 1980s. 
Therefore, they assert that an export-oriented economy is not a surrogate for
44 Linda Weiss & John M. Hobson, States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical 
Analysis. Oxford: Polity Press, 1995, p. 12.
45 Linda Weiss & John M. Hobson, States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical 
Analysis. Oxford: Polity Press, 1995, p.145. Also see Wade, Robert, Governing the Market -  
Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990, p. 125.
46 Linda Weiss & John M. Hobson, States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical 
Analysis. Oxford: Polity Press, 1995, p. 147.
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non-involvement on the part of government. According to Weiss and Hobson, an 
export-orientation is something that requires careful coordination.47 Weiss and 
Hobson’s argument is rather parallel to Wade’s. However, this thesis asserts that if 
coordination is necessary, the government needs to be coordinated rather than to 
coordinate Taiwanese business people.
2.1.6 Theoretical Conclusion
Realism/Neorealism has been dominant in international relations, especially in East 
Asia. The central approach I choose is ‘levels of analysis’ based on Neorealism, 
because it serves best the interlinking function between international system and states. 
In so doing, Hollis and Smith dig deeper and improve Neorealism, by modifying the 
level of international system to incorporate both the level of state and the level of 
individual. In the Neorealist systemic explanation, the behaviour of the units is 
based on rationality and shaped by the structure of the system. The system theory by 
Waltz can thus explain why different units behave in the same way. Waltz’s systemic 
explanations can serve as the theoretical framework because Neorealism (Waltz’s 
theory) offers a means to amalgamate different levels of analysis. Thus, ‘levels of 
analysis’ has been the best approach so far. After I enrich ‘levels of analysis’ by 
emphasising the roles of Taiwanese business people in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy, 
this thesis thus makes significant contributions to international relations as a 
discipline beyond the account of Hollis and Smith.
47 Linda Weiss & John M. Hobson, States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical 
Analysis. Oxford: Polity Press, 1995, p. 147-153.
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Liberalism/Neoliberalism is rather impotent in addressing system level issues. Most 
of its account is still focused on Subnational level. Therefore, it is very difficult for 
Liberalism/Neolibaralism to link system level and state level. Fukuyama is now 
notorious because China and Vietnam still sustain their communist systems, and they 
seem to prosper increasingly. Therefore, ‘the end of history’ has not yet happened.
When it comes to constructivists, Wendt also admits that we can disagree about the 
agent-structure problem while agreeing on the levels of analysis. I have the same 
opinion when Wendt says so. That is, the two problems are, in fact, two separate 
problems. Therefore, ‘levels of analysis’ do not have to take the agent-structure 
problem into account.
As far as neo-Gramscianism is concerned, the theory of Robert Cox and Stephen Gill 
can only construe the impact of capitalism and culture on international social forces. 
This is because when Taiwan faced the pressure of the USA and appreciated the New 
Taiwanese Dollar, Taiwanese business people were forced to establish themselves in 
China and Southeast Asia. However, the various contributions of Taiwanese 
business people in East Asia still need expatiating by ‘levels of analysis’. People 
like Susan Strange point out that leaders of states can no longer have the authority 
over national societies and economies that they used to. They have to share the 
‘power’ with business people who rise to negotiate in the diplomatic arena. Susan 
Strange’s non-state actor/business theory can explain the triangular diplomatic system.
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but it fails to look at the nitty-gritty of how Taiwanese business people perform in 
East Asia.
Developmental state theorists are definitely out of phase in the 1990s. All the 
characteristics of the state described by Wade are far from the facts because he fails to 
find out the structural conflict of the Taipei government. Double-track 
decision-making can only lead to inefficiency and confusion rather than ‘governing 
the market'.
All the mainstream international relations theorists, including Realists, liberals, 
constructivists, Gramscians, non-state-actor/business and developmental state 
theorists, can merely interpret partially the quintessence of Taiwan’s economic 
diplomacy in the 1990s. Therefore, ‘levels of analysis’ proposed by Hollis and 
Smith are used to illustrate the panorama. Only this neutral heuristic tool can 
roughly analyse the roles of Taiwanese business people and the role of the Taipei 
government in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, ‘levels of analysis’ adopted by this 
thesis has been the most effective approach so far. However, in this thesis, 1 
expatiate on the roles of Taiwanese business people, beyond the approach proposed by 
Hollis and Smith. Taiwanese business people’s contributions are thus emphasised. 
They serve as pioneers, intermediaries and proxies in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. 
Furthermore, they are promoters of régionalisation and globalisation in East Asia.
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2.2 Review of Empirical Studies on Taiwan
2.2.1 Traditional and Realist Accounts of Taiwan’s Foreign Policy
There have been many works on the diplomacy of the Republic of China (ROC) since 
Taiwan emerged as one of the newly industrialised countries (NICs). Most of them 
concentrate on political negotiations between states or governments.48 This is not 
wrong in terms of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, which defines 
diplomacy as ‘the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations for the 
attainment of mutually satisfactory terms’. Since the 1980s, the pragmatic 
diplomacy of the ROC has drawn the attention of many scholars.49 The issue of 
Taiwan’s return to international organizations is also widely noted.50 The theoretical 
foundation for ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ can be found in many places, the fundamental 
basis being as follows: (1) an international act performed by a political entity, (2) as 
equivalent to the exercise of a nation’s sovereign rights, (3) as having its origins in the 
ROC Constitution, and (4) as a proper and logical means of expressing a nation’s 
struggle for its ‘international right of survival’.51
** Bernard T.K. Joei, “Pragmatic Diplomacy in the Republic of China: History and Prospects” in Jason 
C. Hu, ed„ Quiet Revolutions on Taiwan. Republic o f China. Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 
1994, pp. 297-330.
49 Bernard T.K. Joei, "Pragmatic Diplomacy in the Republic of China: History and Prospects” in Jason 
C. Hu, ed.. Quiet Revolutions on Taiwan. Republic o f China. Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 
1994, pp. 297-330. See also, Chiao Chiao Hsieh, “Pragmatic Diplomacy: Foreign Policy and External 
Relations” in Peter Ferdinand, ed., Take-off for Taiwan. London: Pinter for Loyal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1996, pp. 66-106. See also, Linjun Wu, "Limitations and Prospects o f Taiwan's 
Informal Diplomacy” & Kay Moller, “Does Flexible Diplomacy Improve Taiwan's International 
Status?”, in Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ed.. The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order. 
London: Kluwer Law International Ltd, 1996, pp. 35- 62. See also Michael Yahuda, “The 
International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan” in David Shambaugh, ed., Contemporary 
Taiwan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 275-295.
*  Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ed.. Ibid. pp. 63-189.
51 Bernard T.K. Joei, op. cit.
Gao Lang separates Taiwanese diplomatic history into two periods.52 He selects six 
indicators to assess the diplomatic relations of the ROC from 1950 to 1972: (1) the 
changes of countries with official relations and (2) treaty relations, (3) changes of 
embassies, (4) the exchange of visits between high-level officials, (5) the situation 
with the United Nations’ ballot, and (6) the expansion of economic and trading 
relations. Gao further suggests another selection of five indicators to evaluate the 
diplomatic activities of the ROC from 1972 to 1992: (1) the changes of countries with 
official relations, (2) the changes of units stationed abroad (3) the changes in treaty 
relations, (4) the exchange of visits between high-level officials, and (5) the situation 
of participating international organisations. He concludes that the quandary of 
Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy is that the expectation of the masses exceeds its 
achievements. In addition, Gao also believes that until the PRC changes its attitude, 
the struggle across the Taiwan Straits will not cease, and the diplomatic predicament 
of Taiwan cannot find an easy solution.
An-chia Wu asserts that in the post-Cold War era, while evaluating the international 
political environment, Peking’s leaders are still swayed by Deng Xiaoping’s 
remarks.53 *5 In the aftermath of the dramatic changes in the former Soviet Union and 
in Eastern Europe, Chinese leaders changed their views towards the international
52 Gao, Lang, The Evolution of Foreign Relations o f the ROC 1950-1972. Taipei: Wunan, 1993. (KM.
1950-1972. f t  jb :3 iW . 1993) See also Gao, Lang, The Evolution of Foreign
Relations o f the ROC 1972-1992. Taipei: Wunan, 1993. (K M .4 » M R « » l - 3 g W « ^ K g  1972-1992, 
ftdb  : £ * ,  1993)
55 An-chia Wu, “Peking's Taiwan Policy in the Post-Cold War Era”, Issues & Studies. July 1994, pp. 
1-15.
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environment. Thus they also re-evaluated their policy on Taiwan, readjusting the 
organisations and personnel in charge of the policy, insisting on the ‘one country, two 
systems’ formula, promoting cross-Straits economic exchange and trade development, 
blocking Taiwan’s international activities, and continuing the strategy of combining 
the advocacy of ‘peaceful unification’ without renouncing use of force. In general, 
according to Wu, Peking’s strategy is thus both hard and soft. The hard tactics 
continue to threaten the use of force, although this is very unlikely. In Wu’s analyses, 
the use of force would not only damage the international ambience of peace and 
development, but also min China’s ‘four modernisations’ (in industry, agriculture, 
defence, and science and technology). The soft tactics oblige China to continue to 
promote peaceful unification while the blockade policy continues. In contrast, Lee 
Teng-hui, Taiwan’s former president, formally renounced the use of force to solve the 
issue of unification, hoping for a reciprocal declaration from China. According to 
Wu, China will never abandon the use of force. However, Wu believes that the 
resolution of this issue will drag on until both sides find the ripe time and right 
conditions for holding negotiations on the termination of hostility or the conclusion of 
a peace agreement, although Wu has mentioned that Peking will continue to promote 
cross-Straits economic and trade exchanges to lessen the gap between the two sides. 
Since the exchanges are largely a tool to achieve unification, all the policy decisions 
and arrangements for the exchanges will be made accordingly. However, further 
analysis of economic changes has not been developed in this article.
Taiwan’s diplomacy has always been conditioned by the military coercion and
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peaceful offensive of the PRC. Nationalism is a crucial element of the PRC’s 
Taiwan policy. Suisheng Zhao maintains that the rise of nationalism does not 
necessarily make China become irrational against Taiwan or threaten international 
society.34 Instead, China’s policy of national reunification is flexible, and 
nationalism has not prevented the PRC from adopting a peaceful offensive as the key 
approach towards Taiwan. Zhao asserts that in addition to sustained dialogue, if 
Taiwan does not declare independence, China will permit it to be a country in 
everything but name, symbols, and formal diplomatic practice. Chinese nationalism 
is assertive in defending territorial integrity and national unity. Unless China’s 
national interests or territorial integrity is in danger, its nationalism does not become 
more intense nor its international behaviour particularly aggressive. Thus he 
concludes that David Shambaugh is right to characterize Chinese nationalism as 
‘defensive nationalism’, which is ‘assertive in form, but reactive in essence’.
Leaders in Taiwan have been credited with making important contributions to 
Taiwan’s foreign policy, although this discussion has not been much developed.35 
After Taiwan’s democratic transition, the KMT still remained in power. Chao and 
Myers find that Taiwan’s leaders have developed a creative leadership style of a 
distinct type. The book Democracy's New Leaders in the Republic o f China on 
Taiwan analyses former president Lee Teng-hui and premier Lien Chan have been 
analysed in terms of their leaderships. In 1993, Lee and Lien initiated the foreign
54 Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Beijing’s Taiwan Policy: A China Threat?” Issues & 
Studies. January/February 2000, pp. 76-99.
”  Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, Democracy’s New Leaders in the Republic of China on Taiwan. 
Stanford, California, 1997.
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policy of pragmatism (wushi waijiao Lien tried to improve economic
relations and foster other exchanges with the Mainland while resolving disputes 
between the two Chinese societies. This was quite successful. In addition, Lien 
also tried to upgrade Taiwan’s relations with other countries and enable it to enter 
other organisations, like the United Nations. Lee and Lien even accepted the 
possibility of double recognition. Lee’s speech at Cornell University in 1995 
exasperated the PRC, since Lee rarely mentioned reunification with China while 
emphasising Taiwan’s democracy and the people’s wishes for parity in the 
international arena. Lien’s visit to Europe that same month further incensed China. 
Then in 1996, the new foreign minister, John Chang, expressed the view that Taiwan 
does not mean to provoke Beijing with its diplomatic initiatives and that entering the 
United Nations is its long-term goal but not its priority. Lien tried to resume delayed 
negotiations between China and Taiwan. By late 1996, Beijing still had not replied 
to Taiwan’s leaders. In terms of Taiwan’s foreign relations, Chao and Myers focus 
only on the level of individual statesmen/politicians. There are no other levels of 
analysis.
2.2.2 Non-Official Diplomacy/Informal Diplomacy
After Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law in Taiwan in 1987 and allowed Taiwan’s 
people to visit Mainland China, the tension between Taiwan and China began to relax. 
Before Taiwan’s president, Lee Teng-hui, visited his alma mater, Cornell University, 
in the summer of 1995, when the PRC launched the 1995-1996 crisis, relations across 
the Taiwan Straits had improved significantly. There are several academic studies of
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this trend.56
Françoise Mengin, in an article on Taiwan’s non-official diplomacy, states that the 
Sino-American normalisation has both led to Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation and turned 
the status of Taiwan from an international issue into one of Chinese internal affairs.57 
Since then, only economic, cultural and scientific ties -  not political links -  are 
allowed between Taiwan and the countries that recognised the PRC. Countries like 
Japan and the US transferred their relations with Taiwan from an official to a 
nonofficial realm. Because of Taiwan’s accumulated wealth, European countries are 
willing to set up non-official ties with Taiwan. This is on a basis quite similar to 
those ruling US-Taiwan or Japan-Taiwan relations: they aimed at keeping the facilities 
of diplomatic and consular relations under the guise of private arrangements. In 
several ways, Taiwan has been successful in extending political relations to economic 
ties. There has been a substantial rise in high-ranking contacts, including legislators 
and government authorities. The foreign civil servants who visited Taiwan might 
still be in office, but they came -  ostensibly -  in a private capacity. From January 
1991 to June 1993, over 20 European cabinet members paid a visit to Taiwan. 
Mengin generalised that Taipei uses a bargaining strategy to obtain political 
advantages through the allocation of important contracts. In other words, because
34 David Shambaugh, ed„ Greater China: The Next Superpower? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995; Tse-Kang Leng, The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development Across the 
Taiwan Strait. Boulder, Colo., 1996; Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait: 
People-to-People Diplomacy. Boulder, Colo., 1993; Jane Khanna, ed„ Southern China. Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan: Evolution of a Subregional Economy. Washington, D.C., 1995.
57 Françoise Mengin, “Taiwan’s Non-Official Diplomacy’’, Diplomacy and Statecraft. Vol. 8, No. 1, 
March 1997, pp. 227-248.
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the bargain exists, some members of the government will come into the picture, 
extending the political effects of economic ties. However, Taiwan’s dream of dual 
recognition cannot be realised. Even consular relations with Latvia were severed in 
1994 under pressure from the PRC. Mengin concludes that Taiwan’s status remains 
that of a non-state. It is excluded from the interstate community. However, she 
states that presently, Taiwan is an entity that has authority to belong to this community. 
It is a pity that in her work, Mengin completely ignores the roles of Taiwanese 
business people in the non-official diplomacy.
2.2.3 The Existing Studies of Taiwan’s Economic Diplomacy
Not many studies of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy exist in English, although 
cross-Straits political ties and Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy have been well 
documented. There is relatively little work in the English literature on Taiwan’s 
recent foreign trade, foreign investment, and foreign aid. Only a handful of English 
language articles have addressed Taiwan’s economic diplomacy in the 1990s. Chiao 
Chiao Hsieh, a pioneer on Taiwan’s strategy of foreign aid, ‘economics- and 
trade-first diplomacy’, in her book Strategy for Survival, analyses foreign policy and 
external relations of the Republic of China on Taiwan from 1949 to 1979. Her 
perspectives also include Taiwan’s state ideology, strategy of military counterattack 
and strategy of political counterattack.58 She also expatiates on Taiwan’s foreign 
policy and external relations from the perspective of ‘pragmatic diplomacy’.39 This
51 Chiao Chiao Hsieh, Strategy for Survival. London: The Sherwood Press Ltd, 1985.
39 Chiao Chiao Hsieh, “Pragmatic Diplomacy: Foreign Policy and External Relations” in Peter 
Ferdinand, ed„ Take-off for Taiwan. London: Pinter for Loyal Institute of International Affairs, 1996, 
pp. 66-106.
50
expounds Taiwan’s international relations in the shadow of the PRC and the USA. 
Peter Ferdinand comments on Taiwan’s foreign trade and investment abroad while 
analysing the Taiwanese economy. His work also contains some limited material on 
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy.60
Linjun Wu was the first author who evaluated Taiwan’s economic diplomacy in the 
1990s.61 Her two articles examine not only factors that affect Taiwan’s efforts but 
also how Taiwan employs economic-related techniques to achieve international space. 
She also contends that the ROC’s government has been facing different challenges 
since President Lee’s visit to Cornell University in 1995. According to Wu, 
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy is both provocative to China and constructive to 
cross-Straits relations. This is a good start to assessing Taiwan’s economic 
diplomacy in the 1990s, but she ignores the roles of business people and foreign aid, 
which are also important to Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. She has not evaluated 
widely the effectiveness of economic diplomacy because of insufficient data 
collection.
Tse-Kang Leng fills the gap left by Wu to a certain degree.62 He argues that the 
business community has adopted various strategies to bargain with states (including
40 Peter Ferdinand, "The Taiwan's Economy", in Peter Ferdinand, ed„ Take-off for Taiwan. London: 
Pinter for Loyal Institute of International Affairs, 1996, pp. 37-65.
61 Linjun Wu, “Does Money Talk? The ROC’s Economic Diplomacy”, Issues & Studies. December 
1995, pp. 22-35. Also The ROC’s Economic Diplomacy After the March Crisis: Can Money Talk 
Again?” Issues & Studies. December 1996, pp. 51-66.
62 Tse-Kang Leng, “States, Business, and Economic Interaction Across the Taiwan Strait”, Issues & 
Studies. November 1995, pp. 40-58. Also, “Dynamic of Taiwan-Mainland China Economic 
Relations -  The Role of Private Firms”, Asian Survey. Vol. XXXVm, No.. 5, May 1998, pp. 494-509.
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the ROC and the PRC); and the Realist perspective on economic statecraft cannot 
fully explain the current political economy across the Taiwan StraitSr—^ The Realist 
school argues that the sole meaningful players are states, excluding any other 
non-state actors. In the anarchic international society, the states pursue relative gains 
in wealth and power. Accordingly, foreign trade and investment policies can be used 
as tools to obtain national interests. The role of Taiwanese firms has been 
interpreted to some extent to fill the gap of Realists. The author demonstrates that it 
would benefit ‘state and market’ as a whole if Taiwan’s government boosted the 
internationalisation of Taiwan and its firms, because this would simultaneously 
enhance economic efficiency and national security. In another article published 
later,63 he again questions whether Taiwan’s dependence on the Mainland is 
asymmetric or mutually beneficial. If China’s government intends to impose 
economic sanctions on Taiwan, the costs and benefits should be calculated in advance, 
since they might hurt other international partners and Taiwan itself. Because of 
economic globalisation, internationally oriented firms have increasingly possessed 
bargaining chips while they negotiate with both host and home countries. The 
Mainland China market serves as a major attraction for businesses across the world. 
The Taiwanese business community thus presses the government to further open up 
economic interactions with the profitable Mainland China market. Leng also places 
cross-Straits economic relations on the wider spectrum of the international division of 
labour and cross-national cooperation. Then he concludes that the best policy for
63 Tse-Kang Leng, “Apolitical Analysis of Taiwan’s Economic Dependence on Mainland China”, 
Issues & Studies. August 1998, pp. 132-154.
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Taiwan’s government is to improve its infrastructure and introduce more international 
factors into its future development rather than to constrain and guide business people. 
However, none of this has assessed Taiwan’s economic diplomacy towards foreign 
countries, whether ASEAN or the countries beyond Asia.
Nancy Yuh-Jiun Lin examines the trade relations across the Taiwan Straits,64 arguing 
that cross-Straits economic relations do not depend on just the two sides but also on 
international political and international economic environments. She also indicates 
that high intra-industry trade (IIT) levels are correlated with low tariff rates and 
similar market sizes (the tariff protection effect). Although there are substantial 
market and institutional differences between Mainland China and Taiwan’s other 
trading partners, Taiwan’s IIT with the Mainland has not deviated from the general 
pattern. If there is a great difference in terms of the relative sizes of Taiwan’s market 
and those of its trading partners, and there is a high degree of tariff protection, as with 
the Mainland, Taiwan has a low degree of external IIT. She also examines the 
development of cross-Straits trade relations since 1978. It was not until the 
mid-1980s that Taiwan took a more active role in trade across the Straits, because the 
internal and external economic conditions both changed. Before this, China largely 
initiated the relations. Lin urges Taiwanese business people to cooperate with those 
from other countries who invest in Mainland China, thus obtaining the protection of 
the agreement between those countries and China. This argument sounds like that of
64 Nancy Yuh-Jiun Lin, “Does Taiwan's Intra-Industry trade with Mainland China Deviate from the 
General Pattern?" Issues A Studies. March 1997, pp. 86-97. Also Nancy Yuh-Jiun Lin, “A Review of 
Cross-Strait Trade Development”, Issues & Studies. April 1996, pp. 46-59.
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Leng, who maintains that Taiwanese business people would increasingly invest in the 
Mainland without worrying about their security because of internationalisation and 
globalisation. In view of this, it is gradually becoming more difficult for China to 
discriminate against Taiwanese business people, since the boundaries between 
Chinese, Taiwanese and other countries are becoming blurred.65
Xiangming Chen, using a systematic comparative approach, wrote an article on 
Taiwanese firms in China and Southeast Asia to examine the features and 
determinants of Taiwanese companies in China and Southeast Asian countries, setting 
up an extensive empirical basis and an integrated explanatory framework to guide 
further comparative research. Initially, a general statistical comparison of Taiwanese 
investment trends in the Mainland and Southeast Asia is displayed. Afterwards, the 
prominent characteristics of Taiwanese firms in both of the two areas are shown at the 
levels of region, industry and firm. Furthermore, the author examines how and why 
Taiwanese firms ‘go both West and South’, thus producing cross-border economic 
relations between China and Southeast Asia. He also evaluates varying opinions on 
the possibility of success of Taiwanese firms ‘going both West and South’. In the 
following section, levels of analysis are developed and major determinants of 
Taiwanese investments in China and/or Southeast Asia are discussed. The arguments 
also include economic comparative advantage and complementary advantage, the 
internationalisation of state-business ties, the historic legacy, cultural and ethnic 
relations, sub-regional integration, and locational advantages that shape Taiwanese
65 L eng, op . cit.
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investments at the same time from the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s.66 
However, within the confines of this article, Taiwan’s Southward policy is not fully 
analysed. Although the role of firms is introduced to a certain extent in this article, 
updated developments still need to be assessed. The author does not evaluate the 
consequences of Taiwanese investments on the Mainland and in Southeast Asia, either 
for the states concerned or for the regional and global economies.
In 1995, Kuo-hsiung Lee wrote an article on Taiwan’s Southward Policy,67 arguing 
that Taiwan adopted a policy of ‘orthodox diplomacy’ before 13 January 1988 when 
President Lee Teng-hui came to power. However, to break through the diplomatic 
isolation imposed by the PRC, Taiwan re-orientated its foreign policy and adopted the 
principle of ‘flexible pragmatism’ in 1988. According to Professor Lee, this has also 
been termed ‘substantive diplomacy’ and has proven effective in achieving ROC 
diplomatic goals because Taiwan has abandoned ideological barriers and has become 
a major capital exporter. In September 1993, Pin-kung Chiang,68 the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, proclaimed that Taiwan intended to promote its relationship with 
countries of Southeast Asia and encourage investment in this area, an initiative known 
as the ‘Look South Policy’ or ‘Southward Policy’. This was the first time in about 
four decades that Taiwan had formulated a Southeast Asian Policy. Lee also 
describes the relationships between Taiwan and Southeast Asia in retrospect by
“  Xiangming Chen, ‘Taiwan Investments in China and Southeast Asia”, Asian Survey. Vol. XXXVI, 
No.. 5, May 1996.
67 Kuo-hsiung Lee, “The Republic of China’s ‘Flexible Diplomacy' and Its ‘Look South' Policy”, in 
David Tawei Lee and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., ed„ Taiwan in a Transformed World. London: Brassey's, 
1995.
“  T h e  nam e was spelled  w rongly  as “B in-Jun  C h iang” in the o rig ina l publication.
dividing the history into three periods: the period of close relationship: 1949-1975; the 
period of growing economic ties: 1975-1987; the period of Taipei’s ‘Pragmatic 
Diplomacy’, from 1987 onwards. Under the principle of ‘flexible pragmatism’, 
Taiwan’s ‘economic statecraft’ has been perceived as the crucial element of its 
pragmatic diplomacy. Since 1987 Taiwan has allowed citizens to transfer overseas a 
maximum of $3 million per person every year. At the same time, Taiwan has 
accumulated foreign reserves up to US$80 billion in the 1990s. EIU has estimated 
Taiwan’s reserves to be US$179.8 billion in 2003. The Economist gives a figure of 
US$227.7 billion in 2004. In consequence, Taiwan has become Asia’s second 
largest foreign investor by opening the flow of foreign exchange. The Economist 
said, ‘The island has become too rich to remain insular’.69 70 In 1988, Taiwan 
investments in ASEAN countries topped $2.1 billion, and trade with these countries 
reached $7 billion, thus resulting in closer relations between Taiwan and ASEAN. 
The statistics supplied by the ASEAN countries indicate that Taiwan invested $8.57 
billion in these nations between 1986 and 1990. Taiwan has also revealed that from 
1986 to 1994, it invested over $16 billion in Southeast Asia. By 1992, Taiwan had 
become the third most powerful economy in Asia, after Hong Kong and Japan. 
Taiwan’s substantive diplomacy has reaped its reward, and the ASEAN countries have 
granted Taiwan’s personnel diplomatic privileges and immunities. In 1994 when 
Premier Lien Chan and President Lee Teng-hui paid a visit to five of the six ASEAN 
member states, the ASEAN countries risked potentially adverse retaliation from the
69 The Economist, 15-21 May 2004, p. 114.
70 httD://economisl.coni/displavstorv.cfm?storv id=!86680 20 August 2003
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PRC, which had categorically warned against the extension of hospitality to ROC 
officials regarding all the countries involved in hosting the visits. Lee concluded 
that after the US defeat in Vietnam, the Southeast Asian countries severed official 
relations with Taiwan, but substantive relations still continued to grow. From 1987 
onwards, both the increasing amount of intra-regional trade and the outflow of 
Taiwan’s capital into Southeast Asia have greatly improved the relationships into 
some form of quasi-diplomatic relations. However, Lee has neither analysed how 
Taiwanese business people have contributed to the Southward Policy nor assessed 
how the ROC government has helped them to invest in Southeast Asia.
Ralph Clough, in an article in 1995 on cross-Straits economic relations,71 explains 
that during the 1970s and early 1980s, the policy of ‘three noes’72 by Taiwan was not 
completely effective in terms of cross-Straits relations. The lifting of the ban in 
1987, entirely approved by the people of Taiwan and welcomed by the people and 
government in the PRC, thoroughly changed the cross-Straits ties by opening the door 
to a flood of visitors from Taiwan to the Mainland. Moreover, there was a smaller, 
but increasing, number of visitors from the Mainland to Taiwan. These visitors have 
contributed to a constantly broadening network of economic interdependence between 
both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Gradually the risk of armed conflict has greatly 
dwindled. In 1992, Kao Chang, an economist, calculated that the Mainland received 
almost 14 percent of Taiwan’s exports, making China the ROC’s second-largest
71 Ralph N. Clough, “Cross-Strait Economic Ties: How Trade, Investment and Economic Development 
Are Fundamentally Altering PRC-ROC Relations” in David Tawei Lee and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 
«1., Taiwan in a Transformed World. London: Brassey’s, 1995.
71 This includes no contacts, no negotiations, and no compromises.
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market after the US, which received 29 percent of Taiwan’s exports. Taiwan’s 
investment in China also reached at least US$9 billion in 1992, and US$13.6 billion 
by the end of June 1993, respectively. The rapid and steady rise in trade and 
investment between Taiwan and the Mainland reflects the complementarity of the two 
societies. The Mainland offers abundant resources, as well as cheaper land and 
labour to Taiwanese business people. Mainland China is also more advanced than 
Taiwan in some aspects of technology and basic scientific research. The PRC has 
also offered Taiwanese business people both preferential treatment and special 
economic zones exclusively for them. Investment and trade have proceeded together. 
Most of the machinery of Taiwan-owned factories on the Mainland was transferred 
from Taiwan. Taiwan also continues to provide materials, parts, and 
semi-manufactured goods to these factories. On the other hand, Taiwan imports 
semi-manufactured products from the Mainland, thereby diminishing the cost of 
finished products sold in or exported from Taiwan. However, Taiwan prohibits large 
enterprises from investing in Mainland China, fearing a ‘hollowing out’ of Taiwan’s 
industrial structure. In the case of Wang Yung-ching, who proposed to set up a US$7 
billion naphtha cracker and an associated petrochemical complex in Xiamen, the 
Taipei government turned down the proposal, fearing that too significant an 
investment would attract many downstream producers. Many more restrictions on 
Taiwan’s Mainland trade and investment are aimed largely at avoiding political 
disaster induced by economic factors. The ‘Look South’ strategy by the Taiwanese 
government was raised to divert Mainland fever. While the ties between people on 
both sides were improving, govemment-to-govemment relations remained mainly
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unchanged. Afterwards, the two governments established unofficial and 
quasi-official channels for handling the increasingly difficult problems caused by the 
variety of contacts between the people of both sides. In terms of dealing with 
foreign affairs, Taiwan has been more flexible, devising unorthodox methods of 
conducting international relations, while the PRC has taken a rigid stance. For 
example, the PRC compelled Liberia and Lesotho to sever their relations with Taipei 
after Taiwan established relations with Grenada, Belize, Liberia, Lesotho, Nicaragua, 
the Central African Republic, and Burkina Faso. The PRC also forced France to 
close its Consulate General in Guangzhou in retaliation for the sale of Mirage fighter 
aircraft to Taiwan. In this article, although the author expatiates on the roles of 
different people in strengthening the ties across the Straits, the roles of business 
people in the ‘Southward Policy’ remain unexamined.
Rong-yung King reviews Taiwan’s economic interaction with ASEAN during the past 
fifteen years and discusses the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis, emphasising the 
lessons which East Asian countries can learn from it.73 The Southward Policy 
adopted by the Taiwanese government urges Taiwanese business people to invest in 
Southeast Asia. This has been challenged by the financial crisis and transformed 
into helping them to tide over the crisis. The original win-win economic interaction 
between Taiwan and ASEAN becomes a lose-lose plight for both sides. Taiwan has 
been trying to upgrade the diplomatic and political relations between Taiwan and the
73 Rong-yung King, 'Taiwan and ASEAN: Another Approach to Economic Cooperation", Issues & 
Studies. November/December 1998, pp.181-201.
5 9
Southeast Asian countries, thus exasperating them and China. In view of this, 
political manoeuvring is not beneficial for the PRC, ASEAN or Taiwan. The author 
then proposes ways in which Taiwan and the ASEAN countries can cooperate 
economically in the future. The theme is that if China, Taiwan and the ASEAN 
countries want to set up a win-win-win relationship, it is imperative that each side 
give up political moves and adopt economic measures to solve common predicaments. 
Nevertheless, this article hardly mentions the relationship between state and 
businesses.
Tain-Jy Chen edited a book in 1998 on Taiwanese firms in Southeast Asia. The 
approach is networking across borders, which provides a comprehensive review of 
Taiwan’s direct investment in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
the Philippines and Vietnam.74 This book is a result of joint research efforts by 
Taiwanese, American and Southeast Asian scholars. Empirical evidence usually 
indicates that foreign direct investment (EDI) is dominated by large firms. The 
incidence of FDI is also positively correlated with firm size. However, Taiwan’s FDI 
is excluded from this pattern. Small- and medium-sized firms play an important role 
in Taiwan’s overseas ventures. From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, there were 
2526 approved Taiwan firms in Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines, with a proposed capital investment totalling 
US$13.8 billion. Among these investment projects, no more than 200 cases can be
74 Tain-Jv Chen, ed.. Taiwanese Firms in Southeast Asia -  Networking Across Borders. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1998.
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identified as having been proposed by Taiwan’s large firms with sales over NT$500 
million (Taiwanese currency) in 1986 (approximately US$14 million at that time). 
The others were undoubtedly undertaken by small- and medium-sized firms. 
According to Chen, the only country that has a pattern similar to that of Taiwan in the 
history of FDI is Japan. The book examines the reasons for this and evaluates the 
difference in practice between small and large firms conducting FDI, focusing on the 
manufacturing sector. The authors conclude that networking is crucial for the 
competitiveness of Taiwan’s overseas firms. These subsidiaries in host countries 
also try to maintain a close correlation with the networks in Taiwan to support 
competitiveness and elasticity. Nevertheless, due to lack of managerial resources 
that are very important to long-term development, Taiwanese firms will have 
difficulty maintaining competitiveness and flexibility. Therefore, they have to 
localise and integrate themselves into the local networks. However, this book 
mainly discusses the role of firms, and hardly mentions the role of states and factors 
in the international system. Therefore, the Southward Policy of Taiwan’s 
government has never been mentioned, let alone its effects on Taiwanese firms.
Gerald Chan has an article on Taiwan’s Southward Policy. According to Chan, 
Taiwan’s trade and aid are beginning to intertwine; Taiwan’s diplomacy is largely 
economically or commercially led; Taiwan has achieved some positive results in 
improving its relations with Southeast Asian countries; and Taiwan has reached a new 
stage in its economic development whereby it needs to invest overseas in order to
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sustain its economic growth.75 However, the research is only limited to the early 
stage. In terms of foreign aid, Taiwan has been described as an emerging foreign aid 
donor.76 Chan points out that Taiwan is financially rich but diplomatically poor. 
Although Taiwan performs very well from the perspective of the economy, it is 
diplomatically isolated, with only thirty countries recognising it as a sovereign state in 
September 1996.77 It is a member of only about ten intergovernmental organisations, 
the most notable one being the Asian Development bank. Some Taiwanese leaders 
have perceived that it might be useful to win friendship and support in the 
international community by extending foreign aid. The Overseas (renamed 
‘International’ in 1991) Economic Cooperation and Development Fund, set up in 1988, 
marked a watershed in Taiwan’s aid policy. Chan develops his article by addressing 
the following questions: Why does Taiwan give aid? To whom does it give aid, and 
why? What is its aid mechanism? How does Taiwan’s aid compare in quantity and 
quality with that donated by other countries? What are the problems and prospects 
of Taiwan’s aid policy? He concludes that Taiwan has the ability to enhance its aid 
capacity, thus ensuring that assistance can remain a useful, if limited, diplomatic 
instrument and a probably essential economic tool, because development aid has been 
a scarce resource in the world. However, the role of Taiwanese business people in
75 Chan, Gerald, “Sudpolitik: the Political Economy of Taiwan's Trade with Southeast Asia”, The 
Pacific Review. Vol. 9, No.. 1, 1996, pp.96-113.
76 Gerald Chan, “Taiwan as an Emerging Foreign Aid Donor: Developments, Problems, and Prospects”, 
Pacific Affairs. Vol. 70, No.. 1, spring 1997.
77 In June 2003, Taiwan maintained full diplomatic relations with 27 countries while maintaining 90 
representative offices or branches offices in the capitals and major cities of 38 countries. These 
offices carried different titles, such as Taipei Representative Office, Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Office, or Ttade Mission of the Republic of China, but all of them performed most o f the functions of 
embassies and consulates general. See
http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gD/vearbook/chpt08,htm 30/3/2004
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the Southward Policy has not been analysed in depth.
Teh-chang Lin has employed foreign aid to analyse Taiwan’s Southward Policy, 
focusing on Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia.78 The combination of political 
and economic motivations in the IECDF’s aid-giving to the three Southeast Asian 
countries has also exemplified Taiwan’s domestic and external predicaments in recent 
years. To avoid economic over-dependence on Mainland China, which might cause 
political disaster, Taiwan has encouraged its enterprises to invest in the Southeast 
Asian countries by giving aid in this area, thus creating a fitting environment. To a 
certain extent, Lin is correct to mention that Taiwan’s Southward Policy and its aid to 
the Southeast Asian countries demonstrate the first concrete step in its involvement in 
the process of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. However, he fails to 
point out that Taiwan has also suffered a setback owing to the changing situations of 
individual states and international environment, such as the Asian Financial Crisis. 
The role of enterprises and their relationships with states also need to be elaborated.
Another observer in the Chinese-language literature on this subject evaluates Taiwan’s 
bilateral relations with other countries by functionalism.79 The institutions under 
different designations and functions are analysed. The functional behaviours to 
achieve bilateral diplomacy are also analysed in terms of economic and trading
7'  Teh-chang Lin, "The ROC’s Foreign Aid and the Southward Policy", Issues & Studies. October 
1995. Also Teh-chang Lin, A Comparative Study of the Foreign Aid Policies across the Taiwan Strait. 
Taipei. 1999, pp. 319-33.
7* Wei, Ming, The Bilateral diplomacy of the Republic of China. Taipei: Institute for National Policy 
Research. 1991. 1991)
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contacts, airline connections, technical cooperation and economic aid. The period 
covers only the period up to 1991. Before this, most of the scholars in Taiwan did 
not recognise or analyse any type of diplomatic relations other than formal official 
relations.80 Most of the present literature in Chinese assesses Taiwan’s foreign 
policy by traditional approaches.81
Hsin-hsing Wu employs integration theory to analyse the ties across the Taiwan Straits. 
He examines six factors -  the economic and political systems of Taiwan and Mainland 
China, public opinion in Taiwan, the transactions between the PRC and the ROC, 
Taiwan’s politics, and the Taiwan Independence Movement — to determine the 
possibility of peaceful unification.82 In this work, economic and cultural exchanges 
have been shown to improve significantly since 1987, when the cross-Straits relations 
began to ease, but the author suggests these do not indicate that political reunification 
will be achieved in the near future. One year later, Wu also published a revised book 
in Chinese. He again uses established integration theory as a means of analysis, but 
with a broader perspective -  international factors.83 Although Wu has discussed the 
political economy of the two Chinas, he does not touch the sub-national level -  firms.
80 Ibid. p. 46.
11 This includes Tsai, Cheng-wen, Rong-Yi Wu, Bih-jaw Lin, Chia-Cheng Lin, The Foreign Policy and 
Behavioural Orientation of Our Country. Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1991. ( ^ ¡E 3 t ,
,1991.) The four authors evaluate 
Taiwan’s foreign relations by the levels of international system and domestic politics. Again the focus 
is short of companies and elite although the perspective ftom the public opinion is incorporated.
12 Hsin-hsing Wu. Bridging the Strait -  Taiwan. China, and the Prospects for Reunification. Hong 
Kong, Oxford University Press, 1994.
“  Wu, Hsin-hsing, Integration Theory and the Research of Cross-Strait Relations. Taipei: Wunan, 1995.
(ftiffw.a*gnwm»w«£gf5e,ftdb:mi99S)
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Teh-chang Lin completed a 400,000 Chinese-character book on a comparative study 
of the foreign aid policies across the Taiwan Strait.84 From the perspective of 
political economy, this book attempts to determine how a donor-state seeks its 
diplomatic goal by means of foreign aid commitment. On the other hand, from the 
same perspective, it also examines how a recipient-state investigates the motives of 
the donor-state that is willing to provide aid. In addition, the author analyses the 
linkage between foreign policy and foreign aid, improving on traditional studies on 
foreign policy and exploring the interaction between the donor and the recipient. 
This is quite successful in terms of using foreign aid as an independent variable to 
interpret the foreign policies of the PRC and Taiwan. For example, all the countries 
that supported Taiwan’s entry into the United Nations (UN) have received foreign 
assistance from Taiwan. Moreover, all the other countries, which opposed Taiwan’s 
attempts to enter the UN, have received aid from the PRC. Notwithstanding, it only 
probes into the relationship among governments at the level of state, overlooking 
analysis of the sub-national level.
However, Lin also wrote an article on Taiwan’s investment in Guangdong.85 Largely 
because Guangdong province is located near the Hong Kong gateway, Taiwanese 
businesses cluster around it. Most of the investments are by small- and 
medium-sized firms. For instance, the average amount of capital stock of Taiwan
14 Lin. Te-chang. A Comparative Study of the Foreign Aid Policies across the Taiwan Strait. Taipei: 
Zhengwen. 1999. 1999)
,s Te-chang Lin, “An Analysis o f  Taiwan’s Investment in Guangdong", Issues & Studies. March 1998, 
pp. 71-87.
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enterprises is under US$1 million. The structure of manufactured industries of 
Taiwan investment focuses on electronics, shoemaking, plastic production, etc. 
Most investment in Guangdong has been concentrated in the cities of the Pearl River 
Delta (Zhujiang Delta) -  Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Dongguan. Nevertheless, due to 
the increasing prices of factory sites and labour recently in these areas, many 
Taiwanese business people are forced to move to inner areas. This is also because 
the cities in the Pearl River Delta, with their swift economic development, have in 
recent years begun to readjust their industrial structure by offering more preferential 
inducements to large-scale investment and high-tech industries, thereby replacing 
sanlai yibu (H3R—M) industries (meaning those industries oriented to the processing 
of supplied materials, processing according to supplied designs, assembling of 
supplied component parts, and compensation trade). With the trend of economic 
development in China, when large-scale Taiwan enterprises set up a factory on the 
Mainland, its partners in the middle and lower reaches have also had to move to 
Mainland China for survival. Lin concludes that the Taipei government must make a 
great effort to ameliorate Taiwan’s investment environment, upgrade Taiwan’s 
industries, and make Taiwan an Asia-Pacific Transhipment Centre as soon as possible.
' Otherwise, Taiwan’s industrial structure will be hollowed out. This article is good in 
analysing the relationship between China and Taiwan’s enterprises in a sense, but it is 
confined to Guangdong province.
2.3 Conclusion
Why is it essential to follow Hollis and Smith by proposing ‘levels of analysis’ as a
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tool in order to interpret Taiwan’s economic diplomacy in the 1990s? On one hand, 
Holists like Kenneth Waltz emphasises the ‘top-down’ force from international system 
to every individual state. On the other hand, Individualists (Reductionists) stress the 
‘bottom-up’ forces from every individual state to the international system. However, 
the ‘levels of analysis’ can reconcile the two. Furthermore, the nation-state is not the 
smallest unit in the international society. To open the box of the nation-state is also 
necessary. National leaders within the state are sometimes influential. Therefore, 
‘levels of analysis’ chosen by this thesis has been the most effective approach so far.
However, Hollis and Smith are not perfect in addressing Taiwan’s economic 
diplomacy. In this thesis, the author also asserts that Taiwanese business people are 
significant in promoting régionalisation and globalisation in East Asia and in propping 
up Taiwan’s international standing. In addition, Taiwanese business people serve as 
avant-gardes, middlemen and surrogates in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy when they 
invest in China, Vietnam and other countries in Southeast Asia.
Most of the present authors focus on either traditional or Realist accounts of Taiwan’s 
foreign policy. In general, this omits analysis of economic changes between Taiwan 
and Mainland China or Taiwan and Southeast Asia. People like Susan Strange and 
Françoise Mengin have identified the drawbacks of this perspective. Therefore, 
non-official diplomacy has been noticed and nationalist mercantilism would be 
abandoned. Taiwan has thus become a typical case of this trend. Constructivists 
assess more Taiwan’s economic diplomacy but generally ignore the roles of
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entrepreneurs. Usually the relationships between state and businesses are rarely 
evaluated. In the 1990s, realism can no longer explain the politico-economic 
relations between Taiwan and other countries. The role of entrepreneurs (or 
companies) in Taiwan’s foreign relations cannot be ignored, yet the current literature 
has not fully explored this perspective. Nor has Taiwan’s economic-related 
statesmanship to achieve international space been fully discussed. The purpose of 
this thesis is to fill the gap. The Realist perspective holds that states are the only 
meaningful actors in the international system. Foreign trade and investment policies 
can be used as instruments to pursue national interests. Other actors, such as 
multi-national corporations, or non-governmental organisations, are subordinate to 
states. Therefore, if the state can effectively control the pace and tendency of 
economic interaction, trade and investment can be highly diminished or augmented 
according to the decision makers’ will and political judgement. In terms of Taiwan’s 
economic diplomacy, this perspective cannot fully stand. At least the economic 
relations across the Taiwan’s Straits are not completely subordinate to the political 
purposes of Taiwan or the PRC.
Small- and medium-sized businesses are the most important actors in Taiwan’s 
economic development. Taiwanese business people are in the vanguard of exploring 
Greater China. Although for many years Taiwan’s small- and medium-sized 
businesses have not been protected, as large businesses have been, by the government 
of Taiwan, they have received a great acclamation. However, Taiwanese business 
people may be regarded as myopic, arriviste-oriented and risk-taking. Thus,
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Taiwanese business people face difficult predicaments. They might both violate 
Taiwanese regulations and meet local misfortunes while investing in Mainland China. 
Fortunately, some of Taiwan’s leaders understand that it is mutually beneficial for 
Taiwanese business people to invest in the Mainland, although the Policy of ‘No 
Haste, Be Patient’ (Jieji Yungren, is used to curb large enterprises from
investing in China. In the 1990s, Lee Teng-hui stated that the economies across the 
Taiwan Straits are complementary to each other. Lien Chan reiterated that the 
cross-Straits relations should be win-win ties. Hence, the importance of Taiwanese 
business people cannot be overemphasised in the relations across the Taiwan’s Straits. 
In addition, the Southward Policy is used to check Mainland fever, given that 
Southeast Asia is geographically, culturally and ethnically proximate to Taiwan and 
that the PRC is Taiwan’s political adversary, and Taiwan’s over-dependence on China 
might lead to political disaster. Therefore, Taiwanese business people are 
encouraged to ‘Go South’ and invest in Southeast Asia. Foreign aid to Southeast 
Asia is also used to match the government’s policy and bolster Taiwanese business 
people.
Since Taiwan’s foreign relations are mainly unofficial and informal, usually without 
diplomatic and/or consular ties, Taiwan has employed an informal and nonofficial 
diplomacy to take the place of a more orthodox one. Besides, Taiwan as a de facto 
independent state wields its economic influence in order to survive, integrating itself 
in international exchanges. In the 1990s, Taiwan started to reap its reward to a 
certain degree. Although other countries are still reluctant to change their attitude on
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formal and diplomatic relations, they have increasingly permitted political extensions 
to commercial ties, such as upgrading unofficial ROC trade offices, allowing 
ministerial level visits, opening air links, and supporting Taiwan’s membership in 
GATT/WTO, United Nations and other international organisations. Though this may 
be an instance of the important role of government, the economic power the state 
wields most often needs the backing of Taiwanese business people. Since Taiwan 
itself lacks raw materials or a large enough internal market, and the businesses are the 
key actors in Taiwan’s commercial ties, the roles of Taiwan’s business people in 
economic diplomacy cannot be ignored.
Most Taiwanese business people are conscientious and hard-working in assessing 
investment, producing products, elevating quality, enlarging scale, managing legally, 
and making money to the best of their ability. During the processes of ‘Go West’ and 
‘Go South’, in fact, Taiwanese business people have played varying roles: risk-takers, 
business-founders, and crisis-managers. They also unwittingly become the 
translators of Taiwan experiences, propagators of the market-economy and promoters 
of private businesses.
What other roles do Taiwanese business people play in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy? 
To what extent are Taiwanese businesses intertwined with those in China and in other 
countries? To what extent are Taiwanese business people acting on behalf of the 
Taiwanese state? Are they acting as independent agents? In other words, are they 
proactive or are they reacting to government initiatives? The Southward Policy has
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been the policy of Taiwan’s government for years, so is it institutionalised? What 
level has the policy reached? Due to the absence of official relations between 
Taiwan and the Southeast Asian countries, it is worthwhile to explore these issues.
Definitions of Key Terms
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy: This thesis analyses Taiwan’s diplomacy from an 
economic perspective, thereby making up for the insufficiencies of those conventional 
approaches which have tended to focus exclusively on the political and military 
dimensions. Looked at from the bottom up, explanations in terms of the decisions 
and actions of Taiwanese business people seek to understand their influence on the 
international political economy beyond Taiwan per se. Taiwan’s economic 
diplomacy means not only economic statecraft but also all the resources used by 
Taiwanese business people, either as rewards or sanctions, which aim to improving 
Taiwan’s international standing or a particular foreign policy objective.
Taiwanese business people indicate the owners, CEOs, and management cadres of all 
Taiwanese small, medium and large-sized enterprises (factories). They can also 
belong to Taiwanese coordination companies and trading companies and liaison 
offices. They are usually the first people to make friends with foreign government 
officials. They are proactive and independent rather than at the beck and call of the 
government, thereby seeking profits. They also serve as pioneers, surrogates and 
intermediaries of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. In addition, they promote 
régionalisation and globalisation in East Asia, especially Vietnam and China.
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Chapter 3
The International System and the PRC
3.0 Introduction
Any study of a nation’s diplomacy must be considered in the larger context of the 
international system and local, influential neighbours. To help provide the appropriate 
context for my investigation into Taiwan’s economic diplomacy, I review relevant 
aspects of the international system and of Taiwan’s closest and most powerful 
neighbour, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). I start by reviewing the changing 
international system, in particular the impact of the end of the Cold War, the subsequent 
Tiananmen incident, and the relations across the Taiwan straits. I conclude this chapter 
by reviewing the pragmatism and obstructionism of the PRC and scholars’ 
contributions after the end of the Cold War.
3.1 The International System
3.1.1 The Changing International Environment at a System level
Taiwan has practised economic diplomacy, including trade, international investment 
and economic assistance, for over 35 years. For example, Taipei has operated aid 
diplomacy since the early 1960s and trade diplomacy since the end of the 1970s. 
However, it was not until the end of the Cold War, when economic issues began to 
assume greater prominence, that Taiwan began to reap any appreciable benefit from 
these diplomatic initiatives; and even though Taipei took advantage of the new
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international system to re-double its efforts in the field of economic diplomacy, the 
benefit was evanescent because the strategy was not soundly based.
3.1.2 End of the Cold War
The period after the Korean War can be roughly classified into three phases as follows:
(1) . The First Period of the Cold War (1950 -  1970)
In the wake of the Korean War, the Soviet Union and the United States launched their 
confrontation. Since Taiwan was situated at the crucial location between Northeast and 
Southeast Asia, the Western countries could not ignore Taiwan’s position when they 
tried to contain the Communist world. Therefore, Taiwan and the US concluded an 
agreement for mutual defence, followed by US foreign aid to Taiwan. Even though 
Taiwan’s strategic status made the US help and protect it, Taiwan lacked full autonomy 
in its foreign policy due to its authoritarian government and economic inferiority. 
These led to its deficiency in national influence.
(2) . The Second Period of the Cold War (1970 -  1990)
After President Nixon came to power, he tried to withdraw from the Vietnam War and 
started to normalise US relations with the PRC, thereby checking the USSR. At the 
expense of Taiwan, the US did not uphold the ROC’s (Taiwan’s) seat in the UN, 
followed by the US severance of official relations with Taiwan in 1979. In this period, 
Taiwan’s economy took off, but its democracy was still far behind the standard of the 
Western countries. Therefore, Taiwan’s foreign relations and national image were in an
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extremely bad situation.
(3). The Post-Cold War Period (1990 - )
After the breakdown of the USSR, Russia lost its status as a superpower and became a 
quasi-democratic country. The US no longer needed to check the USSR, so the ‘China 
card’ became obsolete. However, the rise of China and the fall of the Soviet Union 
became the most destabilising factor in the Asia Pacific. The PRC had the fastest 
economic growth rate in the world, substantially contributing to the build-up in its 
military expansion. The US began to focus its concerns on China instead of on the 
former Soviet Union. The debate over containment and engagement towards China 
thus became a hot point. Taiwan’s status became crucial, no matter what side one took 
in the debate. For those who wanted engagement, Taiwan could be an intermediary 
between China and the Western countries because Taiwan shared the same language, 
ethnicity and culture with China. For those who wanted containment, Taiwan 
recovered the strategic status it had enjoyed during the first period of the Cold War. 
Internally, Taiwan became liberalised and developed vigorously in its political 
economy. For a while, Taiwan seemed to be on the point of increasing its leverage in 
foreign relations, but in reality it enjoyed its new influence for a very short time. This is 
what I describe in Chapter 4 as ‘bubble diplomacy’.
Su Chi, later the Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, indicated that the 
détente between the PRC and the Soviet Union had diminished the value of the 'China 
Card’ and had indirectly elevated the international standing of Taiwan. In the past, the
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US had had a strategic notion of uniting with the PRC and checking the Soviet Union, 
so the US had constantly had to yield to the PRC. At the end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s, both the détente between the US and the USSR and the 
normalisation of relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union had made this 
strategic notion decline. In other words, the relations between the US and the PRC had 
also normalised. Cooperation, conflict, confrontation and compromise between the US 
and the PRC had become common. Therefore, the ties between Taiwan and the US had 
become stable.1 In addition, the Tiananmen Square event helped to make the PRC’s 
relations with the West in general more difficult in the early 1990s. The Western 
countries usually follow the steps of one another’s policy towards Taiwan. Therefore, 
the international environment became generally favourable for Taiwan. But of course 
this has to be qualified by the increasing fascination with the Chinese market on the part 
of Western companies after 1992.
The rapprochement between the PRC and the USSR was also favourable for the easing 
of tension in Asia and the world as a whole, thus fortifying the effect of economic 
strength on international relations and lessening the practical function of military 
power.1 2 Therefore, Taiwan could use its economic leverage in the international 
diplomatic arena. In the past, Taiwan had always been under pressure from the PRC, 
which had besieged Taiwan in international space. Once the environment changed,
1 Su Chi. On the Normalisation of the Relations Between the PRC and the Soviet Union from 1979 to
1989.Tainei: Sanmin Bookshop, 1992. ¡ E t t f t  1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 9 , 1 9 9 2 ) ,  pp.
227-29.
2 Ibid.,
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Taiwan could also change its thinking and become more flexible, and it began to reap its 
reward.
During the Cold War, ideology and security issues dominated all others. In the post-war 
era, they dwindled. Although politics and military alliances remain one of the major 
topics in foreign affairs, economic issues become prominent and even prevail over 
ideology, security and politics. Power or national leverage is no longer measured 
thoroughly in terms of military strength, and economic viability always has been a 
cardinal factor that shapes foreign relations. Regionalism and economic integration 
have become the organising principles of international affairs.
In connection with the United States as the only superpower responsible for providing 
worldwide security as a public good, the world was kind to America in the 1990s, 
according to Robert Kagan. With only the momentum preserved from the previous 
decade, when the Cold War was won, and in 1991, when Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein 
was expelled from Kuwait, the US could still fare well and keep rich. Even though he 
predicts that the next decade will not be so accommodating, the US spent very little on 
its military capabilities in the 1990s. The US successes since the end of the Cold War -  
in Panama in 1989, in the Persian Gulf in 1991, and most recently in the air war over 
Kosovo -  owed their achievement to a force built during the Reagan administration.3
President Clinton, regarding the PRC as a strategic partner, adopted a policy of 
3 Robert Kagan, "The World and President Bush", Survival. Vol. 43, No. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 7-16.
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engagement towards China. In the 1990s the rise of China did not cause much trouble 
for the US despite the debate about the alleged ‘China threat’.4
In the late 1990s the nature of the international system was multi-faceted.5 No longer 
was security the supreme factor. According to people like Samuel Huntington, culture, 
the major factor in the emerging world order, would lead to a ‘clash of civilisations’; 
and with the fading of the ideological power of Communism, economic issues became 
more salient in the 1990s. These cultural and economic developments would supply 
new reasons for security rivalry and competition.
Taiwan’s bilateral relations with most foreign countries were dominated by 
security-related considerations before the mid-1980s, especially with Western countries. 
There were apprehensions about the PRC and the Soviet Union, as well as the need to 
consider how US policy shaped the foreign policies of America’s allies. Before the late 
1980s, both the ROC and the PRC stuck to a ‘one China’ policy, so other countries had 
to choose between them. Therefore, although Taiwan had excellent economic 
competence before the end of 1980s, it was still tangential to the interests of most 
Western countries. Taiwan had been expelled from the United Nations in 1971. The
* For the debate of ‘China threat' see Denny Roy, "The ‘China Threat’ Issue: Major Arguments", Asian 
Survey. Vol. 36, No. 8, August 1996, pp. 758-71; David Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of 
China: Calculating Beijing's Responses”, International Security. Vol. 21, No. 2, Fall 1996, pp. 180-209; 
Gideon Rachman, “Containing China”, Washington Quarterly. Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 1996, pp. 129-40; 
Andrew D. Marble, “The PRC at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century: Why the ‘China Threat’ 
Debate?” Issues & Studies. Vol. 36, No. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 1-18.
9 Akira Iriye, “The End of the Century: Emerging Themes, Disappearing Themes”, Issues & Studies. Vol. 
34, No. 10, October 1998, pp. 10-24; Andrew D. Marble, "The PRC at the Dawn of the Twenty-first 
Century: Why the ‘China Threat’ Debate?” Issues & Studies. Vol. 36, No. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 
1-18.
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ensuing switch of recognition from Taipei to Beijing by many Western countries made 
them very sensitive to the PRC’s policies. They also aimed at intensifying political, 
economic, scientific, technological and educational relations with the PRC. Other 
countries under the influence of Beijing were also pressured to sever official relations 
with Taipei. Nevertheless, after the collapse of communism, economic issues have 
become more prominent. The political leaders of every country regard economic 
development as essential to their legitimacy, including the US and the PRC themselves. 
In a nutshell, they pay more attention to their own citizens who vote for them, than to 
foreign states. Economic issues become the top priority on the global agenda. This 
transformation did a great favour to the growth of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. Even 
Taiwan’s trade disputes with the US from the mid-1980s proved to be a boost for 
Taiwan to upgrade its industrial structure, thus improving Taiwan’s GNP.6
Many countries thus seek for ways to promote exports to Taiwan under the pressure of 
their own domestic economic predicaments. The prospects of economic profits prompt 
countries to court Taiwan and disregard China’s political coercion. At the same time, 
Taiwan started to transform its defence-oriented national security policy by balancing 
the dimensions of diplomacy, defence, trade, and cross-Straits relations. Hence, Taipei 
tried to procure a formidable and balanced self-defence capability in order to oppose 
any rash drive by Beijing to enforce reunification.7 The French government decided to
6 Linjun Wu, “Does Money Talk? The ROC's Economic Diplomacy", op. cit.
7 Although the DPP, the opposition party at that time, continually criticised government arms 
procurement scandals, and wanted transparency in the management of defence programmes, the DPP, as 
well as the KMT, the ruling party then, believed that Taiwan should maintain a strong traditional defence 
capability. See Cheng-yi Lin, “ROC Defence Programs and Priorities”, in David Tawei Lee and Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., ed., Taiwan in a Transformed World. London: Brassey’s, Inc., 1995, pp. 55-75.
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sell 60 advanced Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircraft to Taiwan for which the Taipei 
government was willing to pay US$4 billion. Again, this was because the sale met with 
French economic interests and also because it followed fairly recently the Tiananmen 
Square events.8 Consequently, during the 1992 presidential election campaign in the 
US, President George Bush agreed to sell 150 advanced F-16 A/B fighter aircraft to 
Taiwan because the sale could help the US economy.9 Such deals were impossible 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Meanwhile, in general, the Western countries adopted a 
new policy of sending higher-ranking ministers on official visits to Taiwan, although 
this made the PRC worry that earlier agreements, which were meant to isolate Taiwan 
in the international diplomatic arena, were being undone.10 Indeed, Taiwan did break 
through the diplomatic isolation to a certain extent because economic prominence 
prevailed over political/security issues, even though the French government professed 
it would not sell fighter aircraft to Taiwan again in the future, under the pressure from 
the PRC.
3.1.3 The Tiananmen Incident
The gunfire on 4 June 1989 gave a tragic turn to the Chinese pursuit of democracy at the 
turn of the century. The PRC suffered from the aftermath of this incident. At the same 
time it created an unfavourable change for Chinese diplomacy. After the Tiananmen
* United Daily News (Lianhe bao Wca (8), Taipei. June 27, 1995, p. 2.
9 On the other hand. President Bush resisted congressional efforts to link the renewal of China's Most 
Favoured Nation trading status to a more acceptable human rights record. This made the PRC regard 
President Bush as a 'friend'.
10 This is also partly because the Western countries perceived that they could get tough with the PRC in 
the post-Cold War era. See The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1992-1993. 
London: Brassey’s, 1993, p. 134.
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Incident, a few countries became more amicable towards Taiwan, whereby Taipei’s 
diplomacy accomplished some minor breakthroughs.
Less than one month after the Chinese massacre, at a summit meeting in Madrid on 27 
June, the EC leaders announced joint sanctions against the Chinese government. 
Despite Chinese diplomatic threats, the French government even acted as host to 
prominent Chinese dissidents, permitting them to establish a formal organisation of 
their own which denounced the Chinese government. Together with the collapse of 
Eastern Europe and the USSR, and German reunification, the incident made China 
more tangential. China became less important to West Europeans. The Chinese market, 
still a lure to European interest, was now not very exhilarating.11 Because of the 
massacre the relations between Beijing and Paris even deteriorated with the row over 
the sale of French sixty Mirage 2000-5 fighters (ordered in 1993) to Taiwan in the early 
1990s. Taiwan obviously took advantage of Beijing’s predicament. Consequently, the 
French consulate in Guangzhou was closed, and French companies were forbidden 
from bidding on the construction of Guangzhou subway system.12 In addition, France 
also sold Lafayette-class frigates and Mistral portable surface-to-air guided missiles. 
The Lafayettes contain sophisticated radars, sonars and ASW detection equipment, 
together with 40mm guns and surface-to-surface missiles (a naval version of the French
"Michael B. Yahuda, “China and Europe: The Significance of a Secondary Relationship", in Thomas 
Robinson and David Shambaugh, ed„ Chinese Foreign Policy -  Theory and Practice. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994, pp. 269-73.
12 Peter T.Y. Cheung and James T.H. Tang, "The External Relations of China’s Provinces”, in David M. 
Umpton, The Making o f Chinese Foreign and Security Policy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 
106.
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Crotale).13
With the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations, the ‘strategic triangle’ no longer 
existed.14 President George Bush asserted that he “deplore[d] the decision to use force 
against Chinese citizens who were making a peaceful statement in favour of 
democracy”. Consequently, he suspended military sales to the PRC and stated that the 
US and the PRC could not resume normal relations until the PRC’s leaders “recognise 
the validity of the pro-democracy movement”. The Bush Administration immediately 
imposed a ban on military sales to Beijing and on high-level military exchanges. On 20 
June, the US also suspended high-level exchanges between US officials (above the 
level of assistant secretary) and the PRC government, and advised that all financial 
lending by international institutions also be suspended. In addition, the US extended 
the visas of Chinese students and offered human and medical aid to the injured students. 
Besides, Washington withdrew the families of its diplomats in Beijing, cancelled the 
bilateral technology exchanges and the planned visit of Chinese foreign minister, Qian 
Qichen, suspended China’s MFN status, and truncated its export of computers, arms, 
satellites and loans to China. The US Congress passed an overwhelming resolution 
denouncing China.
The Asian Development Bank and the World Bank ceased new lending. Negotiations
13 David Shambaugh, “Taiwan’s Security: Maintaining Deterrence amid Political Accountability", in 
David Shambaugh, Contemporary Taiwan. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, p. 2S4.
14 David Shambaugh, “Patterns o f Interaction in Sino-American Relations”, in Thomas Robinson and 
David Shambaugh, ed., Chinese Foreign Policy -  Theory and Practice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 
205.
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over China’s application for entry into the GATT also ended. The technical assistance 
projects of the IMF to China were also halted. All these were regarded as essential by 
the Chinese reformers.15 The PRC criticised the Western countries for imposing on 
China a peaceful evolution towards democracy and economic liberalism. Normal 
diplomatic activities between China and the Western countries, especially France, 
nearly ceased.
Japan, a major pillar of Chinese economy and diplomacy, terminated its medical aid, 
extended Chinese students’ visas, withdrew Japanese in China, and allowed foreigners 
in China to enter Japan unconditionally. Moreover, Japan also abolished a loan of 810 
billion Japanese yen to the PRC. Even the USSR joined the verbal assault against 
China, though it had recently normalised relations with the PRC. Because the Soviet 
Union was lenient towards the eastern European reform and the secession movements 
in three Baltic republics, the ideological split resulted in a diplomatic standoff.
Furthermore, the eastern European countries with ideologies similar to those of China 
also criticised China to different degrees. Since the democratic reforms in these 
countries were rolling on with full force, the Communist governments of 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria and Rumania all collapsed. In connection 
with this, China decided to let its ties with these countries stagnate. In the past, China 
had broken out of its diplomatic isolation by establishing good relations with
15 Rosemary Foot, “China’s Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era”, in Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove, 
China in the 1990s. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999, pp. 237-38.
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developing countries. Nevertheless, these countries also thought China was despicable 
for its ruthless behaviour in suppressing dissent. Mexico and Argentina cancelled the 
imminent visit of Yang Shangkun. Countries like Grenada severed their relations with 
China.
In this diplomatic quandary the PRC reiterated its independent diplomacy. Immediately, 
the Beijing government convened a working meeting for all its overseas diplomatic 
officials, in order to bolster their loyalty to the government line and carry out a 
re-shuffle of diplomatic appointments. Even so, in the autumn of the same year, Qian 
Qichen was unsuccessful when he attended the UN assembly in the US, proposing four 
ideas for improving bilateral relations. Therefore, Taiwan took advantage of Beijing’s 
problems, establishing diplomatic relations with several developing countries and 
ameliorating its non-official ties with Western countries by inviting their cabinet-level 
officials to visit Taipei, concluding bilateral agreements and upgrading representative 
offices. The Taipei government could thus pick and choose friends, depending on its 
own agenda. In addition, the Taipei government was sometimes able to shift the 
political policies of other countries. For some years after the Tiananmen Incident, 
Taiwan was occasionally able to upgrade its foreign representative offices. Politically, 
therefore, the PRC suffered greatly as a result of the Tiananmen Incident, but economic 
considerations soon re-asserted themselves in Beijing’s favour to a certain extent.
On the other hand, within weeks, Bush secretly sent his national security adviser, Brent 
Scowcroft, to Mainland China to converse with the PRC’s leaders. The tension
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between the US and the PRC soon declined in a sense, although domestically, both 
Democrats and Republicans roared in discontent. In December 1989, Bush overrode a 
congressional prohibition on loans to companies doing business in Mainland China, 
and he also agreed to resume the export of satellites to China.16 This was because 
Americans had great economic interests in China and, under this pressure, Bush was 
forced to appease the PRC.
In terms of Asia, particularly ASEAN, most countries sided with China against the US 
on the human rights issue. The reaction of Southeast Asian countries was more 
reserved than that of western countries. The ASEAN countries and China also 
exchanged high-ranking official visits and economic activities after the massacre. They 
even invited the PRC to attend the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in 1991. This 
was partly because most of the ASEAN countries had separatist problems of their own 
and accepted the claim of the PRC that the Taiwan problem is a Chinese internal affair. 
They sided with China by agreeing that internal incidents should not become 
international issues that might lead to intervention by foreign countries in the affairs 
they regarded as internal.17
To escape from the diplomatic quandary, Deng drastically widened the scope for 
freedom in the economy. During the Gulf crisis, China was very dexterous in 
manipulating its status as one of the rive permanent members of the Security Council in
14 Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G Brinkley, ed„ Rise to Globalism. London: Penguin Group, 1997, 
pp. 55-56.
"D enny Roy, China’s Foreign Relations. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998, p. 178.
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the United Nations.18 In January 1990, China abolished martial law in Beijing and 
released hundreds of political prisoners. Consequently, several sanctions were lifted by 
the Western countries. At the end of 1990, the European Community resumed political, 
economic and cultural ties with China. In early November, Japan resumed its 
development aid to China with US$ 240 million. Therefore, there was only a minor 
reverse in the international environment against China’s economic growth.
Taiwanese business people enjoyed advantages before the Western countries resumed 
their engagement. The economic exchanges across the Taiwan Straits marched on. The 
Incident had not only a minor negative effect (Western countries’ short-period sanctions 
against China) but also a major positive effect (the Chinese government’s 
encouragement for investment by Taiwanese business people) on Taiwan-China 
economic connections.
3.1.4 Regionalism
Both the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security and Cooperation 
in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) are multilateral security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific, the 
former official and the latter unofficial. However, it is difficult for Taiwan to join the 
ARF, given the PRC’s opposition. Most countries believe that the PRC’s participation 
is indispensable in terms of security in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing’s strict sovereign claim 
towards Taiwan forbids Taipei from participating directly in ARF, although the design
"  The day after China’s abstention on resolution 678 that allowed the use o f force to compel Iraq to 
withdraw from Kuwait, President Bush decided to end the ban on high-level diplomatic exchange; in 
December the World Bank extended ‘non-basic-needs' loans to China.
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of ARF aims to offer the Southeast Asian countries and the PRC an approach to sort out 
problems like the South China Sea issue, and the Taiwan issue as well. It is possible for 
Taipei to play a role, since CSCAP could provide a non-governmental dialogue to 
advise and help ARF in the way that PECC did for APEC by supporting seminars and 
reports.19 The PRC has been very sensitive since Taiwan became politically involved 
with this area. The Taipei government can make only a very limited contribution in 
East Asia in terms of security, except in the Taiwan Straits. The significance of 
economic diplomacy is increasingly important, and the roles of business people are 
essential on the whole. This will be discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
3.1.5 Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
After Taiwan’s lifting of the ban on Mainland visits, the PRC government tried to 
encourage more Taiwanese business people to invest in Mainland China by means of 
preferential measures. In 1992, there was the so-called ‘92 consensus’ between Taiwan 
and China. The consensus indicated that there was only one China. However, Taipei 
claimed the one China was the Republic of China (ROC), while Beijing professed that 
the one China was the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Each one was permitted to 
verbally and separately express its views on the meaning of ‘one China’. At this time 
the atmosphere across the Taiwan Straits was favourable to many kinds of activities.
19 Glenn Hook, “Japan and the Construction of Asia-Pacific" in Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne 
(ed.), Regionalism & World Order. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996, pp. 169-206. Prasert 
Chittiwatanapong, “Challenges of and Responses to Globalization: the Case of South-east Asia”, in 
Yoshinobu Yamamoto (ed.). Globalism. Regionalism & Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 
1999, pp. 70-92. Also, see James A. Kelly, “Breaking the Walls of Separation: Taiwan's Growing Ties to 
Multilateral Institutions”, in David Thwei Lee and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (ed.), Taiwan in a 
Transformed World. London: Brassey's, Inc., 1995, pp. 133-40.
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Throughout 1992 the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), on behalf of the Taipei 
government and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) on 
behalf of the Beijing government, discussed the concept of ‘one China’ in preparation 
for a meeting of their own leaders to conclude agreements dealing with matters such as 
repatriation of illegal migrants, cracking down on crimes, settlement of maritime 
disputes, protection of intellectual property rights, verification of documents, and 
compensation for lost mail.20 This led to the Koo-Wang Talks in 1993. Especially after 
Deng Xiaoping’s walk-about in southern China in 1992, Taiwanese business people 
poured a large amount of money into China. Therefore, there was no significant curb 
on Taiwanese business people investing in the PRC, but a boost at that time.
Throughout the 1990s, the PRC focused on its economic development, encouraging 
foreign direct investment and strengthening its foreign economic engagement with 
Western countries. The enormous domestic market also became the bait and bargaining 
chips in augmenting its international space. Even though internal social problems 
emerged one after another, the whole world could not ignore the rise of China in the 
Asia Pacific, and this rise gave China an increasingly important standing in the world. 
Taiwan serves as an intermediary between China and the wider world. This is so partly 
because China and Taiwan share the same culture. When other countries try to engage 
China economically through investment, Taiwan is often the first go-between they
20 John W. Garver, Face Off -  China, the United States, and Taiwan's Démocratisation. London: 
University of Washington Press, 1997, p.28.
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think of because Taiwan used to be the partner of the Western countries. For example, 
Pou-Chen had been the partner of Nike, Adidas and Adidas for many decades before it 
invested in China. These famous western brands hesitated to invest in China by 
themselves initially. Yu-Yuan, the branch factory of Taiwan’s Pou-Chen shoes in China, 
enjoys the Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) of Nike, Adidas, Reebok; 
Timberland is the most recent and the best example of international cooperation 
between Taiwan, China and the Western countries. The importance of Taiwanese 
business people as a gateway to China has increased in step with the growth of 
Taiwanese investment in the Mainland. Taiwan’s capital, management, techniques and 
even antiquated machinery, combined with China’s cheap labour and land, and Western 
countries’ world-renowned brand and marketing have come together. This is a 
state-of-the-art combination.
3.2 The Pragmatism & Obstructionism of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
Does Beijing government’s policy towards Taiwan mainly support the status quo? 
Several scholars on China studies assert “yes”. Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross opine 
that “since its 1979 attack on Vietnam, China has been a reactive power, striving not to 
alter but to maintain regional patterns of power. Its diplomacy has been in support of
the status quo, aiming not to undermine but to join international regimes........ Its
military threats against Taiwan were aimed at deterring Taiwan from changing the 
status quo rather than at compelling it to accelerate the pace of reunification”.21 Zhao
21 Andrew J. Nathan & Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress -  China's Search for 
Security. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998, p. 230.
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Gancheng added that: “Taipei rebukes Beijing’s calls for one country, two systems. 
Beijing never says whether, if Taipei does not accept it, Beijing will use force to 
intimidate Taipei into submission. In other words, Beijing can accept the status quo as 
long as both sides maintain a one-China principle. Beijing does not like the status quo, 
but it does not make unilateral moves to pressure the other side. It is Taiwan that tries to 
break the status quo and, unfortunately, on the basis of denying the one-China principle, 
a common stance that has been accepted by both sides for a long time”.22
However, the relations across Taiwan Straits cannot be analysed simply from the 
perspective of the sides. We have to assess the international environment, too. Even 
though Beijing can be interpreted superficially as having tried to maintain status quo, it 
has been trying to relegate Taiwan’s status quo in the international community and has 
achieved success to a substantial extent. For example, the major states that recognised 
the ROC on Taiwan have all shifted their recognition to the PRC, including Saudi 
Arabia, South Korea and South Africa. Taiwan’s move to re-enter the United Nations 
has been futile because none of the western countries have supported it. After President 
Lee’s visit to Cornell and the Taiwan Straits Crisis, President Clinton promised that the 
United States 1) would oppose or resist efforts by Taiwan to gain independence; 2) 
would not support the creation of ‘two Chinas’, or one China and a separate Taiwan; 3) 
would not support Taiwan’s admission to the United Nations. These assurances 
afterwards became the new ‘three noes’.23 Hong Kong and Macao were both returned
22 Zhao Gancheng, "The Two-State Theory: Myth or Reality?”, in Gerrit W. Gong, ed„ Taiwan Strait 
Dilemmas: China-Taiwan-US Policies in the New Century. Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2000, pp. 
65-66.
23 James Mann, About Face. New York: Vintage Books, 2000, p. 330.
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to the PRC at the end of the twentieth century. On the other hand, the Beijing 
authorities have been trying to promote politics through economics (yi jingji cu 
zhengzhi, or promote reunification through businesses (yi shang cu
tong, and pressure the government with popular demands (yi min bi guan,
Most of Taiwan’s tycoons, including Wang Yung-ching, Chang Yung-fa 
and Kao Chin-yen, all demanded that the Taipei government lift the limit on investing 
in Mainland China -  ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ (jieji yungren, By offering
incentives to business interests, the PRC government had been quite successful in 
exerting leverage in courting Taiwanese business people against the Taipei government 
in the 1990s. Eventually, the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ of Taiwan was abolished 
by the new DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) government in 2001. On top of this, 
the PRC also employed missile diplomacy to intimidate and foreign aid to isolate 
Taiwan. In this section, the author is going to analyse the strategy of the PRC 
government against Taiwan.
Beijing has never renounced use of force vis-à-vis Taiwan, a threat not conducive to 
cross-Straits relations or the reunification of China. During the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits 
Crisis, the PRC used missile tests to intimidate Taiwan. A US former Ambassador to 
China, Winston Lord, recalled that Xiong Guangkai asserted, “Look, we’re not worried 
if we get into some tension and potential conflict with the United States. By the way, 
we have nuclear weapons, too. In the event of a real confrontation we don't think that 
the Americans are going to give up Los Angeles in exchange for Taiwan”. Although 
the US and Taiwan had no intelligence to indicate that the PRC was going to use force
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at that time against Taiwan, there was no doubt that the PRC wanted to engage in 
psychological and political warfare to bully Taiwan, and it expressed its views on its 
sensitivity to Taiwan’s move. However, the PRC might make an irrevocable mistake. 
The US judging that its choices after the Chinese had done something would be much 
more difficult, decided to deter the PRC from the beginning. The US intervened, so the 
crisis abated. This would have been the biggest conflict in the Western Pacific since the 
Vietnam War, and it probably drew the biggest concentration of US naval power 
there.24
It is said that during his visit to Beijing, Charles W. Freeman Jr. -  the former State and 
Defence Department specialist on China -  was told by Xiong Guangkai, the deputy 
chief of general staff of the PLA and its chief of military intelligence, that China was 
ready to sacrifice millions of people, even whole cities, in a nuclear exchange to defend 
Chinese interests in stopping Taiwan’s independence.25 The PRC was thus determined 
to use force against Taiwan if Taiwan crossed the line the PRC had set.
3.3 Scholars’ Contributions after the End of Cold War
In Chapter 2, the influence of Fukuyama’s work has been analysed. In the 1990s, not 
only Fukuyama but also other scholars advised US and Western countries to engage 
with China, although the emphasis was somehow different from Fukuyama’s. In 
general, they believed that making China obey international norms and consult with the
24 Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, China Confidential -  American Diplomats and Sino-American relations. 
1945-1996. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 484-86.
"  James Mann, About Face. New York: Vintage Books, 2000, p. 334.
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Western countries on international affairs would mitigate military tension and settle 
disputes. Gerald Segal suggests that a sophisticated strategy for tying China into the 
international system will become necessary if, in 2020, the world faces a united, 
authoritarian China with the world’s largest GDP, perhaps the world’s largest budget, 
and a boulder rather than a chip on its shoulder. Then it would be too late to deal with 
the challenges. According to Segal, given that China’s nineteenth-century attitude to 
sovereignty is especially anachronistic, the more China perceives the benefits from 
genuinely multilateral diplomacy, the less paranoid it will feel about the world and the 
less paranoid the world will feel about it. The conditions are very different, if only 
because of China’s greater importance for international trade and the absence of clear 
divisions into East and West. The more interdependent China is with the global market, 
the more means there are of tying China in (and down). The strategy aims to create a 
China that is more used to multilateralism, engaging in substantial dialogues, and real 
interdependence in social as well as economic terms. Although this might be 
adversarial in some minor aspects, military tension and major adversarial behaviour can 
be avoided.26
David Shambaugh also argues that that the US and China should engage each other 
constructively on all different levels (including the People’s Liberation Army) and in a 
range of forums in order to sort out the (address the panoply of) difficult issues between 
both sides. Otherwise, the US and China might misperceive each other and find
26 Gerald Segal, “Tying China into the International System”, Survival. Vol. 37, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 
60-73.
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themselves embroiled in an adversarial relationship which neither seeks, needs nor can 
afford. Both wishful thinking about a benign China and exaggerated fears of a 
threatening China are distorting and destabilising. It is necessary to analyse China 
carefully and rationally. According to Shambaugh, to date it is more artificial than real 
when Chinese military modernisation is assessed and the discussion of ‘China threat’ is 
both incorrect and untrustworthy. The Chinese military does not have the capability to 
directly challenge the US national security now or in the foreseeable future, despite 
modernisation and the streamlining of the People’s Liberation Army. This might 
potentially menace the national interests of China’s ‘neighbours’ and the US, including 
Taiwan’s security and integrity, freedom of navigation in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 
and the security of US staunch allies and partners in East, Southeast, and South Asia. In 
terms of China’s intentions, Shambaugh believes that China does not mean to confront 
the US, but it is ready to retaliate if the US treats China as an enemy.27 Therefore, the 
US had better deal with the PRC cautiously and scrupulously, without provocation. In 
addition, it is also essential that China preserve its integrity and its effective and 
humane governance because China’s stability and security are vital to Asian stability 
and security. China’s prosperity is thus parallel to US national interests.
It is also emphasised that bilaterally, the US must engage the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) at all levels -  seeking through dialogue to augment transparency in Chinese 
defence expenditure, doctrine, deployments, and security perspectives; exchanging
27 David Shambaugh, “China’s Military: Real or Paper Tiger?" Washington Quarterly. Vol. 19, No. 1, 
Spring 1996, pp. 19-36.
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personnel between national military units, service academies, and staff colleges; 
undertaking, in time, joint manoeuvres and other confidence-building and 
transparency-enhancing measures; and keeping an ongoing dialogue on international 
security tendencies and bilateral defence interests at the highest level of the two 
military establishments. In the end, the US should consider limited and defence 
weapon sales and technology transfers to China, disabusing the fears of US 
containment policy. Multilaterally, the US must work with Asian and Western 
countries to integrate the Chinese government and the PLA into global and regional 
cooperative (as distinct from collective) security regimes. Cooperation with China is 
the means of access, since a confrontational approach will lead to the PRC becoming a 
ferocious competitor at best and an adversary at worst. If China is not fully integrated 
into the International system, it has the potential and capacity to become a rebellious 
non-status quo power. The PRC is afraid of being trapped and manipulated by other 
countries, because international regimes will permeate China, limiting China’s 
sovereignty and freedom of manoeuvre outwardly. Therefore, China avoids alliances 
and close binding relationships with other nations, or abiding international norms and 
conventions, including the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in the 1990s.28 Even though Shambaugh focuses 
mainly on security issues, the engaging approaches are conducive to the economic field 
and all other realms. The policy of engaging China is inevitably favourable to 
Sino-American economic relations and cross-Straits economic exchange, although the 
US did not adopt the policy of cooperating with China comprehensively in the 1990s,
“ ibid. pp. 31-32.
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especially in the field of military exchange.
Audrey Kurth Cronin and Patrick M. Cronin also assert that since 1978 Chinese 
economic liberalisation, together with the decline of Soviet threat, the PRC has been 
able to modernise its military, which worries China’s neighbours. As the relative 
strength of the US in Asia dwindles, the potential influence of China will expand. 
Permitting Sino-American relations to drift without guidance would be wrong: the US 
must engage China within a realistic framework. Eight reasons are also enumerated to 
show the defects of containing China -  including that containment could precipitate 
Chinese military intervention in Taiwan or the South China Sea. The prediction of 
Shambaugh is also cited to the effect that “we can expect a lack of Chinese cooperation 
on a range of issues of importance to the United States. You’re just going to find a very 
stubborn and reluctant partner in Beijing”. Like Shambaugh, they also advise the US to 
institutionalise military-to-military contacts with the PRC at all levels. Even though 
China will be regarded as a reluctant partner in trade, human rights, territorial disputes 
and arms sales, the US still must adopt a policy of realistic engagement.29
3.4 Conclusion
In the international system, the salience of economic issues has replaced security, 
ideology and politics in the wake of the Cold War. This, together with the Tiananmen 
Incident, offered Taiwan with an opportunity to wield its economic strength to achieve
29 Audrey Kurth Cronin and Patrick M. Cronin, "The Realistic Engagement of China”, The Washington 
Quarterly. Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 1996, pp. 141-169.
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international space. However, Taiwan has not really had enormous muscle to exercise 
in the international arena. For some time, Taiwan has seemed to break out of 
international isolation. However, this may not be long-term.
By contrast, Deng Xiaoping had ostentatiously opened China at the beginning of 1980s, 
attracting American firms to move into China. Business people jostled one another in 
the rush to provide consumer goods to China’s multitudes of potential customers. 
Hence, they formed an interest group to urge the US government to widen the scope of 
trade with China, no matter how the PRC’s government violated human rights in 
defiance of American/intemational principles. Despite the nearly overwhelming 
repugnance of the American TV audience towards the Chinese government, which had 
been responsible for the Tiananmen Incident, American business people again united to 
support a new ‘open door’ policy in handling the PRC. On the other hand, the PRC 
government endeavoured to break out of the diplomatic predicament caused by the 
Tiananmen Incident. Beijing has since become more accommodating in its diplomacy 
and adopted a more realistic foreign policy, primarily based on economic and security 
interests and no longer on ideology.30 Therefore, the Beijing government did change its 
attitude after the Cold War and the Tiananmen Incident. Although the Taipei 
government improved its ties with the Western countries in the early 1990s to a certain 
extent, the Beijing government soon became proactive in its foreign policy towards the 
outside world.
30 David Shambaugh, “Peking’s Foreign Policy Conundrum Since Tiananmen: Peaceful Coexistence vs. 
Peaceful Evolution”, Issues & Studies. Vol. 28, No. 11, November 1992, pp. 65-85.
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In Asia Pacific, Taiwan could not contribute significantly to security except in the 
Taiwan Straits, although the Taiwan government could somehow provide foreign aid to 
some countries in this area. However, long-term commitment was not guaranteed. The 
euphoria between both governments of Taiwan and China in the early 1990s, especially 
the ‘1992 consensus’, paved the way for the people-to-people diplomacy between the 
two sides. In the end, Taiwanese business people became prominent in Taiwan’s 
economic diplomacy.
On the other hand, Beijing tried to relegate Taiwan’s status to a provincial level. Some 
scholars mistakenly asserted that the Beijing government wanted to maintain the status 
quo. In fact, China employed a carrot-and-stick policy towards Taiwan. China 
nevertheless tried to isolate Taiwan by any means possible.
Many scholars have stressed the importance of China per se and its cooperation. 
Therefore, many Western countries began to draw attention to and engage China. 
Multinational corporations also focused attention on Mainland China. Together with 
Taiwanese business people, these firms and China make impeccable match. This 
chapter tells us that the governments of China and Taiwan have competed with each 
other in the wake of the Cold War. However, it was the salient economic issues of the 
international system and Taiwanese business people that have played a major role in 
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. The role of Taiwanese business people will be 
discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
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Chapter 4
Taiwan’s Diplomacy at the State Level
4.0 Introduction
Although Waltz’s theory is very convincing, his theory is also too narrow, focusing 
merely above the unit level of analysis (the system level is above the state level). 
His prominent definition of structure effectively encompassed both the holist version, 
and the meaning of the ‘system level’. Waltz defined everything that is not structure 
as part of the unit (i.e. reductionist) level: ‘structure includes only what is required to 
show how the units of the system are positioned or arranged. Everything else is 
omitted’.1 Because he defined structure in very limited terms (and confined its use 
to the system level), he could not avoid making the unit level a dumping ground of a 
lot of causal relationships. The unit level thus contains some other levels of analysis 
and some other sources of explanation. Among the debates of levels of analysis, it 
has been focused on how to distinguish between the (collective) unit and the system 
level. Neither Waltz nor Singer stated clearly about this in their early works.1 2 The 
individual and state levels were regarded as mainly self-evident. This does not mean 
that we can thus abandon the analysis of the state level. The unit level of analysis is 
also very important in addition to Waltz’s analysis.
1 Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of Political Politics. London: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p. 82.
1 Barry Buzan, “The level o f Analysis Problem Reconsidered", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, ed.. 
International relations Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 206.
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All these are the reasons why we turn to the state level. In addition, the Taipei 
government has launched a series of successive policies, consistent or contradictory, 
since the late 1980s, thereby attempting to direct Taiwan’s diplomatic and economic 
activities. These policies no doubt more or less influenced Taiwan and its diplomacy, 
including Pragmatic diplomacy, the Six-Year National Development Plan, the APROC 
Plan, the Southward Policy and the Policy o f ‘No Haste, Be Patient’. Even though in 
practice, Taiwanese business people ignored these policies to a certain extent, they 
still on the one hand promoted, and on the other hand curbed what Taiwanese 
businesses have done since the late 1980s. In order to understand Taiwan’s 
economic diplomacy since the late 1980s, we need to review the policies of the state.
I proceed with my analysis by first considering Taiwan’s pragmatic approach to 
diplomacy. Next I review the ‘Two-states’ theory and then consider the impact of 
the Six-Year National Development Plan. Finally, I consider the westward trend and
its conflict with the Southward Policy.
4.1 Pragmatic Diplomacy
Until the mid-1980s, Taiwan had still stuck to a sort of Hallstein Doctrine in dealing 
with its foreign affairs.3 That is, Taiwan stuck with the Policy of “Han and the
3 The Hallstein Doctrine -  named after Walter Hallstein, German Foreign Minister and close advisor to 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer -  was set forth in December 1955. It declared that (other than the 
Soviet Union), West Germany would sever its diplomatic relations with any state that extended 
recognition to East Germany, thereby claiming that the Federal Republic of Germany was the sole 
representative o f all Germans. When Yugoslavia recognised East Germany in 1957, Bonn withdrew 
its diplomatic recognition from Belgrade. See Kuo-hsiung Lee, "The Republic of China's ‘Flexible 
Diplomacy' and Its ‘Look South’ Policy”, in David Tawei Lee and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., ed„ 
Taiwan in a Transformed World. London: Brassey’s, 1995.
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bandits do not co-exist” (Hanzei bu liangli, Taiwan had always
severed its official relations with every country that set up diplomatic ties with the 
PRC. The relations between Taiwan and the PRC were thus a zero-sum game. 
After Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations (UN) in 1971, the number of 
countries that recognised Taiwan dwindled to around twenty. By 1988, merely 22 
countries maintained official relations with Taiwan. Forty countries that hosted 
Taiwanese representative offices and treated them as ersatz embassies but did not 
officially recognise Taiwan as an independent country. By the end of the 1980s, 
President Lee Teng-hui had urged Taiwan to adopt a more flexible, more pragmatic 
and more forward-looking approach to upgrade Taiwan’s foreign relations,4 whereas 
the PRC remained dogmatic. While the PRC claimed, “There is only one China, and 
Taiwan is part of China”, Taiwan asserted, “There is only one China, and both Taiwan 
and the Mainland are part of China”. Afterwards, in view of China’s diplomatic 
blockade, Taiwan modified its claim that “China is divided and separately governed” 
by the two entities across the Taiwan Straits, thus no longer emphasising Taiwan as 
part of China.5
To engage with the international community in all dimensions, Taiwan does not 
struggle to represent ‘China’ against the PRC. Therefore, Taiwan respects 
international cooperation and avoids conflict, strengthens its relations with other 
countries, and tries to co-exist with the PRC, thus developing Taiwan’s international
4 China Times ( * ■ « # * ) ,  8 July 1988.
J Telephone interview with JJ, former Section Chief, Foreign Service Institute, MOFA, Taiwan, 21 July 
2003.
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‘space’ and hoping to achieve a win-win game with the PRC.6
In theory, the concept of rationality borrowed from neo-classical economics is often 
used in decision-making. Given the theory that governments act rationally, they 
would have consistent priorities and calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative 
policies in order to maximise their utility by considering both the priority and their 
perceptions of the nature of reality. However, the assumption of rationality is not 
always descriptively correct, though it still serves a useful function. Herbert Simon 
therefore introduced into the study of decision-making the concept of bounded 
rationality. Actors under bounded rationality usually fail to maximise their utilities 
because they are not always able to use all available information to calculate the costs 
and benefits of every alternative course of action. Therefore, the actors employ 
shortcuts as a quick way of doing something, learnt by practical experience (rules of 
thumb), thereby realising a satisfactory level of performance rather than the best one.7 
Accordingly, after President Lee Teng-hui visited Singapore and was called ‘the 
President from Taiwan’ in March 1989, he responded that the title was ‘not 
satisfactory but acceptable’. Obviously, this title was neither optimal nor too bad.
A book by Su Chi, later the Chairman of Mainland Affairs Council, asserts that since 
the PRC and Soviet Union arrived at a détente based on realism, Taiwan should 
neither underestimate nor exaggerate its own freedom of action and power. Taiwan
6 Tien Hung-Mao, "The Implications of Head-of-State Diplomacy of the ROC”, in Government 
Information Office, Peaceful Journey. Taipei: Government Information Office, 1997, pp.4-5.
7 Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics”, in Robert O. Keohane, 
ed„ Neorealism and Its Critics. New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 11-12.
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should attack what could be attacked and defend what should be defended. To be
more precise, for attacking, Taiwan could use diplomatic guerrilla warfare. In 
classic guerrilla warfare, as expounded by Mao Zedong, the guerrillas control the 
rural areas and carry out opportunistic raids on their enemy. According to the 
analogy, Taiwan had lost the ‘town’ (official recognition) and should concentrate on 
informal or economic relations where it could (the ‘countryside’). According to Su, 
only if Taiwan could make friends where the PRC could not penetrate should it seize 
the chance and not insist on formal recognition from its new partners. To defend its 
position, Taiwan still has had to stick with its ‘one China’ policy so that Taiwan would 
not provoke the PRC or overreach itself. In addition, to be pragmatic, Taiwan should 
continue to promote people-to-people diplomacy with the Mainland and lessen the 
tension between the two sides. Meanwhile, Su claimed that Taiwan could develop 
trading relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries little by little. 
Even though, because of pragmatism, there would be a limit in the relations between 
the Soviet Union and Taiwan, the Soviet Union would be willing to develop trading 
ties with Taiwan to a certain extent. Vladimir Ivanov, an official from the Soviet 
Union, had visited Taipei in May 1989 and had said that if the economic relations 
between Taiwan and the Soviet Union could reach only half the level of those between 
Taiwan and the US, the Soviet Union would find a model or concept to accommodate 
the ties. This, said Su Chi, was the best way to express pragmatic diplomacy—by 
developing first relations and then a model. In this newly transformed world, 
Taiwan should bring pragmatism into full play and develop a larger sphere of
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diplomatic influence.8
In October 1998, the Koo-Wang talks were going to resume; Koo Chen-fu, head of 
the Straits Exchange Foundation, travelled to the Mainland to meet with his 
counterpart and talk with President Jiang Zemin. The meetings were warm and 
seemingly fruitful.9 However, at the turn of the century, Lee even proposed the 
theory of ‘special state-to-state relations’ (‘two-states’ theory) to counter the 
diplomatic predicament imposed by the PRC,10 although this alienated the support of 
US President Clinton.
4.2 The ‘Two-States’ Theory
The ‘two-states’ theory was not only a downturn in the relations across the Taiwan 
Straits, it also alienated Taiwan from the US. Therefore, Taiwan’s economic 
diplomacy has become more important. In the past, Taiwan wanted to re-enter the 
United Nations (UN) by asking for a repeal of UN Resolution No 2758 of 1971, by 
which Taiwan had been replaced by the PRC. However, by the ‘two-states’ theory, 
Taiwan would ask for permission to join the UN as a new, separate state, citing the 
so-called German model to support its policy. The German model was embodied in 
the ‘Grundlagenvertrag’, or Fundamental Treaty of 1972, between the two Germanies. 
It did not set any specific future scenario, with one side recognising the other as an
'  Su Chi. On the Normalisation of the Relations Between the PRC and the Soviet Union from 1979 to 
1989. Taipei: Sanmin Bookshop, 1992, pp. 229-31. 1979-1989,i t J t :  =  R » l E ,
1992), pp. 229-31.
* Copper, John F„ Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? Boulder: Westview Press, 2003, p. 212.
10 According to Copper, the ‘two-states’ theory was Lee's response to President Clinton’s “three no’s” 
statement in China in 1998. See ibid.
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equal entity and neither side claiming itself as the sole legal government of 
Germany.11
President Lee Teng-hui’s announcement of a ‘two-states’ theory in July 1999 may 
have come as a shock to many. But to the policy’s mastermind, it had been a long 
time coming, following a decade of deliberate, painstaking preparations. This theory 
involved all the three levels of analysis. Almost a decade later, Lee finally admitted 
to a German press delegation that the 1991 and 1992 Constitution revisions were 
aimed at giving Taiwan ‘separate-state’ status, thus confirming the New Party’s fears 
that the revisions would endanger the status of the Republic of China.1 2 The process 
of diminishing the ROC continued with another constitutional amendment that 
scrapped the province in the administrative hierarchy, which was completed in 1998. 
All these too place at the level of the state. With these processes completed, Lee 
attempted to turn Taiwan’s de facto independence into a de jure one at the level of 
individual. In 1993, Lee, a Christian, told the late Japanese author Ryotaro Shiba 
that he saw himself as the Moses of Taiwan. This meant the splitting of Taiwan from 
China, since Moses had led his Jewish people out of Egypt.13
At the level of the international system, American pressure might be a factor. Lee 
Teng-hui’s speech at Cornell in 1995 was regarded by the US as inflammatory. The 
US told Taiwan in advance this should be a non-political speech, but the speech itself
11 Ching Cheong, Will Taiwan Break Awav. Singapore: World Scientific, 2001, p. 164.
12 Ching Cheong, Will Taiwan Break Awav. Singapore: World Scientific, 2001, p. 170.
13 Ibid. p. 170.
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clearly was political, and the US believed it had been blindsided by Taiwan, although 
Beijing’s objection was not to Lee’s reunion speech but to the trip itself. China’s 
retaliatory campaign included a series of diplomatic annoyances to the US. The 
PRC postponed a series of high-ranking meetings, such as a trip to the US by Defence 
Minister Chi Haotian and a visit to Beijing by John Holum, the director of the US 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. China also cancelled scheduled talks 
between the two governments regarding nuclear energy and the control of missile 
technology. The PRC also ordered a Chinese air force delegation visiting 
Washington to return to China. In addition, China recalled its ambassador from 
Washington on 17 June 1995, and delayed granting the formal acceptance necessary 
for President Clinton’s appointee, former US Senator James Sasser, to take his post as 
the next American ambassador to China. Consequently, the US and the PRC found 
themselves in the summer of 1995 with no ambassadorial representation on each 
other’s territory for the first time since the establishment of relations in 1979. The 
events of the summer of 1995 made the US determined to pay closer attention to 
China. Clinton also promised the PRC that the US 1) would oppose or resist efforts 
by Taiwan to gain independence; 2) would not support the creation of ‘two Chinas’, or 
one China and a separate Taiwan; and 3) would not support Taiwan’s admission to the 
United Nations (UN). These promises were afterwards called the “three no’s”.14 
All this made the international environment unfavourable to Taiwan.
14 James Mann. About Face -  A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to 
Clinton. New York: Vintage Books, 1998, pp. 327-30.
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The missile crisis in 1996 strengthened the differences between the people on Taiwan 
and the people on the Mainland and shows how little the PRC leaders understood 
about democracy. Although all they did was to increase Lee’s margin of victory in 
the Taiwan presidential elections and make many people on Taiwan furious,15 the US 
was not going to change its policy on one China, urging Taiwan to cool it and 
encouraging Beijing and Taiwan to have direct talks across the Taiwan Straits (talks 
that had been suspended in 1995 because of the Lee visit to Cornell). The US, not 
wanting Taiwan to think it had a blank cheque from the US, told Taiwan not to be 
provocative. The deployment of carriers to the Taiwan Straits helped to cool tension 
down. From then on US relationships with Beijing began to improve.16 Since the 
missile crisis in 1996, the US had departed subtly from its previous non-mediatory 
role to one advocating an ‘interim agreement’ between Beijing and Taipei. Under 
such an agreement, which is supposed to last 50 years, Taipei would not declare 
independence, while Beijing would renounce the use of force. This proposal has 
developed progressively from an academic suggestion to one followed by the US 
government.17 At the level of the international system, Taiwan was facing the 
pressure to enter into political talks with China. In order to solve the problem once 
and for all, Lee Teng-hui declared Taiwan a bona fide state, thus abandoning the 
one-China concept that had been Lee’s longstanding nightmare. 1
11 Nancy Bemkopf Tucker. China Confidential -  American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 486-87.
16 Nancy Bemkopf Tucker. China Confidential -  American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations. 
New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 488-89.
17 Ching Cheong, Will Taiwan Break Awav. Singapore: World Scientific, 2001, p. 171
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At the state level, the theory also related to the presidential elections in 2000. 
According to opinion polls, former governor James Soong (35 percent) led all other 
candidates by a wide margin, including the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian (26 percent) and 
Vice-President Lien Chan (14 percent). It was believed that Lee was unwilling to be 
replaced by Soong, who was a mainlander and whom he found too disobedient. 
Because Soong enjoyed the trans-party support, the ‘two-states’ theory could be a 
deadly blow to him.18 By throwing away the one-China principle, Soong would be 
put into a dilemma. If Soong opposed the new theory, he would lose the votes of 
native Taiwanese. And if Soong supported the theory, it would cost him the votes of 
mainlanders. Although Soong was hurt even more seriously by a scandal in the 
elections, it could be calculated that the ‘two-states’ theory was designed partly for 
him.19
In the end, the ‘two-states’ theory met with the strong negative pressure from the 
international system, including Beijing and Washington. A strong military threat 
from Beijing, open criticism from the US, together with plunging share prices in 
Taiwan all pushed Taipei to back down. Therefore, Su Chi, Taiwan’s Mainland 
Affairs Council chairman, had to tone down Lee’s theory by adding a ‘one China’ 
commitment and a ‘no independence’ promise to Lee’s initial formulation.20 
Politically, Taipei suffered a setback, so Taiwan’s economic diplomacy became 
increasingly more important. Taiwanese business people played a major role in
"  Ibid. 171.
19 In the end, Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election.
20 Ching Cheong, Will Taiwan Break Away. Singapore: World Scientific, 2001, p. 132.
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ameliorating relations across the Taiwan Straits. In addition, they also served as 
pioneers in cultivating relations with countries in Southeast Asia. Political leaders 
also strove to help and protect Taiwanese business people by improving Taiwan’s 
international standing and concluding international agreements.
4.3 The Six-Year National Development Plan
In May 1990 Hau Pei-tsun was appointed Premier of Taiwan, and the Six-Year 
National Development Plan was introduced to lure global major nations, enhancing 
both economic and political relations between Taipei and them. The budget of the 
Plan over six years (1991-1996), which amounted to US$313 billion, received a lot of 
publicity and attracted tremendous business interest worldwide. After Taipei threw 
the Plan into the international market, many countries without diplomatic relations 
upgraded their Taipei trade offices, sent high-ranking officials ‘incognito’ to Taiwan, 
and consented to exchange their air landing rights with Taiwan, even despite Beijing’s 
objection.21
However, all these are only illusions of Taipei’s ‘bubble diplomacy;’ 22 and 
ultimately — and inevitably — the bubble burst. The failure was marked in late 
1993: Premier Lien Chan had to cut the budget of the ‘Six-Year National 
Development Plan’ (1991-1996), which had been used to attract the major companies
21 Linjun Wu, “The ROC's Economic Diplomacy After the March Crisis: Can Money Talk Again?” p. 
38.
22 The term is borrowed from 'bubble economy’, which was used to describe the economy of some 
Asian countries, especially Japan. The ‘bubble diplomacy' suggests that when Taiwan's economic 
diplomacy was booming like ‘bubbles' in the early 1990s, the bubbles suddenly burst after the national 
budget was cut down in 1993.
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and governments of the Western countries. For a short while, this strategy had been 
successful, because companies seeking contracts in Taiwan had lobbied their own 
governments in Taiwan’s favour. However, this strategy lost its force when the 
development budget was cut. A sign of the failure is that, since this event, scarcely 
any high-ranking Western officials have visited Taiwan.
The potential big contracts offered by the Six-Year National Development Plan 
attracted visits by Western countries and promoted their relations with Taiwan. The 
Plan attracted tremendous interest worldwide from business people who wanted a 
chance to invest and make a profit. In January 1991, a substantial breakthrough in 
relations with Western Europe came about, when French Minister of Trade and 
Territorial Development Roger Fauroux led to Taiwan a delegation of 28 government 
officials and business leaders. Despite realising that the PRC would protest, the 
French government and enterprises still launched their move in order to win several 
contracts in nuclear power, subway construction, and a high-speed railroad. The 
PRC did assert that the French government’s action “runs counter to the commitment 
made by France that it recognised only one China” and “is unacceptable to the 
Chinese side”. Notwithstanding the Chinese government’s accusation, French 
Secretary of State for Foreign Trade Jean-Noel Jeanneney led another delegation to 
Taiwan in January 1992. Those countries in Europe and North America which 
followed suit included Italy, Holland and Canada.23 Consequently, visits of Taiwan
13 Italian Minister o f Public Construction Affairs Gianni Prandini visited Taiwan in April 1991; Dutch 
Trade Minister Yvonne Vanrooy called on Taiwan in April 1992: and Canadian International Trade 
Minister Michael Wilson also paid a visit to Taiwan in September 1992. See Ralph N. Clough, 
Reaching Across Taiwan Strait: People-to-Peonle Diplomacy. Oxford: Westview Press, 1993, p.107.
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cabinet-level officials to Western countries became increasingly frequent. Given the 
fulmination from the PRC, these countries’ governments claimed the exchanges were 
unofficial and ‘ignored’ PRC opposition.24
Britain, Japan, and New Zealand all permitted an upgrading of Taiwan’s 
representative offices in their capitals in 1993. For example, Japan allowed the title 
of Taiwan’s ‘ersatz embassy’ in Tokyo to be changed from the ‘Association of East 
Asian Relations’ to the ‘Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan’. 
The other countries that wanted a share of the Six-Year National Development Plan 
sent high-level officials, such as former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, former 
French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, former British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, German Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economic Affairs Juergen 
Moellenmann, Australian Minister for Resources and Tourism Alan Griffiths, and US 
Trade Representative Carla Hills, to ‘show amity’ and lobby for contracts. Japan, 
which had always been very scrupulous in keeping its distance from Taiwan, also had 
its minister for international trade and industry attend a meeting for bilateral economic 
cooperation between Japan and Taiwan.25 Gradually, many countries became willing 
to develop substantial relations with Taiwan based on reciprocity. Countries without 
official relations with Taiwan began to remove various obstacles and vexations from 
the path of Taiwanese visitors. By taking advantage of all this, Taiwan’s government
24 Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, INC., 1999, p. 74.
25 Laura Li, “Contracting Relations: Economic and Foreign Relations in the Six-Year Plan", Sinorama 
Vol. 18, No. 2, February 1993, p. 21. Also see Linjun Wu, “Does Money Talk? The ROC’s Economic 
Diplomacy”, pp. 32-33. Il
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tried to introduce high technology, upgrade its industry, improve its foreign relations 
and elevate its international standing.26 At the same time, American enterprises were 
rushing into Taiwan to compete with European companies for contracts in a more than 
$300 billion public works programme, since this, together with American exports to 
Taiwan of US$16 billion in 1993, more than twice as much as to the PRC, meant that 
Taiwan offered the possibility of profits in a short time, whereas China offered 
glittering prospects for American firms in the future. American defence suppliers 
were anxiously probing whether President Bush’s approval of F-16 warplanes to 
Taiwan opened the way for more arms sales. Therefore, the US business interest in 
Taiwan was growing stronger and stronger.27 However, the Six-Year National 
Development Plan of over US$300 billion investment in transportation, 
telecommunication, and other construction schemes launched in 1991 was truncated 
afterwards by problems with land acquisition, corruption and other policy 
commitments. These problems prevented Taiwan from achieving the Plan’s aim.28
The Taiwan Yearbook 1994 admits that “National deficits have ballooned in the last 
three years due to the tremendous expansion in government outlays to finance the 
plan’s large scale construction projects”. It goes on to describe the fiscal strain of 
Taiwan in these terms:29
“  The MOFAof the ROC. Foreign Relations and Diplomacy Administration. 1993. p. 41. According 
to the MOFA report, other countries which sent high-ranking officials to Taiwan included Sweden, 
Czech, Indonesia, and Switzerland.
27 James Mann, About Face. New York: Vintage Books, 2000, p. 318.
M David Shambaugh, ed.. The Modem Chinese State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 
pp. 98-99.
M Government Information Office, The Republic of China Yearbook 1994. Taipei: Government 
Information Office, 1994, p. 204.
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Since 1991, the Taiwanese government’s finances have been 
strained by the Six-Year National Development Plan. The annual 
increase rate of the national treasury expenditures increased from
18.2 percent in 1990 to 37.6 in 1992. To cover its budget 
shortfall, the central government issued bonds to cover the 
expenditures. The percentage of public bonds to annual national 
treasury expenditure increased from 3.9 percent in 1981 to 18.1 in 
Fiscal Year 1991 and 32.5 percent in FY 1992, the rate once rose to
37.7 percent at the end of 1992. The portion of government 
bonds in Taiwan’s GNP also from 2.9 percent in 1990 to 8 percent 
during the same period of time.
According to the Yearbook, “For every US$100 spent by the central government in FY 
1992, US$32.5 came from issuance of government bonds, and the amount will 
necessitate increased spending in the future. Only 2 to 3 percent of central 
government spending in FY 1991 went to pay for principal and interest on bonds; the 
ratio jumped to 6.17 percent in FY 1992 and is expected to soar to 10 percent in FY 
1 9 9 3 ” 3° j j le p |an thus been regarded as a great burden and fiscal strain on the 
Taipei government.
In February 1993, Lien Chan replaced Hau Pei-tsun as Premier of the Republic of
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China on Taiwan. Given the criticism of the Six-Year National Development Plan 
largely by the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP), Lien 
decided to continue to carry out 12 construction projects, but to relinquish the 
others,31 reversing the policy of allowing the budget deficit to grow.32 On 5 August 
1993, The Council for Economic Planning and Development reported that the number 
of projects under the Six-Year National Development Plan was to be reduced from 
775 to 632, and the capital required from US$313 billion to US$239.2 billion.33 
Because the budget and projects were substantially slashed in late 1993, the 
bargaining chips of Taiwan naturally dwindled to fewer huge contracts. Therefore, 
very few high-level officials have visited Taipei since 1994, especially no 
cabinet-level ones from the Western nations, who turned out to have been fair weather 
friends.
4.4 Westward Trend, Southward Policy and Asia-Pacific Regional Operations 
Centre (APROC) Plan
There are both push factors and pull factors in the Westward Trend and Southward 
Policy of Taiwan. Partly due to the rise of its economic strength and accumulated 
capital, Taiwan tended to invest overseas -  notably in Southeast Asia and China - after
31 On 2000, just after the DPP won the presidential election, a senior advisor to the new President Chen 
Shui-bian, Professor Yao Jia-wen, delivered a speech at the SOAS in London, revealing that one of the 
reasons why the KMT stepped down was that the Six-Year National Development Plan had led to the 
large amount o f national debt, alienating Taiwanese people. No matter how correct this ‘reason’, the 
DPP was strongly opposed to the Plan, which caused great inefficiency and waste o f national budget, 
although it had brought about some ‘acclamation’.
32 Lin. Tai-Man. Mv Heart in Eternal Peace -  The Road of Lien Chan to Holding Office. Taipei:
Commonwealth Publishing Co., Ltd., 1996 ( t t « » .  fcd t: ^ T ,  1996), p.
168.
33 Jason C. Hu, ed„ Premier Lien: A Man of Pragmatism. Taipei: Government Information Office,
1995, p. 193-94.
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the Taipei government lifted controls on foreign exchange in 1988. (See Table 6.1.) 
All these factors will be discussed in the following chapters.
Taiwan’s overseas investment started to boom in November 1987, when Taiwan lifted 
the ban on visiting relatives on Mainland China, Taiwanese business people invested 
on the Mainland slightly more than before. Before 1987, Taiwan’s investment in 
Southeast Asia was largely confined to Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. It was 
not until 1990 that Taiwanese investment in China increased and began to overtake 
investment in Southeast Asia. Soon China, with its vast market and cheaper and 
abundant labour, absorbed a lot of Taiwanese capital. According to statistics, 
Taiwan’s investment in Southeast Asia in 1993 abruptly declined, but the accumulated 
investment in China from 1988 to 1992 amounted to US$8 billion, and US$12.8 
billion.34 The reason why, in the early 1990s, Taiwanese investment declined in the 
Southeast Asian countries (including Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Indonesia) was the opening of China to foreign capital and Deng Xiaoping’s Southern 
Tour in 1992. Obviously, Taiwanese business people have a penchant to transfer 
their investment to China. In addition, Taiwan’s indirect trade with China through 
Hong Kong was expanding.
As a result of these changes, Taiwan’s economic dependence on China has a tendency 
to augment. In view of China’s threats of use of force against Taiwan and the
34 Board o f Foreign Trade, Foreign Trade Development of the Republic of China 1995. Taipei: 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, 1996.
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increasing economic dependence, an alert government of Taiwan tried to encourage its 
business people to look elsewhere for trade and investment. In August 1993, 
Economics Minister Chiang Pin-kung backed the policy of promoting the southward 
development of Taiwan industries (Southward Policy).
After 1993, the only country with a comparable growth of investment from Taiwanese 
sources was Vietnam, though the absolute total capital from Taiwan to Vietnam could 
not rival the sums going to China. Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995. In 1996, 
with the addition of Vietnam, ASEAN now consisted of seven member countries: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei and Vietnam. 
While Burma and Laos subsequently entered in July 1997, Cambodia’s membership 
was delayed until April 1999. All these developments were expected to happen in 
the near future when the Taipei government pushed for the Southward Policy from 
1993. Taiwan expected that ASEAN would expand to form an area of over 500 
million people, with each member’s economy growing over 10% per year, making it a 
potentially great market. Moreover, ASEAN has gradually reduced tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, strengthened political and economic cooperation, and has already 
decided to establish a free trade area in 2003 with an internal tariff rate between from 
0 to 5% for all of the ASEAN countries. The future effect of these trends could be to 
render ASEAN similar to the EU and the NAFTA, making ASEAN one of the world’s 
major regional economic organisations. Therefore, in order to overcome these 
increasing pressures, the Taipei government decided to reinforce its international 
competitiveness and complete the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centre (APROC)
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Plan as soon as p o ss ib le .35
35 Board of Foreign Trade, Foreign Trade Development of the Republic of China 1995. Taipei: 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, 1996, pp. 34-35.
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Chapter 5
Taiwan and Taiwanese Business People
5.0 Introduction
In Chapter 4, we explained the good reasons why we should examine the state level. 
Similarly, we have found reasons to doubt whether ‘national interest’ is defined well 
enough to serve as a plausible and compelling goal for the units of international 
relations. However, Waltz’s restriction of the levels of analysis debate to the confines 
of reductionist/holist one had a very distorting effect. It rammed the whole debate 
about levels into an inappropriate dyad, confining it to merely two levels, and 
importing into the relationship between those two levels the oppositional qualities 
associated with reductionism versus holism.1 Therefore, we should open the box. 
Debate on this layer of the problem cannot proceed without also taking into 
considering the individuals who engage in the actual process of decision-making.
At this level, we will examine both Taiwan’s national leaders and Taiwanese business 
people. Taiwan’s national leaders made every effort to explore Taiwan’s international 
space by hook or crook, especially by overseas visits. Taiwanese business people 
have followed their own steps in pursuing profits, largely ignoring policies made by 
the Taipei government. Although sometimes they are shy and timid in disguise, they 1
1 Buzan, Barry, “The level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered”, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, ed.. 
International relations Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 208.
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are always firm in practice. In order to examine Taiwan’s economic diplomacy in 
depth, we therefore should examine Taiwan’s national leaders and Taiwanese business 
people.
I proceed with my analysis by first considering several political leaders and 
entrepreneurs, then turn attention to the Taipei government’s view of the bargaining 
efforts of the political leaders, which includes a review of criticism levelled at head- 
of-state diplomacy. Next I investigate the complementary nature of Taiwan’s 
economic relations and diplomatic ties. Finally, I consider how entrepreneurs can fill 
the role of middlemen, surrogates and hindrances.
5.1 Political leaders and Entrepreneurs at the Third Level -  Sub-National
In addition to analysis at the international system level and the state level, we have 
also to consider these developments at the level of the individual, which means that 
we must examine the personality and thought of state leaders. Chiang Ching-kuo 
became the defence minister of Taiwan in 1965. In addition to national defence, he 
was also responsible for visiting friendly countries like the US, Japan, South Korea, 
Thailand, Vietnam, etc. In 1969, he served as vice premier. Then he came to power 
as premier in 1972, when Chiang Kai-shek was ill. In 1975, when Chiang Kai-shek 
died, he became the Kuomintang leader. From 1978 to 1988, when he passed away, 
Chiang Ching-kuo was the president of Taiwan. After Chiang Kai-shek's 
Kuomintang forces fled to Taiwan in 1949, in the wake of the communist takeover of 
the Chinese mainland, Chiang Ching-kuo worked to fortify the security and
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intelligence forces and established a youth wing for the ruling Kuomintang. He 
introduced modernising reform, and during his tenure Taiwan enjoyed rapid economic 
development as an export-led country, one of the ‘four tigers’. Gradual 
démocratisation was allowed, together with ‘Taiwanisation’ of the Kuomintang, 
which had hitherto been dominated by Chinese ‘mainlanders’, who had followed 
Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan in 1949. An opposition party, the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP), was allowed for the first time to participate in legislative elections in 
1986; martial law, which had been in force since 1949, was lifted in 1987. Under 
internal pressure within Taiwan, influence from the US, and the threat of the PRC, he 
decided in 1987 to relax cross-Straits relations, permitting travel to the communist- 
controlled mainland for family reunions. Chiang Ching-kuo revealed that he thought 
of himself as a Taiwanese because he had spent most of his life in Taiwan. He also 
recruited many native elites.2
Lee Teng-hui, successor to Chiang Ching-kuo, has been a right-wing politician, vice- 
president 1984-88, president and Kuomintang party leader 1988-2001. He is also a 
native Taiwanese leader without historic baggage. He was regarded as a reforming 
technocrat. He was directly elected president in March 1996, defying Chinese 
opposition to the democratic contest. Lee had taught for two decades as a professor of 
economics at National Taiwan University before becoming mayor of Taipei in 1979.
2 The Hutchinson Encyclopaedia of Modem Political Biography. Oxford: Helicon Publishing Ltd, 1999, 
p. 218. Also see Zhen Peng-Ren, translated. The Biography of Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo. Taipei, Central 
daily. 1990, pp. 235-96. A d t :1*»* B fttfcjfi.1990, pp. 235-
96.)
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He substantially accelerated the pace of liberalisation and Taiwanisation in the 
political economy.3 He pushed for pragmatic diplomacy to seek international space, 
no longer stressed eventual reunification with Mainland China, and recognised the 
PRC as a political entity.
This practical approach by a politician partly echoed what the business community 
had been saying and doing for years. Business people were the pioneers of Taiwan’s 
economic diplomacy. They had invested in Mainland China long before the easing of 
political tension across the Taiwan Straits, and in Southeast Asia long before the 
proclamation of the Taipei government’s Southward Policy.
In 1983, the PRC already promulgated the ‘Special preferential measures regarding 
investment of Taiwanese compatriots in special economic zone’
Many Taiwanese business people also invested in 
China according to the ‘Temporary preferential regulations regarding investment of 
overseas Chinese’ April 1985, and the
‘Regulations regarding encouraging foreign business people’s investment in 
enterprises ’ 1986. Southeast Asia used to be the
popular area for Taiwanese overseas investment. Before the 1970s, due to lack of 
foreign exchanges, the capital stock of investment was usually from their primary 
materials, semi-components and old machinery. The investment items are focused on
3 The Hutchinson Encyclopaedia of Modem Political Biography. Oxford: Helicon Publishing Ltd, 1999, 
p. 255.
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food processing, textiles, plastics, rubber, non-metal and mineral products and 
electronics. In the 1970s, the favourable international payment Taiwan enjoyed 
boosted its overseas investment, especially in Indonesia and the Philippines. The 
investment items are mainly chemicals and bamboo products. Meanwhile, investment 
in America also increased, focusing on electronics and international trade. In the 
1980s, although investment in America greatly increased, investment in Thailand, the 
Philippines and Malaysia remained also very popular. Investment in Southeast Asia 
is the major means for Taiwanese businesses to obtain primary materials, to look for 
production posts of cheap cost, and to avoid international trade with industrialised 
countries. Therefore, investment in Southeast Asia became the main stream of 
overseas investment.4 *
5.2 Political Leaders’ Bargaining Efforts -  A View from the Taipei Government
Pragmatic diplomacy was the initiative taken by Lee Teng-hui, who came to power 
after the death of Chiang Ching-Kuo. After Lee became the Chairman of KMT and 
the President of the ROC, he delivered a speech at the 13lh Party Congress in July 
1988, calling for the party to strive with a greater determination, pragmatism, 
flexibility, and vision in order to upgrade foreign policy and break out of a position of 
isolation.3
4 http;//l 92.192.200.10/87kai23.html 3 June 2004
9 The Masses Daily (Minzhong Ribao £1910 • ) ,  4 June 1989, p. 3.
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By hook or crook, Taipei’s leaders have often been able to change craftily the political 
policy of other nations. Thanks to an enormous anonymous donation, the Lee Teng- 
hui Chair at the University of Cornell was set up, and both the Senate and the House 
of Representatives in America approved President Lee’s holiday diplomacy. To make 
sure that the US Congress backed President Lee’s trip, Taiwan’s government paid 
US$4.5 million to a lobbying firm with a large bonus, payable on receipt of the visa.6
The contract signed between the Taiwan Research Institute (TRI) and Cassidy in 1994 
for US$1.5 million a year stirred things up in Washington and the Taiwan Straits, 
following successful lobbying in Congress to force the Clinton Administration to 
grant a visa to Lee Teng-hui. It is said that during the KMT era, Taipei paid US$1.5 
million for Cassidy Co per year for six consecutive years with each term of three 
years. In 2001, Chen Shui-bian’s government renewed the agreement with its 
successor company, whose subsidiary, Cassidy & Associates, is now responsible for 
lobbying in the administration and the assembly, thus paying US$2 million per year. 
The goals in 2001 for Cassidy were to promote the attendance of President Chen at 
APEC,7 to improve the US preferential treatment towards Taiwan’s leaders when they
6 International Herald Tribune, 21 July 1995, p. 6. Taiwan has around thirty Washington lobbying 
firms. 38 states and 107 cities have links with Taiwan; 18 states established trade offices in Taipei 
during the 1990s, given constant lobbying in the US since 1979. Also see Linjun Wu, "Does Money 
Talk? The ROC’s Economic Diplomacy”, Issues & Studies. December 1995, p. 33; and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Diplomacy Report. Taipei: MOFA, 1992, p. 189. Waiiiao Baoxaoshu
f t » . f td t :* 3 t» .1 9 9 2 ) p .  189.
1 The APEC meeting was held in Shanghai, China, so the Beijing government had not invited President 
Chen. What was worse, President Chen appointed the former Vice President Li Yuan-Zu to attend the 
meeting, but the PRC government rejected Li. Generally, the Beijing government does not approve 
people who have served as president, vice president, premier, current foreign minister, defence minister 
in the Taiwanese government to participate in international diplomatic gatherings. In the end, Taiwan 
forfeited its right to attend the meeting.
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pass through the US, to encourage Taiwan’s entry into international organisations, 
such as the WTO and the WHO, and to promote US arms sales to Taiwan. In July 
2000 Cassidy also lobbied for the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA), which 
had been opposed by the Clinton Administration but had already been passed by the 
House. To make this lobbying mission low-key, these contracts were signed by two 
nominally private institutes, the Taiwan Research Institute (TRI) and the Taiwan 
Political and Economic Research Institute (TPERI), whose chairmen are Liu Tai-ying 
and Lin Chen-yi, good friends to President Lee and President Chen respectively.8 The 
TRI was contracted by Liu Tai-ying, then chairman of the KMT Financial Committee, 
who hired Cassidy without notifying the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).
In addition, it is revealed that Bergner Bockomy Inc received a grand total of 
US$40,000 in 1999 from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office 
(TECRO) for lobbying in favour of legislation to authorise foreign assistance. This 
lobbying has been successful in that an amendment was passed to mandate the 
Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress regarding Taiwan’s participation in 
the World Health Organisation. Bergner Bockomy Inc also lobbied for legislation 
relating to Taiwan’s participation in international organisations and Taiwan’s security.
8 http://contenl.sina.com/news/67/31/673IQ8 1 b5gif.html 29 July 2001, All foreign lobbyists are 
required by law to register either with the US Department of Justice or the lobby Disclosure Act office 
on Capitol Hill. Afterwards, Cassidy & Associates merged with Sandwick Public Affairs, Boland 
Madigan Inc and Cassidy & Associates, Inc. The Washington Post first reported in early July 2000 that 
Cassidy & Associates had ended its lucrative, six-year-long contract with the Taiwan Research Institute 
(TRI).
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Cassidy is obviously making much more profit compared with competitors dealing 
with Taiwan. Diplomatic sources said that Liu Tai-ying was very pleased with 
Cassidy’s performance and even intended to extend the contract after the March 2000 
presidential election. The Chen administration followed suit. However, response 
from Capitol Hill was not as warm as Liu had hoped for. Jim Dom and Mark Tison, 
aids of Senator Jesse Helms -  the original sponsor of TSEA in the Senate -  said that 
the influence of Cassidy has been exaggerated. An assistant to Representative Ben 
Gilman, chairman of the International Relations Committee in the House, pointed out 
that people associated with Cassidy had no idea about the real situation when TSEA 
was voted for in the subcommittee and the full committee. Congressman David Wu’s 
office confirmed it had received a phone call from Cassidy on behalf of TSEA, yet it 
got more from the Formosa Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), a lobby group 
close to the DPP, which claimed the credit. Publicity surrounding TSEA may have 
complicated the situation in Congress. The FAPA and lawmakers like Tsai Tong- 
rong have been promoting TSEA, and people who are long-time supporters, such as 
the Taiwan Independence Movement, have even campaigned in The Washington Post 
for passage of TSEA.9
Besides, China Airlines and EVA Airways, the two largest airlines in Taiwan, 
declared their plans to purchase twelve Boeing 777s just before President Lee came 
back from his visit to the US. Even though the two airlines professed that the
’ http://www.taipeitinies.com/nc ws/2000/07/10/storv/0000043189 10 July 2000, In April 1999 DPP 
Legislator Tfcai Tong-rong led a delegation from Taiwan to lobby for TSEA on Capitol Hill, meeting 
people like Carl Ford, a former Defence Department Asia specialist.
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proposed deal was irrelevant to the President’s visit, observers were convinced that 
the declaration was probably not a coincidence.10 1 By the same token, Minister of 
Economic Affairs Chiang Pin-kung told the Legislative Yuan that the state-run 
Chinese Petroleum Corporation might buy crude oil from Alaska.11
It is normal for a head of state to visit abroad, but sabre-rattling by the PRC reached a 
culmination after President Lee Teng-hui visited Cornell University in 1995 and 
before the presidential election in 1996. All this was to overshadow Lee as a head of 
state because the PRC asserted that Taiwan was a renegade province and that 
Taiwanese were internal affairs. Thus, the President of Taiwan could not be regarded 
as a head of state. Lee’s overseas visit as a head of state would naturally ‘provoke’ 
the PRC, especially when this involved the sole great power, the US, because its 
symbolism was so clear that other countries might follow suit. Chinese officials were 
adherents of a ‘domino theory’, fearing that Taiwan could become a de facto state, 
which the PRC would find intolerable.12
The PRC always professes its sovereignty over Taiwan, never renounces use of force 
towards Taiwan, and tries to isolate Taiwan in the international diplomatic arena in 
order to relegate Taiwan’s status to the same as Hong Kong’s. The PRC refuses to 
recognise the fact that Taiwan is a political entity. Therefore, Taiwanese leaders
10 Linjun Wu, “Does Money Talk? The ROC’s Economic Diplomacy”, p. 33.
11 International Herald Tribune, 13 June 1995, p. 4. Ibid. p.33.
11 Compared to the US visit, Lee’s visit to the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand in 1994 was also 
protested but not so drastically. It was rumoured that after Lee's visit to the US, Japan or Britain might 
be the next target for Lee's 'schedule'. However, Lee was not able to do so.
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believe that Taiwan's existence and security must depend on diplomatic activities 
with political implications rather than solely on economic and trade-related, cultural, 
sports, and art activities. Lien Chan stated that Taiwan should make known that 
Taiwan is a state with absolute sovereignty by participating in all the frequent 
legitimate activities of the global community, because Taiwan is too big to ignore. He 
thus claimed that all the people and the leaders of Taiwan have the responsibility to 
pursue those rights available to them as members of the law-governed international 
community.13
Lee Teng-hui took his presidential office in 1988. Lien Chan, as foreign minister, 
paid a low-key visit to Singapore in December 1988, paving the way for Lee to take 
the unprecedented step of visiting Singapore in March 1989. In 1994 Lee again made 
other visits to the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, where his reception by 
Thailand’s King Phumibol implied a state visit. While he was in the Philippines in 
February 1994, the heads of both states met with each other at the Manila airport and 
discussed Taiwan’s investment in the redevelopment of the former US naval base of 
Subic Bay. Such a meeting nearly amounted to tacit recognition without formalities. 
Lien Chan, Premier of Taiwan, also made visits to Malaysia and Singapore.14
The culmination of these visits was Lee’s at Cornell University. This caused uproar 
from the PRC. The PRC described Lee as merely the latest in a line of Chinese rebels
13 Lien Chan, “The Republic o f China & the United Nations”, Strategic Review. Vol. 22, No. 3, summer 
1994, pp.7-13.
14 See Table 5.1.
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who had betrayed their motherland, China. The US government, under great pressure, 
promised not to issue visas for Lee in the near future. In the wake of his visit to the 
US, Lee announced he would take a break from international travel for a while, 
staying in his home country, Taiwan. The PRC claimed that even if Lee stepped 
down in the future, he would still have to stay put without going abroad. Actually, 
after his term was over, Lee visited Britain in spite of the PRC’s protests. However, 
when he arranged to visit Japan afterwards, the PRC strongly protested to Japan’s 
government. Lee had to state that he would go to Japan only for his heart operation. 
Indeed, he returned home as soon as he had received the treatment. Lee later wanted 
to revisit Japan for further treatment, but the Japanese government vetoed the trip 
under pressure from Beijing.
It was very clear that from 1995 to 1997, when he visited Central America, President 
Lee was confined to his own country because of the PRC’s objection to his going 
abroad again. Lien Chan could not visit great powers like the US, Britain, Japan, 
France, Canada or Germany. These countries could be visited only by Taiwan’s 
ministerial level officials. Even Taiwan’s foreign minister or defence minister, 
involved with highly political implications, was also banned from visiting those 
countries. Therefore, Premier Siew’s visits abroad became more important in the late 
1990s, even though his visits were again restricted mainly to developing countries.
However, Siew’s role was very subtle because he had been mainly an economic- 
related official, which had made him more acceptable to the Beijing government.
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Before he took office as Premier of Taiwan in 1997, he had been Vice Consul in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 1966-1969; Consul 1969-1972; Section Chief, MOFA in 
1972; Deputy Director & Director of 4th Department, Board of Foreign Trade, MOEA 
1972-1977; Deputy Director General 1977-1982; Director General 1982-1988; Vice 
Chairman of CEPD 1988-1989; Director General, Department of Organisation 
Affairs, CC. KMT 1989-90; Minister of Economic Affairs 1990-93; Chairman, CEPD 
1993-1994; Chairman, MAC 1994-1995, Member of Legislation Yuan 1996-1997.15 
Because of his economic profile, he was able to attend the APEC four times, thus 
even meeting Jiang Zemin in the international diplomatic arena.
After Taiwan had been expelled from the UN in 1971, Taipei was driven to the comer 
of the international diplomatic arena. Taiwan’s international trade was booming, so 
flexible diplomacy and pragmatic diplomacy were adopted and trade was the 
bargaining chip when the Taipei government dealt with other countries, especially 
after the Cold War. The APEC and the GATT (afterwards WTO) were the most 
important institutions to Taiwan. When the APEC held a meeting in Seoul, the US 
was very keen to bring Taipei to attend the meeting. Because this was the first time 
for Taipei to ‘come’ after being expelled from the UN, America was very wary that 
Taipei’s performance would cause controversy. This would induce more difficulty in 
bringing Taipei to participate in international occasions from then on.16
15 Government Information Office, 1999 The Republic o f China Year Book, p. 572. Also see Central 
News Agency. Who’s Who in the Republic of China 2001 ■ p. 340.
16 http://www.cw.com.tw/Files/article/frontend/Sub.asD7Dageg 1 &SubicctId= 1003&kev= 1954 
2001/ 11/6
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In 1991 Taipei’s stance was that its trade had been globalised and exchanges across 
the Taiwan Straits were under way, so Taiwan needed equality and parity rather than 
direct dialogue. Siew asserted that Taiwan demanded its speaking space under the 
international framework. Taiwan did not want to discuss the problems across the 
Taiwan Straits, but regional problems, in the broader Asia-Pacific area. Therefore, in 
the end, Taipei accepted the title ‘Chinese Taipei’, and was consequently permitted to 
attend the meeting.17 Vincent Siew, as a minister in charge of an economic-related 
department, was also an appropriate candidate to be present at the APEC gathering on 
behalf of Lee Teng-hui because Taiwan was striving largely for virtual economic 
interests at this stage. Hence, Taiwan was able to promote its trading relations under a 
multi-lateral framework, thereby carrying out its grand strategy and breaking out of 
the isolation which Beijing was attempting to impose.
In addition, members of the APEC are responsible for 70 percent of Taiwan’s trading 
volume. If Taiwan were prevented from attending APEC meetings, it could greatly 
damage the country’s interests.
In 2001 the APEC meeting was going to take place in China. President Chen Shui- 
bian of Taiwan wanted to attend the meeting himself, but China objected. He then 
chose former Vice President Li Yuan-zu to attend on his behalf, but China objected 
again. All this was because Chen and Li were all politically distinctive figures. Even 
though the Foreign Minister advised that Taiwan should send some other
17 Ibid.
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distinguished person to the talks, Chen vetoed the idea; so eventually, Taiwan was 
absent from this meeting. Many scholars, like Su Chi, have concluded that this failure 
to attend the APEC meeting marked the failure of the pragmatic diplomacy which had 
been practised for many years by the former president Lee. We can recall that Shirley 
Kuo, the former Minister of Finance, even sat in on the assembly of Asian 
Development Bank in Beijing in 1989, aiming at proposing ‘one country, two 
governments’. The action was aimed to allow Taiwan to re-enter the international 
diplomatic arena by raising Taipei’s international standing. Chen’s decision not to 
send any representative to the APEC meeting amounted to a reversion to Chiang Kai- 
shek’s policy that Han does not coexist with the bandit (Hanzei Bu Liangli,%
£ ) .
In September 1997, Lee visited Panama, attending an international conference on the 
Panama Canal and participating in a summit meeting of national leaders from all the 
six countries of Central America. As part of the same trip, he also paid a visit to 
Honduras and Paraguay.
To sum up, Taiwan’s head-of-state diplomacy under Lee’s leadership has developed a 
great deal, broadening the international profile of Taiwan. However, the powerful 
protests by the PRC have both curbed Taiwan’s head-of-state diplomacy in a sense, 
and have also widened Taiwan’s celebrity worldwide. Ironically, by making an 
excessive protest about Lee’s visit to his alma mater, Cornell University, China gave 
the visit some welcomed publicity and prompted CNN to broadcast Lee’s entire
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speech at the occasion. But for the PRC’s vehement protests, this visit would have 
attracted far less attention. It could be said that the PRC government had shot itself in 
the foot. The PRC asked those countries to forbid Taiwan’s president, premier, or 
foreign minister to visit them because these visits elevated the international image of 
Taiwan as an international entity. Very often, influenced by the fact of Taiwan’s 
economic power, these countries classified these visits as ‘private’. They were even 
confused by the PRC because when the PRC tried to prevent these visits and eliminate 
the Republic of China on Taiwan as another China, it seemed to create another 
‘Republic of Taiwan’. Also, the emotional and widely acclaimed speech at Cornell, 
entitled ‘Always in My Heart’, was carefully prepared by Lee himself and carefully 
revised by Jason Hu, later the foreign minister of Taiwan. By hook or by crook, 
Taiwan’s leaders’ efforts have greatly elevated Taiwan’s international standing.
Very frequently, Lee, Lien or Siew visited other countries in the company of 
Taiwanese business people and the foreign minister, economic minister, financial 
minister and chairman of Council of Economic and Planning Development.18 They 
brought loans or projects for the developing countries, thereby improving their 
infrastructure and encouraging Taiwanese business people to invest in these countries. 
For example, the Subic Bay Project in the Philippines was supported by Taiwan’s 
loan. Acer, a computer manufacturing company, has built its overseas branch in 
Subic Bay. Aid and investment can quite often complement each other. The 1
11 In addition to the table, on 18 August, Vice President Li Yuan-zu, together with Foreign Minister 
Fredrick F Chien and some other officials, visited Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua by way of the 
US, which greeted them with etiquette becoming o f national guests.
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improvement of the local infrastructure bolsters the investment of Taiwanese business 
people. When Taiwanese business people make their profits and contribute to the 
host country, they help the country to reimburse the loans and make more job 
opportunities, bringing prosperity for local community. On the other hand, when 
leaders of Taiwan meet their counterparts, it is easier to sign an investment guarantee 
agreement and hedging double taxation agreement, thereby protecting the business 
people. We can say that economy and politics intertwine intricately. Even though 
these visits were defined as ‘symbolism’ rather than substantial diplomacy by Ralph 
N Clough, he also admitted that Taiwan could not accomplish extensive economic, 
cultural and other international relationships without any official contact and 
Taiwan’s public also demanded that their leaders seek greater dignity and respect 
from international community.19 When this has happened, they have sometimes been 
re-designated as ‘Taipei Representative Office’, or even, although rarely, given a title 
which included the words ‘Republic of China’. With their enhanced status, they have 
been able to improve the country’s international standing.
To analyse in depth the way that the president, vice president, and premier, together 
with other ministers and officials, visited foreign countries, we find that these 
countries include those not only with but also without official relations. They 
meticulously chose the timing and avoided advance publicity in order to make the 
visit a fait accompli before the PRC could protest. Taiwan has tried, with mixed
19 Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 1999, pp. 91. Clough criticises that Taiwan’s media boasted Lee's visits as a gigantic 
victory over the PRC and it was regarded by the PRC as a move towards international recognition of 
Taiwan as an independent state, greatly provoking the PRC.
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success, to follow a policy of doing well by doing good. Very often, people paid 
attention to these visits, though some of them doubted if they were worthwhile. This 
is because the PRC always thwarted these efforts. When they were criticised by the 
PRC and the countries they visited, they were again under PRC pressure, and the 
legitimacy of their visits abroad was questioned. Internal critics also cited the 
opposition from the PRC and counter-currents from other countries as reasons why 
Taiwan should abandon diplomatic efforts to promote economic relations.20
5.2.1 Criticism of Head-of-State Diplomacy
Criticism also comes from domestic scholars and the mass media, which claim that 
the Southward Policy is only an instrument of head-of-state diplomacy. According to 
Xingxingwen Journal (*r*rlH), Lee Teng-hui and Lien Chan forgot everything about 
how to help Taiwanese business people to invest in Southeast Asia after they came 
back from their head-of-state diplomacy.21 Even though Chiang Pin-kung, the 
chairman of CEPD, professed that the Southward Policy was still under way, the 
US$225 million of the IECDF set aside for this had been used up. Therefore, the 
Southward Policy is only a slogan for Taiwanese business people and an instrument 
for head-of-state diplomacy used by Lee and Lien.
20 For example, Wang Chien-shien, former financial minister and later essential member of New Party, 
proposed that Pragmatic Diplomacy had to be changed back to Flexible Diplomacy, with which 
economic relations could be gradually transformed into political ties without intentional diplomatic 
manoeuvres, which might cause strong adverse effects from the PRC and the targeted countries.
21 http://www.new7.com.tw/weeklv/old/494/article085.html 2003/11/3
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In 1993 the Taipei government started to push for the Southward Policy, paving the 
way for the head-of-state diplomacy for Lee Teng-hui. Mainland China became the 
competitor of the Southeast Asian countries for Taiwanese business people’s 
investment, after the economic reform of the PRC. After Taiwan became one of the 
four tigers in East Asia and accumulated the largest amount of foreign reserves in the 
world, Taiwan’s capital became the target of many developing countries, especially 
those in the Southeast Asia. These countries all have diplomatic relations with the 
PRC and accept the policy of ‘one China’ but ‘keep in touch’ with the Taipei 
government. In order to absorb Taiwan’s investment, they even sent delegations to 
visit Taipei secretly at the risk of provoking the Beijing government.
In early 1994, Lee and Lien visited Southeast Asia separately, promoting officially the 
Southward Policy. Following their visits, several state enterprises and KMT 
enterprises sought commercial opportunities. Subic Bay became the first project of 
the Southward Policy signed by Chiang Pin-kung, then economics minister. Chiang 
also gathered around one hundred entrepreneurs to attend the opening ceremony. At 
the same time, in the academic field, many scholars backed the policy and urged 
Taiwanese business people to invest in these countries. Even Taiwan magnate Kao 
Chin-yen promised at one stage to invest in Subic Bay.22
22 A few years later, Kao, together with some other business people, regretted his decision and decided 
to transfer their investment to Mainland China.
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Table 5.1
Lee Teng-hui, Lien Chan & Vincent Siew’s Visits Abroad
Date of Visit Destinations
3-9 March 1989 President Lee visited Singapore.
30 December 1993 - 5 January 1994 Premier Lien visited Malaysia & 
Singapore.
9-16 February 1994 President Lee visited the Philippines, 
Indonesia & Thailand.
4-16 May 1994 President Lee visited Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica, South Africa & Swaziland.
29 May -  11 June 1994 Premier Lien visited El Salvador, 
Guatemala & Mexico.
1-4 April 1995 President Lee visited the United Arab 
Emirates.
7-12 June 1995 President Lee visited the US and delivered 
a speech at Cornell University.
15-22 June 1995 Premier Lien visited Austria, Hungary & 
the Czech Republic.
12-22 August 1996 Vice President & Premier Lien visited the 
Dominican Republic & Ukraine.
7-18 January 1997 Vice President & Premier Lien visited 
Nicaragua, the Vatican & Ireland.
7-17 September 1997 President Lee visited Central America,
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participating in the International 
Conference of Panama Canal and the 
summit meeting of the presidents and 
prime ministers of Taiwan and Central 
America
1-4 January 1998 Vice President Lien visited Singapore.
12 January 1998 Premier Siew visited the Philippines.
19 January 1998 Premier Siew visited Indonesia.
23 February 1998 Vice President Lien visited Jordan, 
Bahrain & the United Arab Emirates.
2-10 July 1998 Premier Siew visited Tonga, Fiji & the 
Solomon Islands.
(6 July 1998) While in the Solomon Islands, Premier 
Siew signed an agreement of giving a loan 
of $2 million for developing its 
agricultural economy.
5 December 1998 Vice President Lien visited Honduras, 
Guatemala, El Salvador & Nicaragua and 
consoled typhoon-afflicted people in the 
states above.
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5.3 Complementarity Between Economic Relations and Diplomatic Ties 
On the one hand, economic relations can promote diplomatic ties, a process that is 
analysed above. On the other hand, diplomatic connections can also assist economic 
relations. At the beginning of the 1970s, Taiwan gradually lost its relations with other 
countries after it was expelled from the United Nations. Without any embassy or 
consulate, the costs in the exchange of people and trade between two countries 
naturally increased. At this stage, if Taiwan people wanted to visit European 
countries, it took much more time to obtain a visa. It was also more difficult to 
change visas in case of emergency. Therefore, Taiwan’s government made a great 
effort to improve the virtual relations with those countries without diplomatic 
relations since the 1970s.
Taiwan’s basic strategy was to negotiate with the local country and restore some sort 
of institute to represent Taiwan, thereby avoiding the interruption of bilateral 
relations. There were 41 embassies and 12 representative offices representing Taiwan 
in 1972. In 1982, the number of embassies representing Taiwan had decreased to 23 
but the number of representative offices had expanded to 38. In 1992, the number of 
embassies grew slightly to 28 and the number of representative offices rose to 58. In 
1996, the number of embassies went up to 30 and the number of representative offices 
to 65. According to the statistics, when Taiwan had to close an embassy, its 
government strove to establish some other body to act as an ersatz embassy. Even 
when Taiwan was in its worst diplomatic plight, it still preserved relations of some 
kind with 35% of the countries in the world. After President Lee Teng-hui had
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pushed for pragmatic diplomacy and set up representative offices more aggressively, 
Taiwan had relations with up to 46 % of the countries in the world.23
With embassies and representatives’ offices, Taiwan’s government can directly 
communicate with its counterparts in other countries, thus preserving the legal rights 
of Taiwan’s overseas citizens, exchanging economic-related information more easily 
and developing commerce more efficiently. For instance, the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Representative Office in the United States replaced the former ROC embassy 
in the US.24 The Taipei government also set up Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices 
in its former consulates in the US.25 These moves contributed to Taiwan’s economic 
relations with the US, which did not diminish but grew in the 1980s, compared to 
those in 1978. Until the mid-1990s, the US remained the biggest trading partner of 
Taiwan.26
23 Gao, Lang, The Evolution of Foreign relations of the ROC 1972-1992. Taipei: Wunan, 1993, pp.
117-119. l972-1992 .f tJ b :S W , 1993), pp. 117-119. Also see Gao,
Lang, “On Economic-Related Diplomacy of Our Country”, Theory and Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, winter 
19%. p. 2 9 . ( » # , “t t a e * * * X ’’. ! ! ! g » l . f t  1 1 « . *  l » . 1 2 f l . * * ;H,1996.p.29.
24 Initially, the Taipei government could only employ the title ‘Coordination Council for North 
American Affairs Office in the United States of America’ after the US switched its recognition from 
Taiwan to the PRC in 1979.
23 In the United States, the Taipei government maintains several Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices, 
including those in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Guam, Honolulu, Houston, Kansas City, Missouri, Los 
Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco, and Seattle. See The Foreign Relations Yearbook 1998, 
Republic of China, pp. 665-666. Also see The Foreign Relations Yearbook 1999. Republic of China.
26 Even though Taiwan's trade surplus with the US dwindled after the mid-1990s, this was as a result of 
Taiwanese business people taking the initiative to concentrate more on other markets in Europe, 
Southeast Asia and Latin America. Also, to a lesser extent, because the serious trading surplus between 
Taiwan and the US, favourable to Taiwan, caused the US great concern, Taiwan's government 
implemented the ‘five-year plan of spreading market’. See International Trade Yearbook of the ROC. 
1996. p. 85. Also see International Trade Yearbook o f the ROC. 1997, p. 87.
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In Mainland China, by contrast, this array of representative offices was, of course, 
impossible, and Taiwanese business people were consequently more vulnerable. For 
example, they had to negotiate with local and central government by means of 
networking (guanxi, MIR) on their own, even though—on the surface—the Chinese 
government provided many preferential measures for them.27
It is noteworthy that when some Taiwanese business people went to Southeast Asia, 
they were not protected by the Taiwanese government and were mistreated by the 
local officials because there no international agreements had been concluded by the 
governments of both sides. For example, in the 1980s Indonesian customs officials 
knew that Taiwanese business people were rich, so they extorted money from them 
(around US$20 a time) whenever they passed through customs. After 1990, when the 
Taipei government signed with the Indonesian government a memorandum promoting 
investment and economic cooperation, and investment guarantee treaty, Taiwanese 
business people began to be less molested by the corrupt local officials.28 Therefore, 
we can see that government’s role in coordinating Taiwan’s foreign economic ties can 
sometimes assist and protect Taiwanese business people. Diplomatic ties can help to 
ameliorate economic relations.
27 According to author's interview with a Taiwanese businessperson in Jiangsu Province, they would 
like to become Vietnamese rather than Taiwanese (or a citizen of any country with official relations 
with the PRC) because they cannot enjoy the protection of any government. Even though the 
Vietnamese government can protect Vietnamese in China, Taiwan’s government still cannot fully
provide legal protection for Taiwanese business people in the Mainland. For example, Tanpai (■ Jl!) is 
an enforced contribution, nominally to help pay for some public construction, extorted from Taiwanese 
business people by local officials, interview with K on 20 February 1996.
“  Interview with KK on 1 December 2001 at Heathrow Airport, UK.
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5.4 Entrepreneurs As Middlemen, Surrogates and Hindrances
In fact, business people have no motherland: they pursue profits everywhere. 
Taiwan’s enterprises (mainly small-and-medium size) had invested in Southeast Asia 
long before the proclamation of the Southward Policy by the Taiwanese government. 
The push factors include the worsening of public security, high labour costs at home, 
the rise of environmentalism, the difficulties experienced in acquiring land in Taiwan 
and the high rents which had to be paid. The pull factors include geographic 
proximity and the relatively low price of labour and land in Southeast Asia, which had 
become the alternative of Taiwanese business people. For example, by the end of 
1991 Taiwan had become the leading foreign investing country in Vietnam. From the 
perspective of Taiwanese business people, the policy was merely hindsight.29 At this 
time, the PRC allowed this to happen to a certain extent without severe protest, but a 
boundary was crossed in 1993 when China Airlines, Taiwan’s passenger aircraft 
company, introduced a non-stop service to Ho Chi Minh City with Taiwan’s flag on 
the tail of its airplane. The Beijing government objected, and the service had to be 
abandoned. In 1994, Eva Air, Taiwan’s private carrier with only Taiwan’s national 
plum blossom motif on the tail, resumed the flight.30
Another example is that of Fu-Xing Clothing Manufacturing Company, which started 
its investment in the Philippines in 1988 when the US set a quota limit on imports
29 Actually, Taiwan’s first trade mission had been to Hanoi, Vietnam's capital, receiving Vietnam's 
hospitality in 1988. In addition, the vice minister of economic affairs of Taiwan also made a visit in 
September 1993.
30 This means that Beijing can put up with economic exchanges between Taiwan and the countries with 
official relations with Beijing, but conspicuous official symbolism is still not allowed.
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from Taiwan. Taiwan’s labour costs were rising when those of the Philippines were 
only one-fifth as high. The Philippines is also near Taiwan. Initially, Fu-Xing had 
only 100 workers in the Philippines. Now, Fu-Xing has 2,200 workers there. Fu- 
Xing mainly exports clothing to the US. According to Fu-Xing, the Philippine people 
speak English, which is easier for Taiwan management. In contrast, people in other 
Southeast Asian countries speak their distinctive languages, which are not so 
convenient for Taiwanese business people. The language barrier was thus conquered. 
The Philippines is a former colony of America, which had three military bases in the 
Philippines. Thus, the Philippines has very good links with America. Also, the 
clothing market has not been saturated, and its quota to export to America is easier to 
obtain. In addition, to get a larger quota, it is easy to set up companies, which are 
nominally independent but are really just extensions of the original company. Thus 
the Philippines are more profitable than Taiwan.31
Another firm that successfully pursued profits in Southeast Asia was Liang-Ji, which 
erected cooling towers in Thailand and captured 50% of the Thailand domestic 
market.32
After being successful in Southeast Asia, some firms can also transfer to other 
countries, such as Mainland China.33
31 Xinxinwen ( « « ■ ) .  No. 567, ‘Taiwanese Business People’s Story”, (Tailhang de gushi
*).
3J n,M
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However, things for Taiwanese business people are not always without a hitch. 
Because Taiwan has no investment guarantee agreement with all the countries in 
Southeast Asia, Taiwanese business people do not know who to go to when they meet 
difficulties or suffer loss. The democratic level in Southeast Asia is not as good as in 
America. Its political leaders might change their policy, with the result that the new 
political environment cannot protect the existing investment. In addition, the 
representative of Taiwan does not normally provide appropriate assistance to business 
people. Even years after the promulgation of the Southward Policy, most of Taiwan’s 
diplomats were not aware of the existence of the Policy.34 Although the Taipei 
government encouraged business people to invest in Southeast Asia with several 
measures after the Southward Policy, the business people hardly benefited at all.
For example, the Thai government sets a limit on the ratio of foreign capital to local in 
any company. Therefore, Taiwanese business people find some figurehead from local 
people to be the investor. As a result, they cannot obtain loans from the Taiwanese 
government. Besides, the preferential procedure is so complicated that a lot of related 
documents are required before the loans can be agreed, of which some are too
34 Dr Lee Deng-Ker found this situation when he did his fieldwork in Southeast Asia in the initial stage 
of the Southward Policy. The Taiwanese diplomats in Southeast Asia were not familiar with the 
Southward Policy. When the author conducted fieldwork in 2002 in Taipei, many officials thought the 
Southward Policy had failed. Some of them did not even believe the existence of the Policy. Nor did 
the government have any practical measures to implement this Policy. All the foreign aid to Southeast 
Asia had also ceased. Tliis was because the Policy suffered a serious setback in the 1990s, and very 
rarely had people mentioned the Policy until President Chen Shui-bian reiterated it in 2002. However, 
the Policy had never stopped officially. This occurred during the third wave of the Southward Policy.
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confidential to publicise. Therefore, most Taiwanese business people would rather 
find their own source of money than contact the Taipei government.
On the whole, the Taipei government is helpful when it builds local industrial parks 
for Taiwanese business people. Because Taiwanese business people are foreigners 
and are not allowed to buy land or factory buildings, it is difficult to build a factory. 
It is a great favour to Taiwanese business people if the Taiwanese government 
develops an industrial park, and can let it cheaply, and sets up a bank branch, lending 
at a low interest rate to Taiwanese business people. However, the Taipei government 
has not always been so helpful. The resources of the Taiwanese government cannot 
reach many places. Therefore, the Southward Policy does not work very well from 
the perspective of the small-and medium sized enterprises. However, they will invest 
in Southeast Asia if they can earn money there and would have done so even if the 
government had not proclaimed the Southward Policy.
In 1994, the Taipei government set the Southward Policy, which was based on the 
new trend of economic integration in Southeast Asia and the over-heating of investing 
in Mainland China. Even though the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ was still not 
proclaimed initially, the political implications were significant because they spread 
Taiwanese business people’s capital and diverted it from China to Southeast Asia. 
The purpose is to avoid over-dependence on and being absorbed by Mainland China, 
thereby mitigating the Chinese government’s bargaining chips if it tried to dictate to 
Taiwan.
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For the first wave of the Southward Policy in 1994, Taiwan took the initiative to 
favour Southeast Asia, so the host countries were rather arrogant and overbearing. In 
fact, Thailand and Malaysia were sometimes against Taiwanese business people. 
After the Asian Financial Crisis, Taiwanese business people were welcomed in order 
to maintain economic development and to prevent worsening depreciation, like the 
case in Malaysia. The political leaders were also invited to visit Taipei, in order to 
ask for assistance. The second wave of Southward Policy in 1997 achieved little 
success, too. In the riots in Indonesia, ethnic Chinese were attacked on a large scale. 
Taiwanese business people withdrew to other countries nearby or back to Taiwan. 
The Philippine government abolished unilaterally the airline agreement with Taiwan, 
which took a long time to resume and convoluted negotiations. However, Taiwanese 
business people continue to act as diplomatic pioneers in Southeast Asia after all these 
unstable and changeable situations.
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Chapter 6
Economic Diplomacy at Subnational Level
6.0 Introduction
Chapters 4 and 5 considered Taiwan’s diplomacy at the level of the state and at the level 
of individuals (both political leaders and business leaders) within the state. In this 
chapter I turn my attention to the interaction of individuals and the state, in particular 
with respect to the formation of different government policies and the business 
communities’ adherence or lack of adherence to such policies. To help set this 
discussion in its proper context, consider that in the late nineteen-eighties, Taiwanese 
businesses increased their investment both in Southeast Asia and in China. The 
Taiwanese government encouraged investment in the former by promulgating the 
so-called Southward Policy and provided material assistance. It was much more 
cautious about investment in Mainland China and urged the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be 
Patient’ in order to restrain what it saw as the irresponsibility of the business 
community. I
I proceed with my analysis by first considering Taiwan’s response to China’s economic 
reforms, which lead to the relatively ineffective ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ Policy. Next I 
explore the Taiwan government’s ‘Southward Policy’, including its origins, its 
interaction with the APROC Plan (which demonstrates the ‘double-track’ 
decision-making of the Taiwan government), the opportunities presented by this policy
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in Southeast Asia, and the ultimate failure of the ‘Southward Policy’. Next I turn to a 
review of the independent and proactive role of Taiwanese business people; this review 
includes a summary of different viewpoints from the business community, illustrations 
of how the government viewed proactive business activities, and documentation of the 
uncontrollable flow of Taiwanese money into Mainland China. Next I explore the 
dynamics that surrounded Taiwanese businesses expanding overseas; in particular I 
consider the difficulties faced by Taiwanese businesses that do business overseas, how 
Taiwanese business people interact with Chinese officialdom, issues surrounding 
dealing with corrupt officials, getting established in Southeast Asia, and the strategy of 
using local Chinese to help the expansion efforts. I conclude with a brief summary of 
main findings from the chapter.
6.1 China’s Economic Reform: Taiwanese Responses
Since 1978, when China started its economic reform, its economic growth has boomed, 
and its economy has become, potentially, the most dynamic in East Asia. In the same 
period, China proposed very beneficial conditions for foreign direct investment, thus 
attracting Taiwanese business people. In response to pressure from Taiwanese business 
people, the government of Taiwan permitted cross-straits trade with effect from 5 
August 1987. Meanwhile, Taiwanese overseas investment flooded into the ASEAN 
countries. In 1991, Taiwanese businesses started to invest in Vietnam on a significant 
scale. Up to 1992, the accumulated investment of Taiwanese business people in 
Southeast Asia totalled US$ 13 billion. From 1988 to 1992, Taiwanese investment in
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China totalled US$ 8 billion.1
The flow of investment into China was encouraged by a consolidation of Chinese 
economic policy. Deng Xiaoping used his ‘southern tour’ in 1992 to advocate renewed 
reform and hastened growth. The impact of this tour dominated Chinese economic 
development in the first half of the 1990s.2 Taiwanese business people also saw the 
Mainland as a great field of opportunity. In 1993, Taiwanese investment decreased in 
Southeast Asia but increased sharply in China, totalling nearly US$ 12.8 billion. 
Obviously, China was becoming a more attractive prospect than Southeast Asia. In 
addition, Taiwanese indirect trade with China through Hong Kong grew at the same 
time. However, the Taiwanese government, always cautious, favoured a philosophy of 
‘No Haste, Be Patient’, fearing Taiwan’s deepening dependency on China. The 
government realised that China’s military threat to Taiwan had not lessened. The aim 
of the Taiwanese government was to keep the interdependent economic links with 
China while opposing China on a political level. In August 1993, Taiwan’s economic 
minister, Chiang Pin-Kung, announced the Southward Policy, encouraging Taiwanese 
business people to ‘Go South’ rather than ‘Go West’. The Policy of ‘No Haste, Be 
Patient’ was formally announced on 14 September 1996, in the wake of growing 
tension between Taiwan and China.3 The policy led to a decline in the amount of new
1 Central Daily, 15 February 1994, p. 2; Taiwan Public Forum, 9 February 1994, p. 16.
2 Robert F. Ash & Y.Y. Kueh, ed„ The Chinese Economy Under Deng Xiaoping. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997.
3 The 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis launched by the People’s Republic of China with missile exercises 
astonished the world, including the United States. Some scholars regarded the exercises as motivated by 
the PRC government's desire to influence Taiwan's 1996 presidential elections. Others viewed the 
exercises as aimed to strengthen the US commitment to acknowledge Taiwan as part of China because 
the US had recently upgraded Taiwan’s protocol status and sold advanced weapons to Taiwan. Still 
others interpreted the Crisis as largely the outcome of the PRC internal factional and bureaucratic
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Taiwanese investment in China but did not end this investment altogether.
At much the same time, Taiwan was developing its APROC Plan, designed to cope with 
Taiwan’s own economic challenges. Manufacturing industry’s relocation offshore due 
to rising costs had led the government to realise the importance of taking care of those 
operations which its companies had chosen to keep in Taiwan, such as administration, 
research and planning. As a result, the government had come to understand the need to 
improve manufacturing industry and services such as transportation, 
telecommunications, finance and media so that its companies should be able to grow 
more efficiently and be better able to compete in the rapidly expanding global 
economy.4 This plan to make Taiwan more economically competitive was described as 
‘omni-dimensional’.
6.1.1 The Relative Irrelevance of the ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ Policy
Taiwanese business people have been investing in the Mainland for many years. Even 
before the Taipei government called for the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’, when the 
Mainland Policy was still obscure, many Taiwanese businesses had invested heavily. 
For example, some small and medium-sized enterprises from Taiwan had invested and 
set up factories. In addition, some large-sized textile enterprises had contacted and 
cooperated with PRC high-ranking officials through their local personal relations.
struggle in Beijing. This was because President Jiang Zemin had tended to adopt a softer stance towards 
Taiwan, while the hardliners were adamant that the only way to deal with Taiwan was to make a show of 
strength. See Zhao, Suisheng, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait. Mainland China. Taiwan, and the 
1995-1996 Crisis. London: Routledge, 1999.
4 Chiang Pin-kung, "Pillars of Economic Success”, Taiwan Opens Up  -  a Regional Business Centre in 
the Making. Taipei, 1998, pp. 7-8.
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Given Taiwanese accumulated textile techniques and copious cheap local labour, the 
country obtained overseas orders and exported directly from China. Further they sold 
their goods in the PRC domestic market. Now that Taiwan and China are both in the 
WTO, their exports are largely free of tariff barriers.5 According to Lee Xin-hong, the 
lifting of the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ would not affect the textile industry 
because it had already developed and used a network of international contacts to 
enhance its business beforehand.6
6.1.2 A Defence of the ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ Policy — Reasons for Caution of 
Taiwanese Government
The former Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), 
Executive Yuan, Dr Chen Pochih asserted in an article which appeared in 2002 that the 
reason the Taipei government wanted to regulate the Mainland investment was the 
failure of market mechanism in the Mainland and a conflict between the interests of
individuals and those of the country (Taiwan) as a whole. Some Taiwanese business
*
people lost money in the Chinese market. Although they abided by the official 
regulations, other business people who owed them money refused to pay them back and 
violated the regulations and norms, which should be observed. In addition, although 
sometimes the judicial departments in China reached a verdict after a lawsuit had 
occurred, the decision could still not be implemented because of weak executive
5 Robert Ash & Heike Holbig, ed„ China's Accession to the World Trade Organization -  National and 
International Perspectives. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. This book includes not only the economic 
impact, but also the political, social and legal implications of Chinese membership of the WTO.
6 Lee Xin-hong ( $ f f  £ ) ,  "The effect of lifting the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient”’, Textile Quick. 
Taipei: Chinese Textile Industry Research Centre, 2001, pp. 19-21
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resources. Dr Chen Pochih went on to say that those who criticised the government for 
ignorant meddling in business decisions misunderstood and misrepresented the 
government’s reasons for intervening. It had never been the government’s argument 
that those who invested in the Mainland would ‘lose money’. On the contrary, 
individuals might make profits, but a large increase in ‘westward’ investment might be 
to the detriment of Taiwan as a whole.7
Chen’s reason is based on the theory of externalities. For example, an upstream pulp 
mill which discharges effluent into a river, thus reducing the scope for fishing 
downstream, is said to impose an externality on the fishermen. The owners of the mill 
benefit, while the fishing community suffers. Sometimes individuals pursuing then- 
own interests ignore the interests of the society they live in. Someone who stands up in 
a theatre in order to see better will make other people see worse.
According to Chen, if Taiwan increased its investment in China, this would lead to 
externalities for Taiwan. Profit-making by Taiwanese business people might endanger 
Taiwan’s security if their activities made the country over-dependent on the Mainland 
market. The Chinese government might penalise those of its Taiwan trading partners 
who favoured parties in Taiwan which opposed Chinese policy. It might also put
7 Actually, President Lee did employ the reason of ‘losing money’ to call for people not to invest in the 
China. Tong Zhen-yuan supports the argument that enterprises are more vulnerable than the society 
(state) but argues that the government should help them to invest in the Mainland. See Chen-Yuan Tung, 
“Economic Relations between Taiwan and Mainland China -  The Tradeoff between Economics and 
Security", Journal ofYuan-Jing. Vol. 1, No. 2,2000, pp.31-81. ( « « » ,  “AJVIl't’Hff ftNftflBM  
g £ W 3 t a ’’. l l l f l , Vol. 1. No, 2,2000, pp. 31-81).
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pressure on the Taiwanese government via Taiwanese business people to follow 
policies favoured by China.
In addition, outward investment might lead to the relocation of industries and jobs from 
Taiwan to China. Taiwanese enterprises in the Mainland would compete with 
Taiwanese enterprises at home. There would be a brain drain and a flight of both capital 
and know-how. The risks to Taiwan’s economy and politics would be considerable.8 
This is ‘hollowing out’.9
6.2 The ‘Southward Policy’
6.2.1 Origins of the ‘Southward Policy’: the Government Follows the 
Entrepreneurs
In January 1994, the incumbent Premier, Lien Chan, visited Malaysia and Singapore in 
Southeast Asia. In February 1994, Lee Teng-Hui also visited the Philippines, Indonesia 
and Thailand. Afterwards, on 19 March 1994, the Executive Yuan passed the 
‘Guideline for Strengthening Economic and trade Ties with Southeast Asia’. The 
Taiwanese government thus officially launched the so-called ‘Southward Policy’. 
According to the plan of the Executive Yuan, the duration of the ‘Southward Policy’ 
was to be three years (from 1994 to 1997). The Policy was directed mainly by the
'  Chen Pochih, "The Integral Strategy towards the Mainland Investment”, Taiwan Economic Research 
Monthly. No. 4, Vol. 25, April 2002, pp. 137-145.
9 In Hong Kong, the term ‘hollowing out’ is used. For example, see Phar Kim Beng (2002) “Is Hong 
Kong irrelevant?” in Asia Times, 28 November 2002; Richard Homik (2002) "Who Needs Hong Kong?” 
in Fortune, 2 May 2002. The Japanese have also recently been concerned about hollowing out. See 
Takeo Hiranuma (2002) Sugu soko ni aru kiki, shilsugyo maneku kudoka wa koshite kaihi suru (How to 
avoid a Hollowed Out Industry That Will Lead to Unemployment) in Toyo Keizai, January 5,2002.
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Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). Three years later, the Taiwanese government 
expanded the Policy to include Australia and New Zealand and re-named it to reflect 
this change. At this time, Australia and New Zealand were newly incorporated. An 
inter-agency task force established jointly by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
other relevant agencies was responsible for enforcing the Guidelines. According to the 
nature of the business, senior officials from related governmental and private agencies 
were co-opted to be members of the Task Force. This Plan involved most departments 
of the Executive Yuan, including the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, 
the Central Bank of China, the National Science Council, the Council of Agriculture, 
the Council for Labour Affairs, and the Government Information Office, as well as a 
variety of major industrial and commercial associations. The Board of Foreign Trade 
of the MOEA acted as Secretariat of the Task Force. With this new title and operational 
structure, the Policy was renewed for another period of three years from 1 January 1997 
to 31 December 1999.10
6.2.2 The ‘Southward Policy’ and the APROC Plan: Agreement and 
Contradiction
From the perspective of macro-policy, to establish the Asia-Pacific Regional
10 Board of Foreign Trade, Guideline for Strengthening Economic and trade Ties with Southeast Asia, 
Australia and New Zealand. Taipei: Board of Foreign trade, MOEA, 1997, p. 4.
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Operations Centre (APROC) is the all-dimensional development plan of Lien Chan’s 
cabinet under the international situation. What the APROC is to Lien Chan’s cabinet is 
just like what the Six-Year National Development Plan is to Hau Pei-tun’s." Some 
scholars, like Chen Humg-yu, have argued that the Southward Policy was a part of the 
APROC Plan because the policies were formulated very close in time.1 2
It is paradoxical for Chen Humg-yu to assert that the Southward Policy is only a part of 
the APROC Plan. According to him, Taiwan’s grand strategy is aimed at the whole 
Asia Pacific, which includes the strategy towards Southeast Asia. Chen argues:13
In July 1993 the Taiwan government promulgated an 
economy-boosting project, revealing the Asia-Pacific Regional 
Operations Centre (APROC) Plan as its long-term target. In August 
1993 Chiang Pin-Kung, Economic Minister, proposed the policy of 
strengthening investment in Southeast Asia. In February 1994, the 
Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) put 
forward the Draft Guideline for Strengthening Economic and Trade 
Ties with Southeast Asia. In September 1994, the Executive Yuan
11 See Lin Dai-Man, Mv Heart in Eternal Peace -  The Road of Lien Chan to Holding Office. Taipei:
Commonwealth Publishing Co., Ltd., 1996, 168. J b : ^ T .  19%,
p. 168.) Also see Xu Jie-lin et al., Taiwan’s Strategy towards Asia-Pacific. Taipei: Institute for National 
Policy Research. 1991, p. 9. p. 9.
12 Chen Humg-yu, “Analysis on the Relations between Taiwan and Southeast Asia in terms of Southward 
Policy”, Southeast Asia Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1998, pp. 1-19.
W J m W g £ « " ,* m g * F J .V o l .  3, No. 1, January 1998, pp. 1-19)
Ibid.
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set up a special group to push for related planning convened by 
Premier Lien Chan. Meanwhile, the CEPD was appointed to 
undertake the administrative work. After the planning of more than 
one year, ‘The Plan for Developing Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific 
Regional Operations Centre’ was briefed to President Lee Teng-hui 
by the CEPD on 4 January 1995. On 5 January 1995 the Plan was 
officially passed by the Executive Yuan Committee. The Plan was 
proposed earlier than the Southward Policy, which was, therefore, 
not an isolated policy but was developed as a part of the whole 
Asia-Pacific strategy of investment and development. The 
Southward Policy is for entering Southeast Asia and the Westward 
Strategy is for entering the Mainland China. These two were 
conceived as linking Japan in the north and North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area in the east, thereby promoting 
Taiwan’s economic strength. Furthermore, Taiwan will become the 
APROC with omni-dimensional development. Therefore, whether 
Taiwan can be successful in developing its political economy in the 
long run depends on the practice of the Southward Policy.
However, this is not hue; the Southward Policy was made by the Presidency and the 
APROC Plan was made by the Executive Yuan, mainly the CEPD,14 and the two were 
in fact contradictory, a situation that arose as a result of the ‘double-track’
14 Interview with BB on 26 April 2002.
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decision-making of the Taiwanese government. The Presidency and the Executive 
Yuan (cabinet level) can both make decisions, but only the Executive Yuan should be 
responsible for the Legislative Yuan (Parliament). In addition, the Premier (Prime 
Minister) of the Executive Yuan is appointed by the President and approved by the 
legislative Yuan. Therefore, the Executive Yuan is very often blamed for the policy 
failure of the Presidency.
The logical and causal relations of the two policies were problematic. The Southward 
Policy was related less to the APROC Plan than to the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’, 
thereby aiming at diverting the Mainland fever from ‘West’ to ‘South’ rather than 
‘Omni-dimensional’. Furthermore, the term ‘omni-dimensional’ refers to Taiwan’s 
need to become an important player not only in the manufacturing industry, but also in 
the service industries of sea transportation, air transportation, finance, 
telecommunications and the media. It does not refer to the literal directions of east, 
south, west and north.15
The reason that the Southward Policy can accurately be described as parallel to the 
Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ is that it diverted ‘Go West’ to ‘Go South’ and 
prompted investment in Southeast Asia rather than Mainland China. The APROC Plan, 
on the other hand, was incompatible with the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ because 
realisation of the Plan would be incomplete if it did not include greater economic 
engagement with China, even though President Lee Teng-hui asserted that Taiwan
15 Interview with F on 30 April 2002.
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could employ Southeast Asia as its hinterland, and it was not so imperative that Taiwan 
should be able to use China to achieve the APROC Plan.
Ohmae Kenichi (Afliffi- ), a Japanese scholar, expressed the view that the APROC 
Plan would be delayed in its schedule without three direct links of transportation, postal 
services and trade between Taiwan and China. This was proven correct in the early 21st 
century.16 Logically, the absence of the ‘three links’ was also parallel to the Policy of 
‘No Haste, Be Patient’. Therefore, the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ was against the 
APROC Plan. Thus, it was true to say that the Southward Policy was also against the 
APROC Plan. To sum up, the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’, the absence of the 
‘three links’, and the Southward Policy conformed to one another logically, but all these 
three policies contradicted to the APROC Plan logically because they omitted an 
essential element of the APROC, namely closer relations with Mainland China. Hence, 
scholars like Chen Humg-Yu were wrong to argue that the Southward Policy was a part 
of the APROC Plan simply because of close timing.
Scholars like Lee Deng-Ker were also wrong when they argued that the major stages of 
the Southward Policy were that the Taipei government initiated the Policy, state 
enterprises and party enterprises were the pioneers, and other businesses followed.17 In
16 Ibid.
17 Lee Deng-Ker, “The Research of the Southward Policy and Pragmatic Diplomacy”, The Journal of 
International Relations. No. 12, 10 October 1997, p. 124.
No. 12 10 October 1997, p. 114. Also see Samuel C.Y Ku. The Relations of Political 
Economy Between Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Taipei: Feng-Yun Forum, 1998. ( * # * ,
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fact, Taiwanese businesses had gone to invest in Southeast Asia as pioneers. After the 
government had called for the Policy, some state enterprises and party enterprises did 
follow the government’s bidding. This was true, but some of the state enterprises, like 
the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, which were more successful, had gone to Southeast 
Asia before the advent of the Policy.18 In addition, the ‘Go South’ campaign had little 
effect outside some state and party enterprises doing the bidding of the Taipei 
government. These state enterprises include the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, the Taiwan 
Salt Corporation, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation, China Steel, and Taipower. 
These Kuomintang Party enterprises include the CT&D Group and the Chien Tai 
Cement Corporation.19
6.2.3 The Southward Policy and Opportunities Presented by Southeast Asia
In 1997 the Asian Financial Crisis broke out in Southeast Asia. The economies of 
Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia were seriously damaged: currencies depreciated; the 
stock markets plunged; factories closed down; workers were out of jobs. Even finances 
were in crisis. When the countries in Southeast Asia were faced with this 
unprecedented crisis, the US and Japan and international organisations like 
International Monetary Fund all tried to help. In January 1998 the then Vice President 
Lien Chan and Premier Vincent Siew visited Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia 
in turn. Lien even visited Malaysia by way of the Middle East in March 1998. 
High-ranking officials of Taiwan visited Southeast Asia in a very short period, meeting
"  Interview with AA on 6 June 2002.
19 Lee Deng-Ker, “The Research o f the Southward Policy and Pragmatic Diplomacy”, p. 114.
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their national leaders and discussing how to help these neighbouring countries. In 
March 1998, some solid measures were passed to promote the economic and trade 
relations with Southeast Asia. However, at this time the leading role in implementing 
the Policy passed from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to the Council for Economic 
Planning and Development (CEPD).20
It was stated in 1997 that the Plan was to meet the trend of economic and trade 
integration in Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand. The Southeast Asia region 
had been undergoing a process of integration since the 1950s, and the process was still 
developing strongly in the 1990s. Since 1 January 1993, ASEAN had been promoting 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) with the implementation of a ‘Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff’ (CEPT). This scheme aimed to reduce tariffs between member 
states to below 5% on certain industrial and processed agricultural products within ten 
years. The CEPT Scheme was expected to create greater intra-regional trade and 
investment opportunities and to transform the industrial structure of each member 
country. By 1997, Australia and New Zealand were seen to be logical extensions of the 
ASEAN market. Both countries, while acting as dialogue partners with ASEAN, were 
developed and rich in abundant natural resources, and both possessed strong purchasing 
power. In light of these circumstances, it was held that Taiwan should formulate 
suitable measures to take advantage of these conditions. However, the major reason 
stated afterwards was that it was necessary for the Taipei government to adopt an
20 Samuel C.Y. Ku, The Relations o f Political Economy Between Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Taipei:
Debating Fbrum, 1998, pp.265-66.
pp.265-66.
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outward investment strategy to direct overseas investment by domestic enterprises in 
order to lessen the risk of concentration on Mainland China for investment and trade.21
In addition, geographically, Southeast Asia countries were in close proximity to Taiwan. 
The abundant manpower and extensive natural resources of these countries, combined 
with Taiwan’s geographic advantage and its experience in economic development, 
could not only help create prosperity in this region, but also serve as a reinforcement to 
Taiwan’s economic and trade activities in other markets.
The Policy was also intended to facilitate the exploration of new economic and trade 
markets. In recent years, through the emergence of trade blocs such as the European 
Union and NAFTA, the trends of global régionalisation had gradually become more and 
more obvious. Although trade barriers among member countries had been removed by 
this process of régionalisation, protectionist barriers had been established against 
countries outside the blocs. The most effective way for non-member countries to take 
advantage of the preferential measures adopted by these regions was to engage in direct 
investment and to strengthen linkages. As intra-regional cooperation among ASEAN 
member countries continued to strengthen, so did the region’s importance in the world. 
Therefore, the Taiwan government intended to explore the potential of this new 
regional market.22
Board of Foreign Trade, Guideline for Strengthening Economic and trade Ties with Southeast Asia, 
Australia and New Zealand. Taipei: Board of Foreign trade, MOEA, 1997, pp. 1-2.
“ Ibid. pp. 2-3.
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A Taiwan scholar from the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, Chiou Yi 
(S5*),23 has claimed that the Southward Policy was a product of politics. According to 
Chiou’s analysis, President Lee wanted to ensure that he would be able to participate in 
the APEC summit meeting (in spite of Chinese objections), and his method of winning 
support for his attendance was to court the ASEAN nations. To further this plan, Lee 
encouraged Taiwan enterprises to invest in Southeast Asia and used scholars to make 
many reports that depicted this area as a heaven for investment. This theory seems 
quite plausible.
6.2.4 Failure of the ‘Southward Policy’
The reasons the Southward Policy failed to achieve its goals were manifold. There 
were too many institutions whose responsibilities overlapped and whose policies were 
inconsistent with each other. This situation was common in many institutions of the 
Taiwan government, for example, intelligence and propaganda.24 In practice, the 
implementation of the Policy was dominated by certain strong personalities and not by 
clearly defined administrative procedures. This sometimes led to confusion. The 
Southward Policy was initiated by the presidency, but Chiang Pin-Kung was the 
promoter. Chiang was the Minister of Economic Affairs from 1993 to 1996 and the 
Chairman of the CEPD from 1996 to 2000. Therefore, Chiang was in charge of the two 
waves of Southward Policy (1994-1997 and 1997-2000). When Wang Chih-Kang
23 Later, he was elected a legislator in Taiwan's congress.
24 As Rawnsley puts it: The fundamental problem is that the ROC’s (Taiwan's) propaganda organisation 
is badly constructed with a confusing division o f labour. The organisation engages the services of far too 
many government ministries and organisation that all have overlapping responsibilities and lines of 
accountability. See Gary D. Rawnsley, "Selling Taiwan: Diplomacy and Propaganda", Issues & Studies 
36, No. 3 (May/June 2000), pp. 1-25.
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succeeded Chiang as the Minister of the Economic Affairs from 1996 to 2000, he stated 
in public that the Taipei government should re-evaluate the Southward Policy. This was 
because the Southward Policy had suffered a setback. In addition to the Asian 
Financial Crisis, the Philippines had unilaterally cut off direct flights between Taiwan 
and the Philippines. In 1997 unrest was happening in Cambodia, and Taiwanese 
business people were risking their lives. But at the same time, Chiang reiterated his 
belief that the Southward was a good policy and that the Taipei government should stick 
to it. Thus, the mix-up in the Taipei government was not only because of double-track 
decision-making but also because of bad communication within the cabinet. 
Multi-track policy-making led to inefficiency in the Taipei government. What was 
even worse was that many officials, including diplomats who were responsible for the 
Southward Policy, were not familiar with or even not aware of the existence of the 
Policy. This situation happened in the initial stage of the Southward Policy25 and in the 
third wave of the Southward Policy in 2002 when the author was interviewing in 
Taiwan.
6.3 Independent and Proactive Role of Taiwanese Business People
On the other hand, the roles of Taiwanese business people became increasingly 
important in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. Comparing 2001 to 2000, when 
Taiwanese business people received their orders, the goods exported directly from 
Mainland China increased by 66.5%, which is more than the expected 50%. However,
23 Lee Deng-Ker, "The Research of the Southward Policy and Pragmatic Diplomacy", The Journal of 
International Relations. No. 12,10 October 1997, p. 124. [ A ) ® im # R f t3 E £ W 5 t" , f i
1 M JM M |.N o.12 10 October 1997, p. 124.
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compared to the previous year, the increased percentage of goods exported from 
Taiwan and Southeast Asian both declined, especially from Taiwan. This indicated that 
Taiwanese business people tended to ‘Go West’, rather than ‘Go South’ or ‘Root 
Enterprises in Taiwan’. However, it was very interesting that ‘Root Enterprises in 
Taiwan’ was met in a different way from what the government expected. 84.52% of 
research and development of overseas enterprises were supplied by parent companies 
in Taiwan. The overseas companies themselves did only 23.00% of their own research 
and development, and only 12.21% of their research and development was done by 
co-ordination companies. However, between 2001 and 2002, these two rose by 1.59% 
and 0.64% respectively, which is very little. The impacts of relocation of enterprises 
overseas on the domestic enterprises were all positive, except ‘recruiting talented 
Taiwanese’. The impact on ‘recruiting talented Taiwanese’ for domestic enterprises 
was slightly negative. This meant that there was a minor ‘brain drain’ from Taiwan to 
China. However, the ‘brain drain’ possibly had a beneficial result for Taiwan because 
these talented Taiwanese usually came back to Taiwan from time to time. When they 
returned, they brought back the money they had made in China and spent it in Taiwan. 
In addition, the other impacts of relocation of enterprises overseas on domestic 
enterprises were all positive, including ‘expansion of the scale of production of 
domestic products’, ‘improvement of domestic product quality', ‘better financial 
control’ and ‘promotion of product diversification’. Among these, ‘promotion of 
product diversification’ was the most salient. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
Taiwanese business people had really rooted enterprises in Taiwan, thereby making
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Taiwan move towards the goal of APROC.26
Taiwanese business people were proactive rather than at the beck and call of the Taipei 
government. Although the Taipei government tried to divert Taiwanese business 
people from 'Go West’ to ‘Go South’, all it could do to further this aim was to visit and 
sign investment guarantee agreements and double-taxation agreements with the 
governments of other countries. In China, Taiwanese business people could not be 
protected in this way because the Beijing government insisted that Taiwan was just a 
province of China and refused to recognise Taiwan’s sovereignty. When Taiwanese 
business people were seeking their own profits, they had to face the risk of bankruptcy 
if things went badly.
Chen-Yuan Tung, a Taiwanese scholar, asserts that businesses are more vulnerable in 
China than Taiwan itself. He also establishes a generalised model of economic 
relations between Taiwan and Mainland China, by way of analysing the complicated 
economic interests, security considerations, and negotiating behaviour between Taiwan 
and Mainland China. From an economic perspective, he argues that cross-Straits 
economic exchanges have positive contributions to Taiwan’s economic development. 
From a security perspective, he maintains that cross-Straits economic exchanges have 
brought little extra burden on Taiwan’s security because of the transformation of 
Mainland China’s internal political and economic structure and the formation of the
26 The author has done the analysis. For data, see 
http://www.moea.gov.tw/-meco/sMt/four/invest/inv91 .htm 24/02/03
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‘common-interest community of international labour-division’ among Taiwan, 
Mainland China and the international community. In the end, he tries to combine 
economic and security dimensions with a view to construct a model for negotiation 
between Taiwan and Mainland China. Based on an economic and security analysis, he 
concludes that Taiwan should negotiate with Mainland China on cross-Straits economic 
cooperation in order to maximise Taiwan’s overall interests.27
However, if Taiwanese business people were successful rather than bankrupt, they 
could help the Taipei government promote economic diplomacy by being middlemen 
and surrogates. Although they might be regarded as hindrances when they chose to ‘Go 
West’ rather than ‘Go South’, they would also serve as surrogate diplomats in terms of 
people-to-people diplomacy in China.28
The Southward Policy was not very successful in the 1990s in terms of the 
government’s major objectives of discouraging investment in China.29 However, the 
results were perfectly satisfactory from the point of view of Taiwanese business people, 
who had -  for their own reasons -  been investing heavily in Southeast Asia for some
27 Chen-Yuan Tung, "Economic Relations between Taiwan and Mainland China -  The Tradeoff between 
Economics and Security". Journal of Yuan-Jine. Vol. 1, No. 2, pp.31-81. (S tf lU ,
Vbl.1, No. 2, pp. 31-81)
21 Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait -  People-to-People Diplomacy, Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1993.
29 The statistics of the MOEA of the Taipei government in 2002 showed that 72.90% of Taiwanese 
business people invested in Mainland China; 18.62% in ASEAN; 17.14% in the US. The 72.90% who 
invested overseas had invested in Mainland China mainly because China had abundant cheap labour and 
a great potential market; the US granted China the PNTR status; the two sides of the Taiwan Straits 
joined the WTO at the same time. On the other hand, the Asian Financial Crisis and unstable political 
economy o f Southeast Asia had made Taiwanese business people less willing to invest there. 
(http://www.moea.gov.tw/stat/four/invest/inv91 .htm 24/02/2003)
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years before the government proclaimed its Southward Policy in 1994. Taiwanese 
business people worked in their own way even before the proclamation by the Taipei 
government. In some sense, Taiwanese business people became the pioneers and 
practitioners without much government help.
6.3.1 Different Viewpoints from the Business Community
Chen Shen-Tian (WtffiJffl), the CEO of Xin-Bao Group ( f tf l l f t  ■ ), who is determined 
to set up the largest Chinese electronic product brand, has expressed the view that it is 
imperative to have a very large domestic market as a base if a company wants to 
become an international enterprise. There are merely twenty-three million people as a 
market in Taiwan, so how can it compete with a multi-national enterprise? The 
Ding-Xin Group, initially an oil shop in Taiwan, saw its business was declining in 
Taiwan and transferred its business to Mainland China in 1989, looking for new 
opportunities. Today, Kang Shi Fu instant noodles is already one of the biggest food 
products in China. In addition, the Pou-Chen Group, originally a sports shoes company, 
closed its factories in Hsiluo and Touliou in Taiwan and transferred its investment to the 
Mainland and now has become the largest manufacturing group of sports shoes in the 
world, with over one hundred production lines and more than one hundred thousand 
workers.30
By contrast, the Formosa Plastics Group, due to the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’, 
withdrew its application for a power station in Zhang-Zhou, and defened its Hai-Cang
30 Zhao Si-Bi, Tainan Girls' Technology College Tribune. No. 17, June 1998, p. 249.
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Project. This project was proposed by Y C Wang (Wang Yung-ching) of Formosa 
Plastics in order to build a complete petrochemical city, including a power station, a 
naphtha cracker, an oil refinery, a polyethylene plant, a sewage treatment plant, and 
auxiliary facilities on the coast of Fujian Province for a total of $7 billion. Because of 
new strict environmental laws and the rising cost of labour and land in Taiwan, 
Formosa Plastics thought that it could not develop any more there. By this plan, which 
was prevented by the Taiwanese government, Wang pressured the government into 
letting him expand his business in Taiwan. In 1993, the Taipei government granted him 
even better conditions to allow him to set up a larger project of $9.5 billion, including a 
sixth naphtha cracking plant, on a series of new, still-to be reclaimed islands in the sea 
next to Yulin on the west coast of Taiwan, where the distance to Xiamen is the shortest. 
From Yulin, Wang will be able to serve efficiently the hundreds of Taiwanese 
companies in Xiamen and the rest of Fujian that use his raw materials.31
Expecting that Wang would build a complete upstream base for raw materials for the 
plastics industry, more and more small, down-stream Taiwanese chemical producers 
had moved to Xiamen. Therefore, rubber and plastics industry: automobile tires, toys, 
artificial flowers, umbrellas, etc., became the major Taiwanese investments in Xiamen. 
Xiamen became a centre for the chemical industry. Afterwards, Wang started up 
several small-scale activities in Xiamen to the tune of $70 million.32
31 Willem Van Kemenade, China. Hong Kong. Taiwan. Inc.. London: Little, Brown and Company, 1998, 
p. 1%.
32 Willem Van Kemenade, China. Hone Kong. Taiwan. Inc.. London: Little, Brown and Company, 1998, 
pp. 196-7.
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In addition, Wang Wen-yang set up another company in Mainland China, Hong-Ren. 
Wang Wen-yang, Wang Yung-ching’s son, was also the former management cadre of 
Formosa Plastics and helped to build the sixth naphtha cracking plant. Therefore, he 
was very familiar with all the processes of the chemical industry. He was a good friend 
of Jiang Mianheng, the son of Jiang Zemin, because Wang supported financially Jiang 
Mianheng while Jiang was a student in America. Therefore, the Wang family built very 
good relations with the Jiangs. By all this, the scale of Hong-Ren became equivalent to 
Formosa Plastics in Taiwan, and Hong-Ren produced the same products as Formosa 
Plastics. Furthermore, Wang Wen-yang and Jiang Mianheng would cooperate and 
build six wafer plants (three eight-inch wafer plants and three twelve-inch wafer plants), 
totalling US$6.4 billion. The Chinese national bank also provided a loan of US$2.5 
billion for their company, Hong-Li.33
A few years later, its CEO Wang Yung-ching stated solemnly that the Policy of ‘No 
Haste, Be Patient’ was not a long-term policy, because the economic relations across the 
Taiwan Straits could not remain cut off indefinitely.34 A few years later, when 
everybody knew that Project in Ning-Bo (chemical industry and automobile industry) 
had been established by the Formosa Group, its spokesman still denied that it had 
invested in Ning-Bo. This was only to evade the Taipei government’s punishment.
The CEO of the Evergreen Group complained in public that the bargaining chips of
13 Interview with DD on 20 June 2003 in London. 
34 Ibid.
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Taiwan were being lost because preventing economic exchange activities could 
seriously damage the ability of Taiwanese businesses to develop business opportunities 
and could do no good to the Taiwanese people. Not only the business community 
objected to the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ but also some people in the academic 
field advised that the limitation imposed by the Taipei government would make the 
enterprises lose their competitiveness, so it should adjust the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be 
Patient’. The former Chief Executive of the Chinese Productivity Centre also believed 
that the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ could damage Taiwan’s competitiveness. 
Therefore, from the perspective of many Taiwanese business people, the market and 
business opportunities in the Mainland are more copious than those in Taiwan as a 
result of the strong international competitive pressure and Asian Financial Crisis in the 
1990s.35
6.3.2 Taiwan’s Politics and Business Community
In September 1997 Chang Yung-fa the owner of Eva Airline, called for three
direct links. The intelligence service of President Lee Teng-hui ( i  # • )  found that 
Chang had been currying favour from Beijing, so the PRC had helped him to obtain the 
flying rights from Japan to Taiwan. That is to say, because Chang had actually built 
good relations with the Beijing government, he acquired flying rights between Japan 
and Taiwan. Lee therefore thought Chang was disloyal. Even in the early 21“ century, 
Chang Yung-fa stated in Japan that the future of Taiwan’s economy would be in 
Mainland China and that he would transfer the flags of more than half of Evergreen
15 Ibid.
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Container ships from Panama and Taiwan to Britain and Italy, thus allowing them to 
sail to Chinese ports. Chang’s action could have caused the propagandists of the DPP to 
assert that he was a red-top (pro-China) businessman. However, very few DPP 
members accused him because Chang has long been a generous donor to President 
Chen Shui-bian (RI^IR) and the DPP. The Evergreen Group is also an important 
sponsor of Pan-green forces,36 and influences President Chen in his choice of cabinet 
ministers and aides.37
This can be proven by the fact that so-called Evergreen legislators have great leverage 
on the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, and many politicians are from 
the Institute for National Policy Research, which has been set up by Chang. For 
example, Huang Chu-wen (Jt±]!fc), at present Chairman of the Taiwan Solidarity 
Union (TSU), a branch of the Pan-green forces, was the Executive Director of the 
Institute for National Policy Research. In addition, Su Chin-chiang ( I t i t t t t ) ,  Secretary 
General of the TSU and now a member of the cabinet, was a research fellow of the 
Institute for National Policy Research. Yeh Kuo-hsin (X H M ), the Director General of 
the Government Information Office, was the Vice Executive Director of Data Centre of 
the Institute for National Policy Research. Hung-mao Tien (f93/tjS), the Foreign 
Minister, was the President of the Institute for National Policy Research. Huang 
Hwei-chen a Minister of State, was also an Executive Director of the Institute
for National Policy Research, not to mention many other Evergreen legislators.38
34 The Pan-green forces include the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU).
”  Zhang Shu-ling ( H H ) ,  United Daily News, 7 March 2002 
"ibid.
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In the past, Chang focused on a global strategy but is now focusing on a regional one, 
i.e. the Chinese market. Even though the Evergreen Group declared openly against the 
government, which has been supported by the media, Lee and the Pan-green forces 
have not attacked it. However, Lee asserted that people like Morris Chang ( » £ « )  
were red-top (pro-China) business people and that the media which supported 
westward investment were pro-unification. However, Morris Chang had established 
the foundation of Taiwan’s semi-conductor industry. Taiwan’s semi-conductor 
technology was not developed by the government but introduced by Morris Chang and 
the like from the US. Most of the staff of his company, Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Co (TSMC), had been trained in Silicon Valley and brought the 
technology back to Taiwan.
At that time, there were two ways of high-tech development. One was Acer’s way, the 
other TSMC’s. Acer made its own brand. Morris Chang believed that Taiwan could 
not compete with the US in technology so he adopted the strategy of Original 
Equipment Manufacturing (OEM). Under this strategy, America is responsible for 
design and marketing, then Taiwan makes the products and sells them back to America. 
This way has been proven to be more successful than that of Acer, which has its own 
brand but does not make much profit. In general the TSMC can make two or three 
times more profits than Acer. If Morris Chang is a red-top (pro-China) businessman, he 
represents the view of the business community. Furthermore, he has promised to invest 
in a large-scale 12-inch wafer factory in Taiwan when he moves his company’s 8-inch
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wafer production to the Mainland. Basically, according to his plan, Taiwan can still 
maintain relatively high-tech production. It could be plausibly argued that if the 
government forbids business people to invest according to their own judgment, the 
enterprises might lose their competitiveness in the end and that the government should, 
therefore, only warn the business people but not block them.
6.3.3 Uncontrollable flow of Taiwanese Money into the Mainland
There are several major ways in which money flows from Taiwan to the Mainland. In 
fact, many Taiwanese business people invest in the Mainland but register their 
company in a third country. In the Mainland, the first and the second largest FDI 
countries are Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands. These two countries are 
exactly the places where Taiwanese business people most frequently set up their 
overseas companies. In particular, a lot of Taiwanese money is parked in Hong Kong.
So, how in fact does Taiwanese money flow into the Mainland under the Policy of ‘No 
Haste, Be Patient’?
(1). Taiwanese companies can save their money in an overseas bank account when they 
export and import. When foreign exchange was still controlled by the Taiwanese 
government a long time ago, no enterprise could retain foreign exchange assets. At that 
time, some big companies already knew how to keep foreign exchange overseas by 
declaring different prices when they exported and imported. When they imported 
products or components, by declaring higher prices, Taiwanese business people could
172
ask their suppliers to save the excess money in a given overseas bank account, thereby 
investing in the future. In this situation, it is very difficult for the authority concerned to 
find out the truth in every case.39
(2) . Taiwanese companies can use their overseas branches to invest in the Mainland. 
Many Taiwanese enterprises have overseas markets. They receive income by way of 
their overseas branches and save it in overseas banks. It is even more difficult for the 
authority concerned to regulate the investment. Also, some syndicates of Taiwanese 
business people invest in Asia or America on a large scale. It is not essential to return 
their money to Taiwan. Nobody can interfere with their investment anywhere. 
Formosa Plastics invested in a new enterprise on the Mainland some time ago through 
its branch in America.40
(3) . Taiwanese business people can invest in the Mainland through investment funds. 
The four largest investment companies manage over NT$ 70 billions, equivalent to 
the total amount that Taiwanese business people invested in the Mainland in 2001. 
Part of the funds flows into those places where the Taiwanese government does not 
allow investment. One high-tech company pointed out that the money it put into the 
investment funds was bound to go to its company in the Mainland.41
(4) . Taiwanese companies can set up paper companies in a third country. Many
39 Interview with X on 28 May 2002..
40 It is also feasible on the other way round. A company near Shanghai transfers its income in China back 
to Taiwan by way o f its branch in Singapore. Interview with A on 2 March 2002.
41 Interview with N on 1 May 2002.
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enterprises which invest in the Mainland establish this kind of paper company in tax 
havens like the British Virgin Islands or the Cayman Islands. In the early 21“ century, 
the British Virgin Islands is the second biggest investor in China and the biggest in 
Taiwan. The Cayman Islands are the 8th biggest investor in China.42 The PRC’s 
Zhongguo tongji nianjian ( 2003, shows (a) that FDI from the Virgin
Islands was almost 4 times higher than that from the Cayman Islands; and (b) that taken 
together, the Virgin and Cayman Islands rank second as a source of FDI to China.43
In this way, Taiwanese business people can avoid the rigorous control regulations of 
both the Chinese government and Taiwanese government because it is very easy to set 
up a paper company in a third country and acquire the status of a foreign corporation. It 
costs only two or three thousand US dollars to run a paper company in these places. It 
also needs only one to three people to organise a board (W ) .  Therefore, an enterprise 
can set up several paper companies to make capital flow more complicated, thus 
avoiding the control of the authority concerned. It is also easy for an individual to open 
this kind of paper company and keep his or her capital overseas. The investment 
company of the famous Zhang-Zhou Power Plant and He-Jian Technology are both 
based in the British Virgin Islands.44
(5). Some companies make their plans earlier than necessary and apply every year for 
permission to invest in China. Some companies apply for investment in the Mainland
42 Interview with EE on 1 May 2003.
45 Zhonsiuo tonsil nianiian C P H lf c t t* * ) ,  PRC, 2003, pp. 672-674.
44 Interview with N on 1 May 2002.
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according to law but through multitudes of branch companies, with a different one 
every year. It is rather difficult for the Taipei government to discover the relations 
among those branch companies. Once the money goes abroad, it is hard to control how 
they invest in the Mainland. A wafer company pointed out that it had applied for 
permission to invest in the Mainland to the Investment Commission, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, ROC. It applied for items permitted by the government but actually 
invested in a different industry in the Mainland, which is beyond the control of the 
Taipei government.45
(6). Some companies use the rebate from equipment suppliers to invest in the Mainland. 
Most of the high-tech companies have very good relations with overseas equipment 
suppliers. Investment to set up and equip a new factory in the wafer, TFT and LCD 
industries usually costs over NTS 10 billion. Equipment suppliers have to build related 
equipment according to the needs of the high-tech companies, with long-term bilateral 
cooperation and communication. In the international equipment procurement market, 
there are open systems of rebate. For most of the procurement companies, the 
equipment suppliers usually offer 2% to 10% rebate. In this connection, Taiwanese 
enterprises can ask the suppliers to invest in the Mainland with the rebate or share the 
same projects. Sometimes, they can ask the equipment suppliers to save the money in a 
given overseas account and thereby retain overseas capital.46 *
**http://www.cw.tw/Files/articlc/frontcnd/Sub.asp?page=2&SubiectId=1002&kcv=2Q89 2002/6/2 
w Interview with A on 1 March 2002.
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(7). Some Taiwanese companies use triangle-trading to transfer capital into China. For 
example, P usually pays money to another wood company in Southeast Asia. Then the 
company in Southeast Asia delivers the wood to his company in China. In the end, he 
can invest in the Mainland after selling the wood.47
In terms of the analysis above, even though the Taipei government weaves a tight web 
to control the flight of capital into the Mainland, many people and enterprises still find 
different legal ways to invest in the Mainland. Hence, according to the Central Bank of 
Taiwan, it is estimated that US$ 50 billion have flowed from Taiwan into China. What 
is worse is that Chen Ji-Zhu, Vice General Manager of China International Commerce 
Bank, believes that the capital flow is over US$ 150 billion in the last decade.48
6.3.4 Boldness versus Caution
Taiwan opened its door for Taiwanese business people to invest in the Mainland as long 
ago as 1987. However, the subsequent ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ Policy was based on an 
awareness of the risks inherent in any rush of investment in the Mainland. On the other 
hand, some people have argued for a ‘Bold Westbound’ Policy, because they believe 
that westward investment in the Mainland does not lead to negative effects. Both of 
these policies were viewed at the state level. However, if we examine the issue from a 
sub-national level, e.g. businesses, we can come up with different viewpoints. In 
addition, business people have more practical strategies in terms of individual
47 Interview with P on 12 June 2002. The company can also transfer the money back to Taiwan. When 
the company in China receives the wood from Southeast Asia, it can also transfer its money back to 
Taiwan by way of Southeast Asia or even through Hong Kong.
41 httD://www.cw.com.tw/Filc8/articlc/frontend/Sub.asp7page=2&SubicctId=1002&kcv=2098 2002/6/2
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enterprises. Large enterprises might have different strategies from small- and 
medium-sized enterprises. ‘Go West’ and ‘Go South’ might have different implications 
for business people from those for the government. What kind of conditions in the host 
country are their major concerns? Also, when they act on their own, do they serve the 
interests of the state? That is to say, are they acting as middlemen, surrogates or 
hindrances?
6.3.5 The Growth of Taiwanese Investment in China
Taiwanese investment in China has been on a large scale. For 2001, the Taiwan 
Statistical Databook (2002), shows that the volume was US$ 2.784 billion. The 
cumulative investment for 1991-2001 as US$19.9 billion -  omitting the Virgin and 
Cayman Islands.49 However, PRC government statistics put the figure slightly higher 
than this: US$ 2.979 billion. Taiwanese business people are the fifth largest Foreign 
Direct Investors (FDIs) in the Mainland.50 Nevertheless, both these statistics may have 
underestimated the volume in total.
The General Situation of Taiwanese Investment in China and Southeast Asia
(Table 6.1)
Table 6.1 shows the Statistics of Taiwanese Investment in China and Southeast Asia. 
Taiwanese foreign investment stemmed largely from 1986, a time when the New 
Taiwanese Dollar appreciated greatly and the domestic investment environment was
49 Taiwan Statistical Databook. Republic of China, 2002, p. 272.
50 Statistics on Indirect Mainland Investment, Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Republic of China..
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deteriorating. Before 1990, the main investment area was Southeast Asia, mainly 
Thailand and Malaysia. Afterwards, Indonesia and the Philippines followed. In recent 
years, Vietnam has become the investment destination because of even cheaper and 
more hard-working labour and a more stable political economy.
The data given in Table 6.1 were recorded by the governments of the host countries. 
Usually the statistics are higher than those shown in the Taiwan Statistical Databook 
and Zhonghua mingo tongji nianjian ( * ¥ £ g a t t U - ¥ * ) ,  2003, which suggest a 
quite different picture. This is because the latter shows the statistics approved by the 
Taiwanese government. However, many Taiwanese business people invested overseas 
without the approval of the Taiwanese government. Therefore, the statistics from the 
host countries are usually higher than those from the Taiwanese government.
In some cases, after the approval of the Taiwanese government, some Taiwanese 
business people chose not to invest abroad. Both in 1997 and 2000, the figures from 
Zhonghua mingo tongji nianjian (4* are higher than the statistics
recorded by the Chinese government (host country). The thesis (host country’s record) 
shows Taiwan’s investment in China peaking in 1996 at US$3.48 billion. If you look at 
Zhonghua mingo tongji nianjian ( 4 * ®) , 51 you will see that the 
corresponding figure for 1997 is US$4,334 billion (which is higher than the statistics 
recorded by the PRC government). This is because, in 1997, just after the Asian 
Financial Crisis, many Taiwanese business people decided not to invest in China
91 Zhonghua mingo tongji nianjian 2003, p. 242.
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against uncertainty there after the approval of the Taiwanese government. At that time, 
the Chinese currency (Renminbi) did not depreciate, making the producing cost in 
Mainland China relatively high. This also discouraged Taiwanese business people 
from “Going West” in 1997. The difference of the statistics is also as follows:
Statistics of the PRC Zhonghua mingo tongji nianjian
1999 $2.6 billion $1,253 billion
2000 $2.3 billion $2.6.7 billion
2001 $3.0 billion $2,784 billion
The statistics of the PRC show a 11.5% decline from 1999 to 2000, whereas Zhonghua 
mingo tongji nianjian shows a 108.1% rise. After Taiwanese
business people applied for permission for investment in China in 2000, some of them 
decided not to invest in China in the end. This is because, in 2000, after the presidential 
election in Taiwan, some Taiwanese business people who supported Chen Shui-bian 
found that Chinese tax authorities were now much more eager to examine their tax 
records and make trouble for them. Therefore, although some of them obtained the 
permission of the Taipei government to invest in China, they abandoned investment in
2000.
The westward investment into China greatly increased in 1991 with the easing of 
tension across the Taiwan Straits. In 1996, the amount peaked at US$3.48 billion. 
However, the investment decreased gradually due to the Taiwan Straits Crises and
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Asian Financial Crisis. In 1999, there was Taiwanese investment of only US$2.6 
billion in China. In 2000, there was even less Taiwanese investment (US$2.3 billion). 
In 2001, the investment went back up to US$3 billion, but still less than the figure 
before the crises.
In terms of China’s share of Taiwanese investment in China and Southeast Asia 
between 1959 and 2000, it absorbed nearly 40%. In single year statistics, it occupied 
more than 60% in 1998 and 2000 and over 70% in 1993, a turning point when westward 
investment reached above US$3 billion. From 1998 onwards, the rise of China’s share 
was because of the Asian Financial Crisis, leading to the decrease of Taiwanese 
investment in Southeast Asia.
It is not obvious which country comes next after China in the league table of preferred 
destinations for Taiwanese investment. There are often especially high amounts in 
several single years in some countries (e.g. Thailand, Malaysia or Indonesia). This is 
because there were single large-scale investment projects in those years, mainly Taiwan 
state-run enterprises and Kuomintang party-run enterprises.52 91
91 Interview with V on 1 June 2002.
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The Geographical Distribution of Taiwan’s Foreign Investment (Table 6.2)
In connection with the distribution of different size of enterprises in different area, the 
Statistics Department of Ministry of Economic Affairs made a survey in 1998. Table
6.2 shows that the most popular destination for investment is still China (measured by 
percentage of companies - 71% - investing there). The second most popular destination 
is Southeast Asia (37%). The next is the USA (17%). Scarcely any small-sized 
enterprises invest in more than two countries. The major country they invest in is China 
(76%). The next is Southeast Asia (32.6%). The USA attracts only 9.5% of small-sized 
enterprises to invest there.53
A smaller proportion (65%) of medium-sized enterprises invest in China than of 
small-sized and large-sized companies. The next is still Southeast Asia, at 34%. 
However, 23% of medium-sized enterprises invest in the USA. This is because most 
medium-sized Taiwanese enterprises are electronics ones.
In connection with large-sized enterprises, a rather high percentage of them invest in all 
of the three areas: China (77%), Southeast Asia (51 %) and the USA (40%).54
53 Wang, Hong-zen & Gong Yi-Jun, "Moving into or out of China? -  The Mobility of Taiwanese Capital 
in China and Southeast Asia", httD://benz.nchu.edu.tw/-hongzen/TaishangVNCN,htm 26/11/02
14 Because a company can invest in more than one area (two or three areas), the total percentages are 
more than 100%.
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If we add all of the percentages, we can find out the index of cross-border investment of 
each kind of enterprise. If it were equal to 100%, it would mean that there were no 
enterprises investing in more than two areas. The higher the figure rises above 100%, 
the more companies (we can deduce) are engaged in cross-border enterprises. We find 
that the index of cross-border investment is 124% for small-sized companies, 135% for 
middle-sized, and 183% for large-sized. This means almost all large-sized companies 
take on cross-border investment.55
To sum up, China is the most popular offshore area of investment for Taiwanese 
business people. Southeast Asia is the second most popular offshore destination of 
investment. The next is the USA, especially for the large-sized enterprises (40.06%), 
following China (77.19%) and Southeast Asia (50.88%).56
In terms of different-size enterprises, the scales of their offshore relocation are different. 
The larger the size of the enterprises, the more cross-border areas they are engaged with. 
It is noteworthy that only a small proportion of small-sized enterprises are engaged in 
cross-border investment.57
Obviously, both ‘Go West’ and ‘Go South’ were the two major trends in the relocation 
overseas of Taiwan’s business community in the 1990s. In addition, ‘Go West’ was
55 Wang, Hong-zen & Gong Yi-Jun, “Moving into or out of China? -  The Mobility of Taiwanese Capital 
in China and Southeast Asia”, httD://bcnz.nchu.edu.tw/-hongzen/TaishangVNCN.htm 26/11/02
184
more popular in this period than ‘Go South’. This was beneficial to the government’s 
Plan to make Taiwan the hub for business in the region, though it was the result of 
business people simply seeking to further their own interests. However, the trend did 
not exactly follow the policy of the Taipei government in connection with ‘No Haste, 
Be Patient’.
6.3.6 Shift of Investment from Taiwan to China
In the early twenty-first century, more and more western firms are moving their 
investment from Taiwan to China, too. The reason is the ‘cluster effect’ of the 
Taiwanese business community that has formed in Mainland China. All the enterprises, 
including up-stream, middle-stream and the down-stream, have formed a chain and 
help one another. This tendency can be seen in both the Pearl River Delta and the 
Yangtze River Delta.58
Frequently, when a country begins to invest in new manufacturing enterprises overseas, 
trade between the home country and the host country will soon increase, because 
initially the new factories will be dependent for supplies of primary materials and 
components on the original suppliers in the investing country. This is apparent in 
Taiwan’s relocation overseas process. Therefore, the economic exchanges, including 
investment and trade, have boomed. If the Taipei government could have followed up 
this development and relaxed the restriction of three links of postal services, trade and 
transportation, economic exchanges across the Straits would have increased much more
51 Interview with T on 17 April 2002.
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than they did, and this would have been a tremendous boost for the realisation of the 
APROC Plan. However, when the time came to make the necessary decisions, the 
Taipei government failed to seize the opportunity.
In this connection, it is fair to conclude that it would have been better to follow the 
collective steps of the Taiwanese business people, which would have been more 
beneficial to Taiwan itself as a whole. The contradiction and inconsistency which 
resulted from the double-track policy made by the Taipei government (‘No Haste, Be 
Patient’ and ‘Southward Policy’ by the Presidency & the APROC by the Executive 
Yuan) merely led to ineffective administrative development without paying attention to 
the individual interests of the Taiwanese business people.
However, the Taipei government had its own consideration - security - and insisted on 
the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’. All the transportation of people and goods 
between Taiwan and China has to pass through a third place, usually either Hong Kong 
or Japan. This has been not only very time-consuming but also costly and has made 
business people tired of the ‘red tape’ of the Taipei, Hong Kong and Japanese 
government. Some Taiwanese business people joke that they would like to send their 
goods directly to China and bribe Japanese officials to stamp the documents to provide 
evidence that they have gone via Japan. Because the Taiwanese government persists in 
refusing to authorise the three links across the Straits, the Hong Kong government and 
the Japanese government benefit greatly by means of ‘stamp procedure’, while 
long-suffering Taiwanese business people have had to incur delays and extra costs.
1 8 6
Gradually, all types of enterprises - including western firms - have been moving to the 
Mainland just because of the absence of ‘three links’.
Why did Taiwanese Enterprises Relocate Overseas in the 1990s? (Table 6.3)
The above question was surveyed in 1996 and 1998, and the results for the two years 
are not very different. The three major reasons are ‘using cheaper local labour’ (65%), 
‘great potential of host local market’ (50%) and ‘deteriorating investment environment 
of Taiwan’ (36%). However, if we consider separately the answers given by different 
size companies, there are some interesting differences. Whereas about the same 
proportion of all companies name ‘using cheaper local labour’ as a reason, there is a big 
gap between small-sized and large-sized companies when the question asks about 
‘great potential of the local market’. This is identified as an important motive by only 
42.8% of small companies but 65.8% of large enterprises.59
In terms of ‘Deteriorating investment environment of Taiwan’, 41% of small-sized 
enterprises regard this as the reason why they relocated overseas, but only 29.8% of 
large-sized enterprises believe this was important in their decision. Instead, 31.3% of 
large-sized enterprises think ‘Effectively using the firm’s capital’ was relatively 
important.60
59 Wang, Hong-zen & Gong Yi-Jun, “Moving into or out o f China? -  The Mobility of Taiwanese Capital
in China and Southeast Asia”, http://bcnz.nchu.edu.tw/-hongzen/TaishangVNCN.htm 26/11/02 
“ Ibid.
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In terms of the reasons of relocation overseas, the first two major reasons given by 
enterprises in all size ranges are the same: ‘Using cheaper local labour’ and ‘the Great 
potential of the local market’. However, in terms of other reasons of relocation 
overseas, large-sized enterprises consider ‘Effectively using the firm’s capital' as 
relatively important. Both small and medium-sized enterprises regard ‘Deteriorating 
investment environment of Taiwan’ as relatively important.61 (See Table 6.3)
Where to Invest? Views of Taiwanese Business People in Late 1990s (Table 6.4) 
From the data analysed above, we can deduce that many Taiwanese enterprises have 
been engaged in cross-border investment, especially large-sized enterprises. When 
Taiwanese business people were asked in the late 1990s where they considered they 
might invest next, their answers showed an unflagging enthusiasm for overseas 
investment. China was still the most popular country for next investment (55.4%). For 
Southeast Asia as a whole, including Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, 60.0% of the Taiwanese enterprises were going to invest there next.
61 Ibid.
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It is interesting to note the fact that Taiwanese enterprises now investing in China intend 
to invest next in Southeast Asia. However, the Taiwanese enterprises currently engaged 
in investment in Southeast Asia were likely to invest next in China.62 The Taiwanese 
enterprises operating in Indonesia were exceptional: they were less likely to seek new 
territories in which to invest, largely because they had benefited greatly from the 
cheaper local labour after the Asian Financial Crisis.63 However, Taiwanese business 
people in general were inclined to spread their risks in cross-border investment.
A Taiwanese shoemaker in Vietnam expressed the view that Vietnam, as a former 
colony of France, benefited from exporting goods to the European Union (EU). 
Therefore, Vietnam became the major chosen country when he decided to invest 
because compared to Vietnam, China offered him no favourable terms for exporting to
62 Wang, Hong-zen & Gong Yi-Jun, "Moving into or out o f China? -  The Mobility of Taiwanese Capital 
in China and Southeast Asia”, http://benz.nchu.edu.tw/-hongzen/TaishaneVNCN.htm 26/11/02
63 Interview with FF on 25 April 2002. The Asian Financial Crisis starting from Thailand in 1997 caused 
major depreciation of currencies. During the huge fluctuation of currency value, the impacts on the local 
Taiwanese business people have varied. In general, if Taiwanese business people focused on the local 
domestic market, the negative effects on them were very serious. The shrinking domestic market as well 
as the rising cost of importing were both devastating. However, for Taiwanese business people who 
focused on export, the reduced cost of local labour made them become very competitive, and if they also 
bought local primary materials, the cost became even lower. At that time, the Chinese currency 
(Renminbi) did not depreciate, making the producing cost in Mainland China relatively high. When 
western customers ordered products, they were very aware o f the price of primary materials and the 
transportation fee. By contrast, if an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) wanted to maintain its 
competitiveness, China became less likely to be its top priority. For example, according to the statistics 
in 1996,72% of Taiwanese business people in China wanted to utilise cheaper local labour. This figure 
was very similar to that o f Taiwanese business people who wanted to utilise cheaper local labour in 
Southeast Asian countries in 1997. The statistics were Thailand (70%), Indonesia (79%), the Philippines 
(81%), and Vietnam (65%), respectively. On the other hand, gradually the figure of Taiwanese in China, 
who wanted to utilise cheaper local labour, rose from 41% in 1997 to 69% in 1998. This was because the 
relatively stable currency enhanced the trend of Taiwanese investment. Again, the figure dropped from 
72% in 1996 to 41% in 1997 because the currency depreciation of Southeast Asian countries made 
Chinese cost o f labour relatively high when Chinese currency remained stable. See also The Overseas 
Investment Practice Investigation Report of Taiwanese Manufacturers. Taipei: Department o f Statistics, 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1997. & The Overseas Investment Practice Investigation Report of 
Taiwanese Manufacturers. Taipei: Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1998.
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the EU and he had no chance of gaining access to any of China’s quota of exports to the 
USA.64 Like Pou-Chen, Taiwanese business people expected Vietnam to establish 
diplomatic relations with the US and benefit from normalisation of trade relations 
between Vietnam and the US. In addition, Vietnam was going to join the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area, so they too expected to benefit from exporting products to and importing 
primary materials from other ASEAN countries, especially when trade barriers were 
removed in the future. Therefore, with regard to Taiwanese business people already 
investing in Vietnam and exporting to third countries, the changes of international 
economic climate, international norms (including international regulations), and 
exporting destination countries are all factors they consider when choosing where to 
invest (either ‘Go South’ or ‘Go West’).
The Impact of Where Overseas Taiwanese Business People’s Primary Materials, 
Components and Semi-Products Came from (Table 6.5)
After the overseas relocation of Taiwanese businesses, did they still maintain strong 
links with Taiwan or let old networks weaken while they built new relations with the 
local community in their host country? Based on the statistics of overseas Taiwanese 
businesses, it is obvious that the connection between overseas Taiwanese businesses 
and Taiwan was reduced over time. For example, the proportion of primary materials 
which these businesses sourced in Taiwan fell from 49.7% in 1996 to 45.5% in 1997. 
Similarly, the proportion of semi-products from Taiwan fell from 53.7% to 49.7% in the 
same period. Although these differences were not very substantial, all the countries
64 Interview with S on 3 March 2002.
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As regards individual countries, Taiwanese businesses in the USA, China, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia had less connection with Taiwan itself in 1997 than 
they had in 1996. Only the Taiwanese businesses in the Philippines obtained slightly 
more primary materials from Taiwan, going from 50.4% in 1996 to 52.3% in 1997. On 
the other hand, the percentages of the primary materials and semi-products provided 
both by local Taiwanese business people and local non-Taiwanese business people rose. 
This trend is similar in almost every country. In other words, the necessary primary 
materials and semi-products for production provided by local businesses have usually 
increased year by year.66
excep t in a very few  cases seem  to have the sam e declin ing tendency.65
45 Wang, Hong-zen & Gong Yi-Jun, “Moving into or out of China? -  The Mobility of Taiwanese Capital 
in China and Southeast Asia”, http://benz.nchu.edu.tw/-hongzen/TaishangVNCN.htm 26/11/02 Also, 
both the percentages of primary materials and semi-products of Singapore sourcing from Taiwan were 
the same from 1996 to 1997. The primary materials of Indonesia and the Philippines sourcing from 
Taiwan rose. These are the only exceptions.
44 Wang, Hong-zen. Mobility Patterns and Strategies Among Taiwan's Small and Medium-Scale 
Business People. Unpublished PhD Thesis: Australian National University, 1998, pp. 210-211.
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Based on the statistics of mainly overseas Taiwanese businesses of 2001 and 2002, the 
primary materials, components, and semi-products sourced from Taiwan all declined 
from 2001 to 2002. The primary materials, components, and semi-products sourced 
from local non-Taiwanese businesses all increased. The primary materials, 
components, and semi-products sourced from local Taiwanese businesses all increased 
even more. This indicated that after the development of overseas Taiwanese businesses 
had become stable, the effect of trade produced by investment gradually declined. 
Overseas Taiwanese businesses gradually turned to employ local resources efficiently 
and to devote them to local development, thus sourcing local primary materials, 
components and semi-products sourced.67
Therefore, the longer Taiwanese businesses stay in China, the more likely they are to 
become entrenched locally. The cluster effect of Taiwanese business people in China is 
becoming more and more evident. For example, in Dongguan the degree of integration 
of Taiwanese electronics industries from up-stream to down-stream is already 
extremely high. Businesses can order in Dongguan and pay in Taiwan.68
67 http://2k3dmz2.moca.gov.tw/gnweb/news/hot html/Inv92.htm 27/04/04
61 Wang, Hong-zen & Gong Yi-Jun, "Moving into or out of China? -  The Mobility of Taiwanese Capital 
in China and Southeast Asia”, http://benz.nchu.edu.tw/-hongzen/TaishangVNCN.htm 26/11/02
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6.4 Extending Taiwanese Businesses Overseas
6.4.1 The Difficulties Faced by Overseas Taiwanese Businesses (Table 6.6)
‘Go West’ or ‘Go South’ also involved the administrative effectiveness of local 
government and local political economy. A Taiwanese businessman in Vietnam 
expressed the view that he had examined China and Vietnam many times before he 
decided where to invest in 1995. He felt that not only was the infrastructure of China 
better than that of Vietnam, several other factors were also superior to those in Vietnam. 
However, he eventually decided to invest in Vietnam just because the political risks 
were higher in China. Table 6.6 shows that 41.8% of Taiwanese businesses in China 
believe the administrative effectiveness in China does not meet their needs for 
investment. 31.9% of Taiwanese business people in China think that the unstable 
political economy in China is the main difficulty they met with. Only in Indonesia and 
the Philippines did a higher percentage of the Taiwanese business people mention 
political instability as a negative factor, 76.7% and 40.0% respectively. In China, 
Taiwanese business people were regarded by local officials as an instrument against the 
Taiwanese government.69 In addition, Taiwanese business people could not be 
protected by the local law because the Taiwanese government had no sovereignty in the 
Mainland, and Chinese officials could not be relied on to adjudicate impartially
69 Beijing's announced policy o f "yijingji cu zhengzhi, yi tong cu tong, and yi min bi guan"
kUBfEfit, JS lR il t ; “promoting political amalgamation through economic integration; 
achieving unification through communications; and pressuring the government with popular demands”) 
implied a strong desire to utilise an over-committed business community to influence the politics in 
Taiwan. See Yu-shan Wu, “Economic Reform, Cross-Strait Relations and the Issue of Policy Linkage”, 
in Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang, Samuel S.G Wu, Inherited Rivalry -  Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits, p. 
128. See also Steven M. Goldstein, “Terms of Engagement; Taiwan’s Mainland Policy” in Alastair Iain 
Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Engaging China -  the Management of an Emerging Power, p. 67.
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between foreigners and their own nationals. Some business people would even like to 
change their nationality.70 In Indonesia, the uprising to topple Suharto in 1998 and in 
the Philippines the accession to power of President Joseph Estrada, a popular 
entertainer who turned populist politician, were both thought by the local Taiwanese 
business people to be indicators of a highly unstable political economy. By 1999, there 
were many more Taiwanese business people expressing fears about the stability of 
Indonesia and the Philippines than there had been in 1996. (In Indonesia, the 
percentage rose from 37% to 76.7%, in the Philippines, from 23% to 40%.)71 By 
contrast, Taiwanese business people in Vietnam had legal rights because the Taipei 
government had concluded an investment guarantee agreement with the Hanoi 
government. Therefore, they were treated as foreign business people, sharing 
privileges under the Vietnamese government’s ‘Doi Moi’ Policy.
The management of local labour was another difficulty faced by overseas Taiwanese 
businesses. Most Taiwanese business people expressed the view that it was highly 
desirable to build up a cadre of locally recruited managers and administrators. There
70 Interview with K, who said that if he were Vietnamese, the Vietnamese government would be more 
powerful to protect him than the Taipei government because the Taipei government could not negotiate 
with the Beijing government in terms of the rights of Taiwanese business people. Consequently, 
Taiwanese business people can neither be treated as foreign business people nor Chinese business people, 
thus being deprived of any rights shared by either foreign people or Chinese. On the other hand, some 
argued that people who kept the law had nothing to fear from the Chinese government and that most 
Taiwanese business people enjoyed privileges such as reduced taxes and the cooperation of local 
government in areas such as improvement o f the infrastructure. However, the confidence of Taiwanese 
business people is undermined by the fact that even if one gets a favourable verdict from a Chinese court, 
there is no guarantee that officials will enforce the judgement effectively. This situation shows the need 
for improved institutions and government intervention.
71 The Overseas Investment Practice Investigation Report of Taiwanese Manufacturers. Taipei: 
Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1997, pp. 216-217. Wang, Hong-zen & Gong 
Yi-Jun, “Moving into or out o f China? -  The Mobility of Taiwanese Capital in China and Southeast Asia”, 
http://beM.nchu.cdu.tw/-hongzen/TaishangVNCNJiUn 26/11/02
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were two reasons for this policy. First, a Taiwanese manager in China costs from 1.5 to 
2 times as much as one in Taiwan, equalling to about US$2,4000 to US$3,150. This 
salary is roughly that of 5 or 6 Chinese managers of equivalent rank. Second, 
Taiwanese managers are usually unwilling to go to the Mainland because they dislike 
leaving their home country, and thus they find it difficult to concentrate on their work 
overseas. However, it is difficult to achieve localisation of management, because 
locally recruited managers are difficult to retain. Many Taiwanese business people 
expressed the view that whenever another company offered a higher wage, workers 
would swiftly depart. These workers only wished to make the most money in the 
shortest period, and were not interested in acquiring skills that would further their 
long-term career development. Given the mobility of employees, it is very hard to 
cultivate local management cadres. 53% of Taiwanese business people stated that it 
was difficult to find local technicians.72 Thus, Taiwanese businesses have had to 
cultivate their internal management cadres because highly-qualified managers are 
difficult to find in China. However, high mobility led to difficulty in cultivating 
management cadres.73
6.4.2 Taiwanese Business People and Chinese Officialdom
Taiwanese business people had to build good relations with local government in China. 
Some of them had great influence on the local government. One of the Taiwanese
The Overseas Investment Practice Investigation Report of Taiwanese Manufacturers. Taipei: 
Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1997, pp. 156-157.
,J Wang, Hong-zen & Gong Yi-Jun, “Moving into or out of China? -  The Mobility of Taiwanese Capital 
in China and Southeast Asia”, http://benz.nchu.edu.tw/-hongzen/TaishangVNCN.htm 26/11/02
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business people was even called the ‘underground mayor’ of the city.74 Very often, 
Taiwanese business people had to deal with various institutions of local government in 
China, for example, when applying for a licence and business registration (X f tS fE  
S). Frequently, a licence had to be stamped by more than twenty different officials and 
took more than a year to complete. In the coastal area, local authorities were more 
open-minded, since they had met many foreign business people. However, in the 
interior areas like Xian, officials followed older Chinese traditions which laid down 
that officials should be distant and superior. It was very difficult to build up personal 
networks with them. Therefore, Taiwanese business people in Xian had to ‘fight 
countless battles’. A Taiwanese businessperson who went to Xian in 1992 had to deal 
with many officials every day for a year before he could obtain the necessary licences to 
build his factory and start producing goods. During this period, his hotel bill and public 
relations expenses were enormous. This was time-consuming and dispiriting. He was 
faced with a dilemma whether he should give up or persevere. In the end, he decided to 
stay. In addition, he suffered from the dishonesty of his Chinese partner. He expressed 
the view that he finally survived after paying a lot of ‘tuition fee’.75
Many Taiwanese business people complained about the unforeseen payments they had 
to make; many officials were very corrupt; it was very difficult to make money in China. 
Very few people said that they had made a lot of money and that their businesses were 
very successful. However, if this was so, why were so many Taiwanese business people
74 Interview with J on 20 June 2002.
73 Li Dai-Zheng & Xu Xiou-Mei, Dealing Businesses in China. Taipei: Shang-Xun, 2001, pp. 203-204.
2001. pp. 203-204)
2 0 0
rushing to invest in China? In fact, many Taiwanese people had made a lot of money 
and expanded their investment.76 Prompted by the growing ‘cluster effect’ in China 
and the lack of three links across the Taiwan Straits, they even moved their headquarters 
from Taiwan to China. Although they might meet some troublesome tax problems, 
business was still very smooth. In general, if a Taiwanese businessperson did not 
violate the law or challenge the unwritten ‘regime’ of corruption, he or she would not 
meet any trouble.77
However, some exceptional situations did exist. Taiwan and China did not sign a 
double-taxation agreement. According to the tax regulation in China, all foreigners had 
to pay taxes after they had lived in China for ninety full days. Even if the employees 
hired by Taiwanese business people obtained their salary in Taiwan, they still had to 
pay the tax. A Taiwanese manager did not know this regulation. One day, a local tax 
bureau official came to the factory. The manager showed his business card to the visitor 
and, in reply to the official’s questioning, said he had been in China for five years. The 
tax official asked if he had paid any income tax. The manager replied that he had not 
paid any tax in China because he had always received his salary in Taiwan. In the end, 
the manager had to pay all the arrears of income tax in China.78
The tax problems were both troublesome and complicated for Taiwanese business 
people and the local government. The government did not have sufficient personnel to
!! Dealing Businesses in China, p.204..
77 Interview with M on 6 April 2002.
71 Dealing Businesses in China, pp. 140-41.
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examine tax for every business, so there had been much flexibility in levying tax. Many 
Taiwanese business people adopted the policy of ‘bargaining’ with the local 
government, which generally worked. For example, a Taiwanese businessperson paid 
RMB 100,000 to the government, including all the complicated taxes. This made both 
the local government and the businessperson happy. Sometimes, if a Taiwanese 
businessperson had ten employees, he bargained with officials and ended up paying tax 
for only three or four of them. Some Taiwanese businesses ‘downgraded’ the title of 
their managers to ‘engineers’ so that they could pay less tax. In addition, if a person 
lived in China for six consecutive years, he had to pay tax for all his income around the 
world. Therefore, many Taiwanese business people returned to Taiwan for over one 
year after staying six consecutive years in China in order to avoid paying this income 
tax. In order to avoid paying income tax, some companies also distributed their 
employees’ salary into several parts. For example, if a manager had NT$ 100,000 per 
month, the company could pay him NT$55,000 through the British Virgin Islands (a 
favourite tax haven), NT$30,000 through the Taiwanese parent company and 
NT$15,000 through the Chinese branch company, thus avoiding all the income tax.79
A Mr Cai went to Chongqing, Sichuan in 1992 to invest in real estate. By investing 
many millions of Taiwanese dollars, he bought a piece of land for building a 
multi-storied building. However, it took him seven years to get the licence and 
permission to relocate the people from the land. This was too late to make money. 
Another businessman, a Mr Li, bought a piece of land after Mr Cai but built his
79 Ibid. pp. 139-146.
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multi-storied building for sale two years earlier than Mr Cai, when the Chinese real 
estate market was at its peak, thus making a fortune. Mr Cai reminisced that he made 
good networks with city-level officials but ignored the problem of moving village 
people. He had thought the officials would help him to sort it out. Thus he had spent 
seven years without building the multi-storied building, and his money was wasted. 
Many Taiwanese people thought they had built very good networks with local officials, 
ensuring that everything would go smoothly. However, there were provincial leaders 
above city leaders and there were central leaders above provincial leaders. If your 
competitors had better networks, your investment would be beyond redemption.80
6.4.3 Different Networks With Different Occupations -  Dealing with Corrupt 
Officials
Taiwanese who dealt with imports had different situations with people who dealt with 
exports. For imports, they had to deal with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce 
Management ( X f f i f f l i ) .  If Taiwanese business people had joint ventures with 
Chinese, they could just leave the task of networking to the Chinese. At most, they had 
only to have dinner with officials on important occasions. Whenever festivals came 
round, they had to give some presents. But things were much more difficult for 
Taiwanese people whose main business was in export, and these were the majority of 
Taiwanese business people in China. If irregularities were found, the situation would 
be very serious. The factories might have to close down, and Taiwanese business 
people might be sent to jail. A Mr Lin ran a factory producing shoes. He gave some of
10 Dealing Businesses in China, pp. 204-206.
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his products to all the officials of customs, tariffs and governmental institutions. He 
also dispatched employees to make a list of the shoe sizes of those officials’ families 
whenever the Dragon-boat Festival, Moon Festival and Chinese New Year were 
approaching. He expressed the view that if his customs declaration had a mistake and 
they allowed him to correct it without violating the law, it would be worthwhile to give 
those shoes as presents. Many Taiwanese people followed suit. However, this way 
only worked until the mid-1990s. Gradually, Chinese officials came to be satisfied only 
with a large amount of money.81 In addition, the booty had to be neither too much nor 
too little. Too much could be regarded as bribery; too little would fail to get the desired 
response. How much would be appropriate? A Mr Wang, with a factory of two 
thousand workers, gave presents to different officials from RMB 500 to RMB 1,000 
whenever festivals occurred. Every time, he treated from thirty to forty people, his 
expenditure amounting to roughly RMB 60,000 or RMB 70,000 annually. This 
equalled less than ten thousand American dollars, which seemed reasonable to him. 
However, for Taiwanese business people who were engaged with entertainment and 
leisure industry, the booty had to be much more because Chinese regulation of this 
industry was very strict. Taiwanese business people had to be very willing to give 
periodically in order to run this kind of business smoothly. A Mr Lin ran a karaoke 
business, with over two hundred girls younger than twenty years old. Every night 
police officers visited his premises because he offered women, Mercedes-Benzes cars 
and houses to the police as ‘sweeteners’. As a result, he was able to run three karaoke
"  For more analysis in detail, see Xiaobo Lu, “Booty Socialism, Bureau-preneurs, and the State in 
Transition -  Organisational Corruption in China”, Comparative Politics. Vol. 32, No. 3, April 2000, pp. 
273-294.
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bars without any problems.82
However, after 1998, when Zhu Rongji came to power, there was serious cracking 
down on corrupt activities, and the situation has changed to a certain extent. Officials 
were nervous about accepting houses, tangible assets and money because they were 
afraid of being charged with taking bribes: people with limousines and mansions 
attracted the attention of ordinary people, who would denounce them to the 
authorities.83 Usually big enterprises needed to emphasise more their public images, so 
they could pay less attention to offering bribes. However, there was an exceptional case 
of a multi-national enterprise, which was requested to pay several million RMB, 
ostensibly in overdue tax, because it did not socialise with the customs officials. Since 
the enterprise had paid all its taxes and official fees, it decided not to pay any more but 
to denounce the customs officials. However, this case had to be dropped because the 
officials were accused of another case of corruption and two-thirds of them were 
dismissed. In the end, this multi-national enterprise built new networks with the new 
customs chief so it could avoid further unwarranted demands for payment. There was, 
then, no fixed rule of networking between Taiwanese business people and the local 
government.84 Generally, big enterprises had to participate in more charity activities to 
build up a good image. Small businesses might have to open overseas bank accounts
“  Li Dao-Zheng & Xu Xiou-Mei, Dealing Businesses in China. Taipei: Shang-Xun, 2001, pp. 203-204.
2001> PP-206-211.
13 For very large bribes, however, they were still willing to take the risk.
14 Li Dao-Zheng & Xu Xiou-Mei, Dealing Businesses in China. Taipei: Shang-Xun, 2001, pp. 203-204. 
(*aX&WHHI.g«»B.<fJb:WW3tfb»a«H»»B^W.2001,pp.206-211.
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for local officials or send their children to study overseas.85
6.4.4 Getting Established in Southeast Asia
As in China, Taiwanese business people had to build good relations with local 
governments in Southeast Asia. During the turmoil in Indonesia in 1998, Pou-Chen 
called for the help of the Indonesian government. The Indonesian government even 
dispatched troops to protect the factories and building complexes of Pou-Chen.86 This 
proved Pou-Chen had very good relations with the Indonesian government.
Taiwanese business people who went to Southeast Asia could be divided into three 
types: first, those gaining an entrée to Southeast Asia by means of networks which they 
themselves had built up, without government help: second, those following big 
companies to Southeast Asia to set up their coordination factories; third, those doing 
joint-ventures with local enterprises.87 Typically, Taiwanese business people set up 
enterprises, sought funding, and coped with excessive demand by fanning out orders to 
members of the local Taiwanese network. A leading factory organised small and 
medium-sized enterprises as coordination factories. The relationships between them 
were flexible and small-scale. The flexible production networks of coordination could, 
when necessary, form a production line that was not a single factory. Therefore, it was
15 Interview with N on 1 May 2002.
16 In 1998, when inflation in Indonesia reached 70 percent a year, nationwide unemployment made 
two-thirds o f the Indonesian people unable to obtain minimum necessary food. This led to violence and 
looting, especially against ethnic Chinese scapegoats (so-called rich people). See Wayne C. McWilliam 
& Harry Piotrowski, The World Since 1945 -  A History of International Relations. Boulder: Lynne 
Reinner, 2001, p. 396.
v  "Southward Policy and Overseas Chinese Conference”, Southeast Asia Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 2, April 
1997, p. 98. ( W | 8 l * * * W ^ * A » « B * * E I I , * l f f i l £ l , V o l .  2, No. 2, April 1997, p.98)
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not necessary to accumulate a lot of materials, because the production line was 
composed of many scattered small factories, including family OEMs. This could adjust 
production combination according to what and how much the orders were.
According to the regulations of Southeast Asian countries, usually there was no 
percentage limit on foreign capital. Many Taiwanese business people operated small 
and medium-sized enterprises set up entirely with their own capital because they 
largely exported. For medium and large-sized enterprises, which usually focused on 
the market in Southeast Asia, it was very important to consider the local government’s 
policies and the strategies of the market. Therefore, they often chose to operate by joint 
venture with local enterprises, thereby using the networks of political economy of local 
people. Although coordination factories followed large enterprises to operate 
cross-border investment, they did not receive all of their orders from the large 
enterprises. Therefore, they still had to search for new customers, in addition to 
receiving the orders from the main factories. These small and medium-sized 
enterprises usually set up international networks among Taiwanese business people and 
local Chinese business people. On the other hand, large enterprises established 
high-level relations of political economy. Large enterprises set up relations with 
various governments in Southeast Asia as well as Chinese business people in various 
countries of Southeast Asia. In general, Taiwanese business people cooperated with
M Michael H.H. Hsiao, “Interpreting the Establishing Processes of Taiwanese Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises and Large Enterprises", Chinese Social Science Monthly. No. 16, December 1992, p. 142.
No.16. December 1992,
p.142.
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local Chinese business people by public relations. That is to say that through the 
introduction of friends or customers, Taiwanese business people were in charge of 
management and finance, and their local Chinese business partners were in charge of 
procurement of land and banking finance on the existing economic and commercial 
networks.89
Those enterprises that went to Southeast Asia before 1987 usually went alone or on 
their own social networks without the help of the Taiwanese government. They might 
have few relations with local government. Sometimes they invested under the names of 
local people. If they met an adverse environment, they might move to other places. 
However, some small and medium-sized enterprises as coordination factories, together 
with medium and large-sized enterprises, invested in Southeast Asia. These small and 
medium-sized enterprises usually had better relations with local government than those 
that went alone or via their own social networks. This was because large enterprises 
usually had better politico-business effects than small and medium-sized enterprises.90
6.4.5 Relations With Local Chinese
The first problems Taiwanese business people met were language difficulties and 
cultural differences. They usually sought the help of overseas Chinese in Southeast 
Asia. These Chinese had usually been in Taiwan as overseas students, so they spoke
m Michael H.H. Hsiao & Gong Yi-Jun, "The Commercial Networks of Taiwanese Business People and 
Chinese People”, Taipei: Academia Sinica, May 1998 (PROSEA Occasional Paper No. 17) pp. 15-18.
May 1998 (PROSEA Occasional Paper No. 17) pp. 15-18.
90 Ibid. pplO-11.
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Mandarin, read Chinese, understood the situations of Taiwan’s political economy, and 
were familiar with a couple of Chinese dialects. Therefore, they could communicate 
with Taiwanese business people very well. Very often they organised Taiwanese 
Alumni Associations.91 The exception was that Vietnamese Chinese students in 
Taiwan did not go back to Vietnam because Vietnam was a Communist country, so 
Taiwanese business people did not get much help from them.
In addition, these former overseas Chinese students in Taiwan were rather familiar with 
local development of political economy and even spoke local aboriginal dialects, so 
they could provide Taiwanese business people with local information. Thus these 
former overseas Chinese students in Taiwan became very important economic and 
commercial networks, management cadre and even partners of Taiwanese business 
people.92
In addition, the training and experiences of the former overseas students in Taiwan 
helped them to be familiar with the management style of Taiwanese business people. 
From the perspective of the former overseas students in Taiwan, the Taiwanese capital 
which flooded into Southeast Asia in the 1980s and 1990s helped to promote their 
social and economic status. Their college certificates from Taiwan were usually not
91 Yan Jiann-Fa, “The Commercial Networks and Management strategies of Chinese Business People in 
Southeast Asia”, Southeast Asia Quarterly. Vol. 2, No.2, July 1997, p.58. 
» * ± * * • * • " . 1 1 1 1 1 ,  Vol.2, No. 2, July 1997, p. 58.
92 Chen Tian-Zhi, “The Role Chinese Business People Play in the Internationalisation of Taiwan’s 
Economy”. Essays on Overseas Chinese Issues. Taipei: Overseas Chinese Association, 1991, p. 110. (M
October
1991, p. 110.)
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recognised by local governments, so it was very difficult for them to compete with 
graduates of western universities, and thus it was hard to survive. The investment of 
Taiwanese business people helped the overseas alumni of Taiwanese institutions to 
develop and utilise their social networks by being partners and employees of Taiwanese 
business people. The local governments of Southeast Asia also used those former 
overseas students to absorb Taiwanese capital and to be the communication medium 
with Taiwanese business people. Therefore, these former overseas students and 
Taiwanese business people gradually formed a new set of politico-economic 
networks.93
However, overseas Chinese business people also had a conflict of interest with 
Taiwanese business people when they competed for business opportunities. In recent 
years, the abundant capital, sophisticated techniques, excellent marketing and 
management of Taiwanese business people had put a lot of pressure on local overseas 
Chinese business people.94 Therefore, overseas Chinese business people and 
Taiwanese business people had complicated relations of cooperation and competition. 
Sometimes, it also happened that overseas Chinese business people peculated the assets 
of Taiwanese business people. In addition, the new-coming Taiwanese business people 
also competed for markets with the already established Taiwanese business people.95
93 Michael H.H. Hsiao & Gong Yi-Jun, "The Commercial Networks of Taiwanese Business People and
Chinese People”, p. 11. p .ll .)
94 Yan Jiann-Fa, “The Commercial Networks and Management strategies of Chinese Business People in 
Southeast Asia”, p.62. (« U É » ,“* l « À £ W I » * * M I ± f U i  « * * ”. p. 62.)
95 Michael H.H. Hsiao & Gong Yi-Jun, "The Commercial Networks of Taiwanese Business People and 
Chinese People”, p. 15. (M M frll& IU S ,“]K M i£ À 1 V J (V A 2 .n 4 U iiS N ff”, p. 15.)
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6.5 Conclusion
To sum up, due to the change of the objective environment in the late 1980s, Taiwanese 
business people gradually increased their investment and involvement in Southeast 
Asia. The Taipei government not only requested them to abide by the Policy of ‘No 
Haste, Be Patient’ but also called for the Southward Policy, encouraging Taiwanese 
business people to develop their economic activities in Southeast Asia. In spite of the 
Taiwanese government’s assistance and encouragement, the total investment projects 
and capital of Taiwanese business people in Southeast Asia did not increase as expected. 
The overlapping and multi-track decision-making of the Taipei government proved to 
be relatively futile. However, Taiwanese business people continued to invest in 
Southeast Asia as usual. They also rooted their enterprises in Taiwan, making Taiwan 
the potential APROC. Vietnam and China became the new popular destinations of 
Taiwanese investment. Generally speaking, Taiwanese business people were proactive 
in investing overseas rather than investing at the beck and call of the Taipei government, 
and they used the networks they built with the local overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia 
and China. The encouragement and help of the Taipei government by signing bilateral 
investment guarantee agreements and double-taxation agreements played a 
complementary role at most. Meanwhile, Taiwanese business people served as 
surrogates (people whose dealings with other nations take the place of 
govemment-to-govemment links), middlemen (people whose activity proves useful to 
the government when it finally comes round to seeking diplomatic links) and 
sometimes ‘hindrances’ (people who go west rather than go south) of Taiwan’s
211

Chapter 7
Practice of Economic Diplomacy in Vietnam
7.0 Introduction
This article does not compare the cross-Straits economic relations with 
Taiwan-Vietnam economic relations. However, as Brandy Womack puts it: “In general, 
China and Vietnam are most similar cases.... The differences lie primarily in scale.”1
Taiwan-Vietnam economic relations share many similarities with cross-Straits relations 
in terms of the limited usefulness of the market mechanism. Market mechanism is the 
core theory of mainstream economics. When scholars discuss varying economic issues, 
‘laissez-faire’ is the most frequent viewpoint. This means governments should not 
interfere with markets but should let the markets operate freely by themselves. For
1 http://www.pcople.virginia.edu/-bw9c/gzho.html 2003/2/13
When William S. Turley and Brantly Womack refer to the problems of disparity in China and Vietnam 
comparisons:
In general, China and Vietnam are ‘most similar' cases for comparison, because no country is more 
similar to China than Vietnam in terms o f traditional society, revolutionary experience, and 
post-revolutionary government, and no country is more similar to Vietnam than China. This being said, 
the disparities between the two create tremendous difficulties for comparisons, and these difficulties are 
particularly acute for a concrete comparison of parts of each country.
While the similarities between China and Vietnam concern situation, culture, history and institutional 
forms, the differences lie in scale. With seventeen times Vietnam’s population and twenty-nine times its 
area, China has a Gross Domestic Product over thirty times as large as that of Vietnam, or about twice as 
large per capita.
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example, the Taiwanese government has been asked by some people to allow
Taiwanese businesses to ‘Go West’ and respect market mechanisms. However, Zheng 
Bing-Zheng argues that market mechanisms cannot be efficiently applied to the 
complicated cross-Straits economic-related exchanges. The special political economy 
of the Mainland makes the application of pure market mechanisms futile.2 Similarly, 
the author argues that the state and institutions of Vietnam still matter in 
Taiwan-Vietnam economic relations.
I begin my discussion regarding economic diplomacy in Vietnam by considering the 
central question of who is leading whom, government or businesses? Next, I discuss 
the impact of Taiwanese business people as promoters of régionalisation and 
globalisation. I proceed with my analysis with a brief review of Vietnam’s economic 
history, including the failed integration of central planning, which led to a 
transformation of the economy and the impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
Following this review, I turn my attention to the attitudes of the Taiwan and Vietnam 
governments. Then I summarise important parts of the recent history of 
Taiwan-Vietnam relations and review Taiwan’s investment relationship with Vietnam.
1 point out here that the relationship between trade and investment, including a review
2 Zheng-Bing Zheng (VIRA), “The Death o f Market Mechanism Theory”, Policy Forum. No. 33,14 
June 2002.
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of the impact of Vietnamese Labour in Taiwan and Taiwan’s foreign investment in
Vietnam. This chapter then reviews the international pressures on businesses in China, 
Vietnam and Taiwan. Finally, this chapter discusses the roles of three different 
Taiwanese companies with respect to diplomatic efforts in Vietnam. This chapter 
concludes that states and institutions still matter in the face of increased trade and 
investment; and while governments play an auxiliary role in providing the basic 
environment for economic development, businesses for their part take their own 
initiatives and assert considerable power from the bottom up.
7.1 Governments and Businesses -  Who Is Leading Whom?
Most Taiwanese companies follow the policy of ‘Root Enterprise in Taiwan’. Even 
though Pou-Chen has operations all over the world, it still insists on ‘Rooting enterprise 
in Taiwan’. After China, Indonesia and Vietnam have gradually become the production 
centres of Pou-Chen. Under the global strategy arranged by Cai Qi-Rui, Taiwan has 
become the Research and Development (R&D) Headquarters. For example, a few 
years ago, Pou-Chen built three R&D centres in Chang-Hua, specialising in research 
into better shoe-material and moulding machine design and developing ways to 
auto-control temperature and shorten the time of production. At present, out of 40,000 
Pou-Chen employees in Taiwan there are 300 researchers with BSc or MSc degrees
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who specialise in advanced R&D. In addition, several hundred people make frequent
business trips to spread its R&D fruits.3
For another example, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) also 
decided to set up 12-inch wafer factories in Taiwan while it prepared to move its 8-inch 
wafer production to China. Many other firms have also upgraded their Taiwan 
production before moving their lower-level production overseas. These are typical 
‘Root Enterprise in Taiwan’ cases. Therefore, although the Taiwanese government 
failed to establish Taiwan as the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centre (APROC) 
because it was simultaneously pursuing other inconsistent policies, such as the 
‘Southward Policy’, the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’, and the policy of refusing to 
establish postal, trade and transportation links with the Mainland, nevertheless many 
Taiwanese business people have been hastening the day when Taiwan will be a real 
operation centre in the region.
These developments are examples of the processes analysed by John Naisbitt in the 
foreword to The New Asian Wav by Foong Wai Fong. John Naisbitt states that 
entrepreneurship should be encouraged to flourish and that in a supportive
] http://archive.cw.com.tw/88 86/90*F 02 MM 237 flfl.doc/157848897.16.htm
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entrepreneurial environment, failures are tolerated, people are encouraged to try and try
again if they do not succeed the first time, and success is celebrated with recognition 
and financial rewards. He also expresses the view that the most dramatic shift in the 
world today is the shift of power from governments: the world is moving from being 
directed from the top down to being driven from the bottom up. He goes on to say that 
the experiences of the 20th century seem to show that it is more effective and efficient to 
allow individuals to decide and accomplish through their own efforts than through 
centralised state planning.4 What I have said about Pou-Chen and TSMC shows that, 
although Taiwanese companies do follow some of the policies of the government, they 
essentially serve their own interests. This perhaps illustrates part of Naisbitt’s 
argument.
7.1.1 Taiwanese Business People as Promoters of Régionalisation and 
Globalisation
Southern China was becoming integrated into wider East Asian regional and global 
commodity-driven production networks. With most of the components of the products 
imported rather than produced by factories in China, southern China was in many ways 
more firmly locked into the international economy than it was part of the internal
4 John Naisbitt, “Foreword" in Foong Wai Fong, The New Asian Wav. Kelana Jaya: Pelanduk 
Publications, 1999.
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Chinese economy.5 This development owed much of its impetus to Taiwanese business 
people.
Many liaison offices were based in Taiwan, responsible for trading business between 
China, Vietnam and western countries. A shoe liaison officer was interviewed by the 
author.6 He estimated that 95% of the leather used in shoe-making in China and 
Vietnam was imported as untreated hides (10% from Argentina, 15% from America and 
70% from India and Bangladesh) and turned into processed leather in Taiwan. The 
remaining 5% was imported from Italy, not in the form of hides but as finished leather. 
This was because Italy processes and uses domestically nearly all its own production of 
hides, so that after supplying its own finished leather and shoe-manufacturing industry, 
it has almost no untreated hides available to export. (Italy’s shoes and finished leather 
are premium products, with high added value, so the export of hides is not important to 
its economy.)7 Afterwards, it was transported to China or Vietnam. Among these 
leathers, the leather from Italy was the best. The second best was leather made from 
hides from America and Argentina. The third grade leather came from hides of
9 Shaun Breslin, “Decentralisation, Globalisation and China's Partial Re-engagement with the Global 
Economy”, New Political Economy. Vol. 5, No. 2, 2000, p. 218.
9 Telephone interview with D on 29 March 2003.
7 Some very rare poor rawhide was also provided by China. Brazil also provided hide but because it also 
produced shoes, very little hide in Brazil, which was inferior to that in Argentina, was exported to East 
Asia. Also, gradually some Taiwanese coordination factories moved to China (but very rarely to 
Vietnam), so China processed hide into semi-products (finished leather) in recent years.
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Brazilian origin. Even poorer leather was that made from Indian and Bangladeshi hides.
The worst leather had a Chinese provenance.
The coordination factories were so-called leather suppliers, mainly based in Taiwan; 
very few were in China, none in Vietnam. Therefore, the raw materials in Vietnam 
were all imported into Vietnam, leading to higher cost. Even though labour in Vietnam 
was cheaper than that in China, the finished shoes were still more expensive in 
Vietnam.
My informant worked for a company linked to a design company based in Italy, which 
is famous for shoe-design. During the shoe-development period, the designer came to 
Taiwan twice a year, several weeks each time. This was to ensure the products were 
unique and fashionable and had copyright. The samples were then sent to the 
exhibition fairs in Germany, Italy and America, to attract customers. The customers 
were usually famous but second-order western brand name companies.8 Whether shoes 
were made in China or Vietnam depended on whether the brand-name companies had 
quota. If so, they could choose China, and Chinese shoes are generally preferred to 
those from Vietnam because they are cheaper. If not, they chose Vietnam, which does
'  The most famous western brand-name companies usually have long-term relationships with their OEM 
companies, for example, Nike, Reebok and Adidas with Pou-Chen.
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not need quotas to export shoes to the EU. (After 2004, because of new WTO
regulations, Chinese shoes will have unimpeded access to the European market.) 
Although the US had lifted sanctions on Vietnam, most companies selling in the 
American market still prefer to source their shoes from China for reasons of price and 
long-standing partnership.
If we analyse the known components (excluding bribery and corruption) of the final 
price of a pair of shoes produced under this system in China or Vietnam, we typically 
find the following figures:
Labour in country of manufacture* 4%
Salaries of Taiwanese management cadre* 1 %
Profit of Taiwanese entrepreneurs* 20%
Transportation 10%
Raw materials 55%
Liaison companies 10%
TOTAL 100%
It may seem that the local labour got very little in return for its contribution, but it
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should be noted that, adding together the elements marked with an asterisk (*), 25% of
the total contributed to the GDP in China or Vietnam and thus stimulated the local 
economy. This process could be categorised as one of the commodity-driven 
production networks described by Shaun Breslin.9 The integration between Southern 
China and Taiwan (régionalisation) or Vietnam and Taiwan (régionalisation) was 
linked with the hide-producing country, Italian design company and western brand 
name customers (globalisation).
Chinfon was another promoter of régionalisation between Taiwan and Vietnam. In the 
mid-1970s, Taiwan was able to produce 90% of the components needed for motorcycle 
production. By the early 1980s, Taiwan could produce engines independently, though 
still following Japanese blueprints. By the mid-1980s, Taiwan was able to design and 
produce motorcycle engines without outside help. Therefore, Taiwan was able to 
produce complete motorcycles by itself from then on. Huang Shi-Hui, CEO of Chinfon, 
was a major shareholder of Sanyang, a Taiwanese motorcycle company. Initially, the 
designer was Honda, a Japanese company. At the same time, Honda was also a 
shareholder of Sanyang. SYM was the brand of Sanyang motorcycles.
9 Shaun Breslin, “Decentralisation, Globalisation and China's Partial Re-engagement with the Global 
Economy", New Political Economy. Vol. 5, No. 2,2000, pp. 216-218.
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For several reasons, Chinfon planned as its next step to set up a motorcycle factory in
Vietnam. It considered the facts that motorcycles were bulky and expensive to ship; the 
Vietnamese market was large enough to justify the setting up of an assembly plant and 
the introduction of component suppliers; and Chinfon expected the Vietnamese 
government to introduce protectionist measures to encourage the new industry in its 
early stages.
However, Huang Shi-Hui’s plan to start a motorcycle industry in Vietnam was rejected 
by Honda because Honda exported motorcycles to Vietnam and held 90% of its market, 
and Huang’s investment would compete with Honda. However, Sanyang had already 
internalised all the motorcycle production techniques in Taiwan. That is, SYM had 
100% localisation and could produce its own motorcycles according to a Taiwanese 
blueprint. Accordingly, Huang Shi-Hui built his own brand, VMEP, and set up a 
motorcycle factory in Vietnam using Taiwanese techniques, capital and management 
completely. In 1992 VMEP acquired the first motorcycle production licence in 
Vietnam and in 1993 VMEP started to produce motorcycles.
Initially, about 70% of the components were imported from Taiwan and 30% of the 
components were produced locally in Vietnam. By 2003,75% of the components were
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produced (loca lised ) in Vietnam . 23% o f  the com ponents were still imported from
Taiwan, and 2% were imported from neighbouring countries. Therefore, the 
régionalisation between Taiwan, Vietnam and neighbouring countries was promoted by 
VMEP, a branch of Chinfon.
In 1997, Honda also obtained a motorcycle production licence in Vietnam and started to 
produce in 1999. In 2002, the four major motorcycle production companies in Vietnam 
shared the market as follows:
Honda 394,608 motorcycles
VMEP 235,299 motorcycles
Yamaha 66,531 motorcycles
Suzuki 44,263 motorcycles
TOTAL 740,701 motorcycles
Roughly only 1.5 million motorcycles were sold in Vietnam in 2002, including Hondas 
imported from Malaysia, Thailand and Japan, and some other copied Hondas. 
Although VMEP had only 15% (235,299/1,500,000) of the Vietnamese motorcycle
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market, by 2003 , 75%  o f  the com ponents o f  m otorcycles m ade in  Vietnam cam e from
Vietnam itself. Since the early 1990s, Chinfon has introduced many coordination 
factories (component suppliers) from Taiwan to Vietnam against the will of Japanese 
Honda, promoting the motorcycle localisation of Vietnam and the régionalisation 
between Taiwan and Vietnam. In addition, VMEP also exported some (fewer than 10%) 
of its Vietnamese motorcycles to the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, thus 
contributing to the régionalisation in ASEAN and Taiwan.10
7.2 History of Taiwan-Vietnam Relations:
Up to 1975, largely because of international ideology, the Republic of China on Taiwan 
had official relations with South Vietnam but not North Vietnam. The connection 
between South Vietnam and the ROC was very intensive, including politics, military 
matters and economics. It is noteworthy that Taiwanese investment in South Vietnam 
at that time was extensive, including textiles, food processing, chemical fertilizers, 
etc.11
7.2.1 Taiwanese Disengagement and Re-engagement
After Vietnamese re-unification in 1975, most Taiwanese business people withdrew
10 This is the primary research of the author based on the telephone interview with X in April 2003.
11 Interview with Q on 2 March 2002.
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their investment from Vietnam. The Vietnamese Communists afterwards nationalised
their factories and enterprises. Therefore, Taiwan severed its relations with Vietnam.12
The major reason why Taiwan split with Vietnam was political: Vietnam had become 
part of the Communist bloc and had cordial official relations with the PRC, thus 
confronting Taiwan. Even though China had waged war with Vietnam in 1979, Taiwan 
did not take advantage of the situation to set up diplomatic relations with Vietnam 
because the ROC on Taiwan still stuck to its anti-communism doctrine.
In the summer of 1986, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, embarked on his twin strategies to reform the 
Communist State, glasnost (opening) and perestroika (restructuring). This led to the 
decline of Soviet assistance to Vietnam. The Vietnamese planned economy also failed 
to help the country, which had been devastated by war. Therefore, this resulted in the 
Vietnamese ‘Doi Moi’ (Open Door) Policy, which embraced a greater openness to 
economic investment from abroad and a greater readiness to engage diplomatically 
with foreign countries, even former enemies. The new policy soon bore fruit. On 3 
February 1994 the USA lifted American economic sanctions against Vietnam, and in
12 Ibid.
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1995 it established diplomatic ties with Vietnam. Although it was not until late 2001
that the US granted normal trade relations to Vietnam, the attitude of the western 
countries has been changed towards Vietnam in the 1990s.13 The US policy was not 
necessarily a pre-condition but only conducive to a pull factor. Above all, the European 
market was open to Vietnam without quota control. Most of the products of Taiwanese 
businesses were for Vietnamese domestic or European markets. Vietnam also joined 
ASEAN, the ASEAN Free Trade Area, and the APEC.
During the Cold War period when the North Vietnamese government had a friendly 
relationship with the Soviet Union, the US and its western allies imposed multilateral 
sanctions on the communist government. These sanctions on North Vietnam were 
extended to South Vietnam when its pro-western government fell in 1975. Although 
after the Cold War the US western allies no longer imposed multilateral sanctions, the 
US did not lift the sanction until 1994. Therefore, Vietnam was able to establish very 
good relations with the EU.14
13 On 10 December 2001, the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) took effect. Under the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, a bilateral trade agreement and certification of 
freedom of emigration are necessary for the US to establish conditional Normal Trade Relations (NTR) -  
formerly called most-favoured-nation (MFN) trading status -  with non-market economies such as 
Vietnam. The conditional NTR is subject to annual review by Congress. 
jinp://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/vietnam/ 15 September 2003
http://www-Dersonal.umich.edu/-rtanter/F98PS672PAPERS/MANOKHAM.THAMMASACK.VlETN 
AM.HTML..htm 04/03/2004
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Since Vietnam signed the first Textile and Clothing Agreement of 1992 with the EC,
two more trade agreement have been concluded and implemented (agreements of in 
1997 and 2000). The signature of a Framework Cooperation Agreement (OJ L 136/28 
of 07.06.1996) between Vietnam and the EC in July 1995 entered into force on 1 June 
1996 provided for Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment. In 2003, the European 
Commission and Vietnam concluded a further bilateral agreement on trade in textile 
and clothing products and other market opening measures. Up to November 2003, no 
anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties were in place against Vietnamese exports, but only 
a combined anti-circumvention and anti-fraud case regarding zinc oxide was in 
progress.15
Now, it actively participated in the WTO. Furthermore, Vietnam could offer a potential 
domestic market and cheap and abundant labour, which was reasonably well educated, 
eager to learn and hard working. It also had copious natural resources, including 
agriculture, forestry, fish and minerals, which provided the necessary primary materials 
for industrial expansion. In addition, both imports and exports were growing rapidly, so 
there was every reason to expect a sustained growth in the Vietnamese domestic market. 
All these pull factors helped to make Taiwanese business people eager to invest in 1
11 http://curopa.en.int/comm/external rclations/vietnam/into/indcx.htm 04/03/2004
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Vietnam. 16
7.2.2 Initiatives by Vietnamese Government to Encourage Investment
In January 1988, Vietnam promulgated its Foreign Investment Law, providing foreign 
business people with favourable conditions and attracting foreign direct investment. 
This policy was framed to help the recovery of the country’s shattered economy. Year 
by year, the input of foreign investment solved the problem of Vietnamese shortage of 
capital and drove its economic reform forward. From 1988 to 1998, foreign direct 
investment projects totalled 2488, amounting to US$ 35,520.8 million.17
In the post-Cold War era, the impact of ideology declined extensively; and the ‘Doi 
Moi’ Policy of Vietnam stemming from December 1986, together with the Pragmatic 
Diplomacy, the efforts of Taiwanese business people in Vietnam and the Southward 
Policy of Taiwan, opened the door of Taiwan-Vietnam relations. Since the two sides 
were willing to develop their economic relations, some of the existing production lines 
annexed by the government were returned to Taiwanese business people. Once again, 
Taiwanese companies were active in Vietnam in food processing, the production of
14 The push factors have been discussed in Chapter 5.
17 Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam 1988-1998, Statistical Yearbook. Hanoi: Statistical Publishing 
House, 1999, p. 247.
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textiles and chemical fertilizers, and in other primary industries.18 In addition, the 
Vietnamese government continued to improve investment conditions for foreign 
business people. These measures included revising the Foreign Investment Law, 
allowing licensed foreign investors certain tariff privileges, granting them government 
compensation if their rights were violated, the ability to carry out indirect exports free 
of duty, large-scale reduction of land rent (25-95% in 1999), simplified procedures of 
investment, devolving the right to grant investment licences down to local government 
level, and some other new preferences for foreign investors in Vietnam. The Hanoi 
government also promoted exports by promulgating new measures, which included the 
abolition of direct import-and-export restraints and widening the range of enterprises in 
which foreign investment was permitted.19
7.2.3 Doi Moi benefits Vietnam and Taiwan
The foreign enterprises changed the original configuration of the Vietnamese economy, 
elevating productivity, expanding the market economy, and forcing Vietnam to develop 
an export-oriented economic system.
"  Interview with Q on 2 March 2002.
'* CETRA, Overseas Market Economic Yearbook 2000-2001- Asia Pacific. Taipei: CETRA, 2000, p. 
363. In 2000, the new law also abolished the necessity for unanimous agreement in a board of directors, 
prescribed that foreigners could run a limited liability company and a branch company, simplified the 
procedures for joint ventures to change into individual-owned enterprises, and allowed foreign
2 29
As regards growth, the data of the World Bank show that in Vietnam the average annual
percentage growth of gross domestic product in the period 1980-90 was 4.6% and from 
1990 to 1998 was 8.6%, nearly double the figure for the previous decade. (In China, the 
GDP growth rate from 1980 to 1990 was 10.2%, and from 1990 to 1998 11.1%.) The 
average annual percentage growth of gross domestic investment 1990-98 was 28.4%, 
the fastest growth rate in the world. (For China in the same period, the rate was only 
13.4%). By 1997, the percentage of gross domestic fixed investment coming from 
private investors had reached 79.7%.20
As regards exports, the figure for the average annual percentage growth of exports of 
goods and services from 1980 to 1990 is not available, but for the period from 1990 to 
1998 it was 27.7%, the highest in the world. (In China, by contrast, exports grew at an 
average annual rate of 11.5% from 1980 to 1990 and only 14.9% between 1990 and 
1998.) By 1998 exports of goods and services had come to occupy 46% of Vietnam’s 
GDP.21
Therefore, in terms of growth rate, the average annual percentage growth of gross
enterprises to purchase foreign currencies in Vietnamese commercial banks for business purposes. 
“ The World Bank, Entering the 21“ Century -  World Development Report 1999/2000. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, pp. 250-61. See Table 11, Growth of the economy, pp. 250-51; Table 16, Private 
sector finance in p. 261.
21 The World Bank, Entering the 21" Century -  World Development Report 1999/2000, Oxford: Oxford
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domestic product, the average annual percentage growth of gross domestic investment.
and the average annual percentage growth of exports of goods and services from 1990 
to 1998 were by far larger than the previous decade. This was good enough to justify 
the success of the *Doi Moi’ Policy.
In this transformation, Taiwan played an important role in Vietnam. Taiwan’s 
investment in Vietnam grew very rapidly, and by 1991 Taiwan had become the top 
investor in terms of project numbers, project categories, total capital, etc. Taiwanese 
investment capital in Vietnam continued to increase almost every year and reached its 
peak in 1995, totalling US$1,204.63 million.22 Taiwan had also become the third 
largest trading partner, behind Japan and Singapore. In 1997, Singapore overtook 
Taiwan and became the largest investment country in registered capital. However, 
Taiwan remained as the largest investment country in terms of real (as opposed to 
registered) capital.23 (See Table 7.1 and Table 7.2.)
University Press, 2000. See Table 13, Structure of demand in p. 255.
22 See Table 6.1.
23 Interview with O on 22 April 2002.
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7.3 Taiwan’s Investm ent R elationship with Vietnam
7.3.1 The Attitudes of the Two Governments
Initially, the Taiwanese government had no over-arching policy towards investment in 
Vietnam when Vietnam revealed its ‘Doi Moi’ Policy. Many Taiwanese business 
people went to Vietnam and invested there before the Taiwanese government launched 
its Southward Policy because if they can make profits, many Taiwanese business 
people usually do what the Taipei government discourages or even forbids. For 
instance, Vedan Enterprise established its corporation in Vietnam in 1991. Even before 
the instalment of its factory, Vedan had traded with Vietnam through Hong Kong and 
Singapore for nearly twenty years, at a time when the Taiwanese government forbade 
any form of exchange between Taiwan and Vietnam because Vietnam was a communist 
country, which the Taiwanese government tried to shun at that time.
Because of different political and social systems between Vietnam and Taiwan, the 
bilateral ties did not boom until the beginning of the 1990s. In addition, the hostile 
relations between the Chinese and Taiwanese governments made official contact 
between Taiwan and Vietnam impossible. In this connection, substantial relations are 
essential. Therefore, the Vietnamese government set up the Committee for Taiwan
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B usiness Affairs under the Cabinet, w ith the former Deputy Prime M inister as its
Chairman.24
The Vietnamese government believes that in the past, Taiwanese business people were 
too cautious to invest in Vietnam, but the attitude has been changing. On the other hand, 
the Vietnamese government did not understand Taiwanese business people very well. 
Gradually, the Vietnamese government and Taiwanese business people have come to 
understand each other. Taiwanese small and medium-sized enterprises have offered the 
Vietnamese people a chance to gain useful training, experience and employment. 
Taiwanese business people are willing to risk and explore, so they are more successful 
than those from other countries. Vietnam is in a political transitional period, so its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures are unstable. However, the Taiwanese and 
Vietnamese share similar customs and habits, so Taiwanese business people are able to 
accept them. In this context, European and American business people cannot 
acclimatise so easily to the Vietnamese environment.
From the perspective of the Vietnamese government, the economic relations between
34 Interview with GG, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Planning and Investment, Vietnam, in Taichung, 8 
June 2002. Nevertheless, GG believed that Taiwanese business people would have to adjust their 
attitudes to the new sound regulations. Deals sub rosa would be eradicated or extirpated in the future if 
healthy regulations were introduced in Vietnam. He believed there was a danger, at some time in the 
future, that Western business people might have advantages and replace Taiwanese business people.
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Taiwan and Vietnam are extrem ely important. E ven  though there are no diplom atic
relations between Taiwan and Vietnam, like other countries, Taiwan has concluded an 
investment guarantee agreement, a double-taxation agreement, and agreements on 
agriculture, forestry, fishery, labour and technological cooperation. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, Taiwan has become the largest FDI country in Vietnam and the 
third largest trading partner of Vietnam. Commercial relations between the two 
countries are highly complementary. In Vietnam, Taiwanese businesses greatly 
contribute to Vietnam in industry skills, import-substitution and export-led foreign 
exchange making. In 2002, there were more than 22,000 foreign Vietnamese labourers 
working in Taiwan.25 There were also 60,000 Vietnamese brides married to 
Taiwanese.26 Unlike China, Vietnam shared three links with Taiwan -  postal services, 
trade and transportation. On the other hand, the skills and technologies of Taiwan were 
relatively inferior to those of Japan, Europe and America, but the Taiwanese option was 
increasingly welcome to Vietnam, because it was seen as more appropriate. Taiwanese 
business people helped Vietnam to develop everyday consumer products, mechanical 
equipment, moulding machines and fish farms. They also cooperated in projects to 
produce new animals and plant varieties for the agricultural sector. In this connection, 
Vietnam competed with China. Taiwanese business people were seen as more
Besides, the existing Vietnamese business people could also compete with them by cheaper labour.
25 Compare the figure o f 10,154 foreign Vietnamese labourers for 1999.
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trustworthy than people from China or Hong Kong.27
Therefore, the Vice-Minister for Industry visited Taiwan in early June 2002 to seek out 
Taiwanese business people, although the Chinese government had always protested 
against any kind of official contact between Taiwan and Vietnam in the past. According 
to the President of Vedan Enterprise Corporation Limited, even vice governors or 
governors o f all the Vietnamese provinces were not allowed by the PRC to visit Taiwan 
in the 1990s. Although we understand that the retired Deputy Prime Minister could 
visit Taiwan from time to time in a private capacity, China tried to forbid any bilateral 
diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Vietnam. However, in this journey to Taiwan, 
the Vice-Minister for Industry held two open seminars in Kaohsiung and Taichung and 
had discreet meetings with high-ranking officials of the Taiwanese government. In the 
future, it is very likely that the two countries will conclude a bilateral trading 
agreement.
7.3.2 Taiwan’s Investment in East Asia: Rival Attractions of Vietnam and China
Taiwan invested in Southeast Asia and was its major investment country. Singapore 
had good infrastructure, but its labour was expensive and insufficient, and its domestic
26 In 2003, there were about 90,000 Vietnamese brides living in Taiwan.
27 Interview with HH, Foreign Investment Department, Ministry of Planning and Investment, Vietnam.
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market was small. Therefore, Singapore was a suitable host for an electronics industry.
Malaysia also had good infrastructure, but its labour was insufficient and more 
expensive than that of Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Thailand had 
bountiful labour, but it was more expensive than that in Indonesia and Vietnam, and its 
infrastructure was somewhat inferior. Indonesia and the Philippines had unstable 
political economies.28 Even though Vietnam had an inferior infrastructure and 
ineffective administration and it was a difficult country in which to raise finance, 
Taiwanese business people still wanted to invest there because it had a policy of 
privileges for foreign business people and special types of investment industries. After 
1993, China became the top investment destination for Taiwanese business people. The 
Taipei government promoted the Southward Policy in order to avoid the ‘Go West’ 
trend, which would lead to Taiwan’s over-dependence on China.29 In this context, 
Vietnam became one of the beneficiaries of Taiwanese investment, although the 
influence of the Taipei government was rather limited. Chiang Pin-kung at that time 
expressed the view that the economic centre of gravity of the world was moving 
towards Asia, and the highest growth rates in Asia were to be found in China and in
In Taichung, Taiwan, 8 June 2002.
“  Li Jun-Xian, Jiang Hong-Zhi & Xu Mu-Lang, “Analysis on the Investment of Taiwanese Business 
People in the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand”, Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1999, pp. 4-6.
1999.)
29 Chen Tian-Zhi & Ou Ying-Hua, “Taiwan's Investment in the ASEAN in General”, Economic Prospect. 
No. 54, 1997, pp. 40-44. ( * * « & ■ ■ « .  No. 54, 1997, pp.
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some certain ASEAN countries and would be found in Vietnam in the future.30
There are some significant contrasts between China and Vietnam. China’s market is 
much larger than Vietnam’s, and China’s infrastructure is better than Vietnam’s. 
However, Vietnam’s labour price and land cost are cheaper than China’s. The most 
important factor was that Taiwanese business people were protected by the ‘Foreign 
Investment Law’, enjoying the same status as other foreign business people. In 1993, 
the Taipei and the Hanoi governments concluded an investment guarantee agreement. 
Even though China promulgated a law -  the so-called “Investment Protection Law of 
Taiwan Compatriots of the People’s Republic of China” (*£ 9  A K & S H  &
—this was municipal law that could not really protect Taiwanese people 
once a dispute arose. Especially when the Chinese adopted the policy of ‘promoting 
political amalgamation through economic integration’ Taiwanese
people could be trapped in a predicament after a political power struggle. In the wake 
of the March 2000 presidential election, for example, some Taiwanese business people 
who supported Chen Shui-bian found that the Chinese tax authorities were now much
40-44.)
34 Li Pei-Ling, “The Countries in Southeast Asia Will Become the Important Economic Partners of 
Taiwan in the 21st Century”, Observation Bi-Weekly, No. 1,1994, pp. 8-11.
21 t t t tE f f tS K S W I t '# ”, » . N o.l, 1994, pp.8-11. Vietnam was not a member o f  ASEAN 
until July 1995.)
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more eager to examine their tax records and make trouble for them.31
7.3.3 Paving the Way for Taiwanese Investment
In 1987, Taiwanese business people successively investigated and invested in Vietnam. 
In view of the turmoil of information, the CETRA also undertook market investigation 
in June 1988 and set up offices in Hanoi and Ho Chi-Minh City, promoting economic 
exchanges between the two countries. These were followed by the first official contact 
between the two countries; and Chiang Pin-kung, Vice Economic Minister, visited 
Vietnam with a delegation, signing a cooperation memorandum. In June 1992, both 
sides established liaison offices. In August, at the Economic Cooperation meeting 
between the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce and the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry of Vietnam it was decided to convene a meeting every year 
in either Hanoi or Taipei by turns. Up to 2002, eight meetings had been held. In July 
1993, the first ministerial level meeting of economic affairs took place. In 1995, the 
second ministerial level meeting was held.
It is obvious that since 1992, economic relations have developed much more rapidly 
than before. Taiwan became the sixth largest trading partner of Vietnam in 2000 and
3lShi Wen-long ( I tK I I ) .  CEO of Chi-Mei, was a famous case.
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the third in 2002. The two sides have signed several agreements as follows:
1. Investment guarantee and encouragement agreement (April 1993)
2. Avoiding double taxation agreement (April 1998)
3. Agricultural and fishery agreement (May 1999)
4. Labour cooperation agreement (May 1999)
Based on the above agreements, over thirty thousand Taiwanese business people have 
invested in Vietnam. Officially, the accumulated investment in total up to 2000 reaches 
more than US$5 billion, making Taiwan the second FDI country in Vietnam. 
According to Mr O, Taiwanese business people have in fact invested much more than 
US$5 billion. In the beginning, foreign investors had to share their companies with 
local people, so some Taiwanese business people employed local people as figureheads 
of their companies. Some investment has been in the name of Vietnamese but in reality 
by Taiwanese business people. In addition, Taiwanese business people also invest in 
Vietnam by way of Hong Kong, Singapore and the British Virgin Islands. Therefore, 
Taiwan has actually been the number one FDI country in Vietnam.32 Bilateral trade has 
also been booming. For the first half of 2000, the trading volume certainly realised over
31 Interview with O, Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan. According to O, the 
Vietnamese government can distinguish the origin o f investment in Vietnam somehow.
241
US$ 1 billion and possibly US$ 2 billion. From 1992 to 2000, there were roughly
150,000 Taiwan tourists to Vietnam every year. To satisfy the needs of tourism, the 
airliners of the two sides decided to negotiate and expand the non-stop flights from 
Taipei and Kaohsiung to Hanoi and Ho Chi-Minh City in 1999.33
7.3.4 The Marriage Question: An Outgrowth of Continued Investment
In addition, because more and more families of Taiwanese business people had settled 
down in Vietnam, the education of their children became a new issue to face. In 
September 1997, the first Taipei school was set up in Ho Chi-Minh, providing for the 
children of Taiwanese business people. Marriages between citizens of the two 
countries became increasingly common in 1996. From January 1996 to October 1997, 
more than 7000 couples registered for marriage. By August 1999, 27,000 such 
marriages had been contracted, and by January 2000, the figure had reached 34,000. 
From January 1996 to January 2000, there was an average of 1,000 marriages per 
month. In time, this became the most common type of foreign marriage in Vietnam.34
It is said in Taiwan that Chinese brides are ferocious, Indonesian are snobbish, but 
Vietnamese are most obedient. Therefore, Taiwanese men are very fond of marrying
33 Memo of Mr Chu Cong Phung, Head, Vietnam Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei.
34 Interview with L, Vietnam Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei, 27 June 2002.
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Vietnamese girls, who are considered to be docile and hardworking. Up to January
2003, there were 150,000 foreign brides in Taiwan. Among these, the Vietnamese 
brides represented 60%, totalling around 90,000 people, and an even higher proportion 
(70%) of foreign brides found through marriage agencies. However, the Vietnamese 
government was concerned about the trend of more and more girls migrating to Taiwan, 
afraid they might be abused by Taiwanese men after marriage. Mr Nguyen Chinh 
Thang, Deputy Head of the Vietnam Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei, expressed 
the view that the Vietnamese government objected to agencies introducing Vietnamese 
brides to Taiwanese men. In fact, the agencies were doing so furtively, and some of the 
brides were introduced by their relatives who had already married Taiwanese men. In a 
few cases, the agencies introduced Vietnamese girls to marry handicapped Taiwanese 
men.35
In addition, some Vietnamese girls were not accustomed to Taiwan’s environment or 
were abused by their Taiwanese husbands. Some of the agencies presumed on their 
wealth and exercised undue power and authority. All these developments were very 
obnoxious to Vietnamese people. The Vietnamese media also accused Taiwanese men 
and agencies. The officials also made films to warn Vietnamese girls not to throw
35 http://udn.eom/N ASApp/rightprt/prtncws?newsid=l 154523 (2003/1/12)
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themselves away for money and marry Taiwanese men. Taiwan’s Representative
Office in Vietnam stated that this had done a great damage to Taiwan’s image. In early 
2003, the Taipei Representative Office in Hanoi had to deal with 1,200 marriage 
procedures per month. A secretary in the Representative Office, Zhang Zheng, said that 
the marriage procedure had become the predominant business in the Representative 
Office. Vietnamese girls crowded in every morning, day in and day out. Officially 
there were over 65,000 Vietnamese brides in Taiwan, but it was estimated that there 
were roughly 90,000 Vietnamese brides in Taiwan, the highest figure for all foreign 
brides in the country. However, a lot of comment in the Vietnamese media argued that 
Vietnamese girls should not marry Taiwanese men and described the life of Vietnamese 
brides in Taiwan as ‘harrowing’, ‘miserable’, and ‘shameful’. The officially made 
films illustrated that beautiful young Vietnamese girls married old, handicapped, or 
dwarfish men in Taiwan just because the Vietnamese were poor. Are these free 
marriages or poor Vietnamese girls willing to sell themselves to Taiwanese men? From 
the perspective of many Vietnamese, Taiwanese men who ‘bought’ Vietnamese girls 
should be punished by law. A newspaper reported that on 5 July 2002, fifty-nine girls 
who were set up by a marriage agency to participate in a beauty contest to marry 
Taiwanese men were ‘rescued’ by the police. This kind of market of competing for a 
chance to marry Taiwanese men was cracked down on by the police. Some other
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newspapers also claimed that Vietnamese girls in Taiwan were sexually abused and
traded between men like goods. Nevertheless, all this information could not stop the 
upsurge of Vietnamese girls wanting to marry Taiwanese men. When Vietnamese 
women chose to marry foreign husbands and emigrate, Taiwan was by far the most 
popular country, with America a poor second. If a girl married a Taiwanese man, the 
hut of her family could be transformed into a concrete house immediately. According 
to Vietnamese analysis, economic pressure made the attractions of marriage to a 
Taiwanese almost irresistible, but Vietnamese people were very angry about the 
situation and resentful towards Taiwanese men. The contradiction between what 
Vietnamese women were actually doing and what Vietnamese opinion thought about it 
created conflict within the society. This was also harmful to Taiwan’s image.36
“  http://udn.com/NASADP/rightDrt/Drtnews7newsid» 1154517 (2003/1/12)
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7.4 The Relationship Between Investment and IVade
7.4.1 Trade Ties Between Taiwan and Vietnam
The Taiwanese government promoted the Southward Policy of strengthening 
investment and trade relations from 1993 on. Taiwan’s trade in 1995 with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) increased by 25.0% to achieve a 
total of US$ 24.14 billion. Within this figure, exports totalled US$13.92 billion, an 
increase of 28.5%, while imports totalled US$10.22 billion, an increase of 20.5%, 
resulting in a trade surplus of US$3.7 billion. From the perspective of the regional 
composition of Taiwan’s trade, Taiwan’s economic and trade relations with ASEAN 
have grown increasingly close, with Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand all among 
Taiwan’s ten largest trading partners. With the exception of a 25.9% increase in exports 
to Thailand, Taiwan’s exports to the members of ASEAN all increased by over 30% in 
1995. (See Table 7.3.)
The shipping link between Taiwan and Vietnam was cut in 1976. In 1982, trade 
between the two countries was also forbidden. In August 1989 direct trade between 
both sides resumed.37 According to the data of the Directorate General of Customs,
37 Board of Foreign Trade. Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, Bilateral Economic Date Between 
Taiwan and Vietnam. Taipei: MOEA, 2000, pp. 4-5.
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Ministry of Finance of Taiwan, the total amount of bilateral exports and imports
between Taiwan and Vietnam rose greatly from US$ 41,348,465 in 1989. Only in 1998 
was the growth rate negative, -7.835%, due to the Asian Financial Crisis. In 1999, the 
amount of exports and imports totalled nearly two billion US dollars, 46 times what it 
had been a decade before. This indicated that the complementarity between Taiwan and 
Vietnam was very high. As regards the balance, Taiwan enjoyed a tremendous surplus 
over the period. Only in 1989 was the balance unfavourable to Taiwan. (See Table 
7.4.)
»,2000)
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In Vietnam, foreign trade and investment were obviously linked. Foreign trade
followed Vietnam’s foreign direct investment. Especially in exports, large amounts of 
capital goods, components and primary materials were imported from other countries. 
Taiwanese business people exported mainly machinery equipment, plastics, fibre, 
components, etc. to Vietnam. The main crop is rice, of which it is the world’s 
fifth-largest producer. Other crops include bananas, coffee, groundnuts and rubber. In 
addition to its traditional exports of agricultural and forestry goods, fish, crude oil, 
phosphates coal and natural gas resources, Vietnam increasingly exported products 
manufactured by foreign-owned enterprises, accounting for roughly 20% of total 
exports. Taiwan largely imported wooden products, processed agricultural products, 
crude oil, coal, etc from Vietnam. Taiwanese business people imported from Vietnam 
clothing and shoes, which had been produced in that country by Taiwanese 
companies.38 This kind of interaction between investment and trade was the key 
characteristic of Vietnam’s trading structure.39
31 Board of Foreign Trade, MOEA, Annual Report of Overseas Market -  Vietnam 1997/1998. Taipei: 
MOEA, 1998. ( « * « ■ « « .  1997/1998 1998) Also, Luck,
Steve, ed., Philip’s Compact Encyclopedia. London: Chancellor Press, 1999, p. 659.
39 http://www.gcbn.net/Econoniic/new/Vietnani09.htm (2003/1/21)
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7.4.2 The Structure of Taiwanese Investment and Trade in the 1990s
As regards the categories of Taiwan’s investment in Vietnam in the 1990s, construction 
(including the building of office and apartment blocks) formed a large element, 
accounting for 38.5% by value, even though the number of projects was not great. All 
these, together with the construction of export-processing zones, represent 40.89% of 
the total investment. Manufacturing industries, with the highest number of projects, 
included shoes, umbrellas, clothing, textile, food processing, motorcycles, automobile 
components, cement, etc., accounting for 34%.40 (See Table 7.5.)
About the same time, imports into Vietnam reflected the structure of Taiwanese 
investment, including machinery, steel, raw materials for textile-production, fertilisers, 
cement, automobile components and construction materials; and exports included 
clothing, shoes, crude oil, rubber, rice, coffee, fish, etc.
In general, Taiwanese business people’s foreign direct investment can be classified into 
three categories: First is the horizontal cross-border transfer of production strongholds, 
which produced the same products as their parent-factory. This was aimed at reducing 
production costs and maximising profits. Second was the vertical division of labour for
40 Industrial Development A  Investment Centre, MOEA, Bilateral Investment Between Taiwan and 
Vietnam. Taipei: MOEA. 1999.
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international industries, aimed at spreading the risk in primary materials and making
profits by division of up-stream, middle-stream and down-stream. Third was 
diversification by investing in completely different types of enterprises. In the early 
1990s, most Taiwanese businesses in Vietnam were small, medium-sized enterprises, 
engaged in the horizontal cross-border transfer of production strongholds. These 
enterprises were confined by the production techniques, internal management resources, 
capital, etc. of their parent companies. Therefore, there was a lack of ability in 
large-scale cross-border resource management and production integration.41
In view of the limited foreign exchange reserves and unfavourable balance in foreign 
trade, Vietnam levied high tariffs and imposed barriers on the importation of consumer 
products, including domestic electronics, motorcycles and automobiles, etc. Therefore, 
many foreign businesses, especially Japanese and Korean, went to Vietnam and 
invested in order to break through tariff barriers.42
The nature of Taiwanese exports to Vietnam reflects this strategy. According to figures
41 Chen Tian-Zhi & Gu Ying-Hua, "The Characteristics of Overseas Investment of Taiwanese Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises”. Economic Prospect. No.40, 1995, pp. 26-30. “ f tM 'b 'J '
£ * * » * « * » t t * r , l * I * . N o . 4 0 , 1995, pp. 26-30.)
4i Chen Tian-Zhi & Gu Ying-Hua, "The Characteristics of Overseas Investment of Taiwanese Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises”, Economic Prospect. N o .40 ,1995, pp. 26-30. (H R U ttt& H SV , 
,g » l t « .N o.40.1995, pp. 26-30.)
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published by the Taiwanese customs service, the top 20 exports to Vietnam in 1998,
ranked by value, included raw materials for textile production, shoe materials, 
machinery, steel, plastic materials and automobile components. These products closely 
reflect the main industries in which Taiwanese business people have invested in 
Vietnam. In effect, a large proportion of these industries were concerned with the 
production of textiles, clothing and shoes. Textiles and clothing were represented by 
over 100 Taiwanese-owned factories, and shoe manufacture by a similar number. 
Second to this was the furniture industry, with about over 40 enterprises. In addition, 
the machinery and construction materials for setting up and equipping factories were 
largely imported from Taiwan, so that Taiwanese exports to Vietnam and Taiwanese 
investment in Vietnam were very closely linked. At that time, export-oriented 
Taiwanese businesses in Vietnam imported primary materials and semi-products from 
Taiwan largely for re-export as finished goods. The quantity depends on the orders for 
exports to other countries. Therefore, we cannot entirely determine the size of 
Vietnam’s domestic market using only the statistics of Taiwan’s exports to Vietnam. Of 
all the imports of machinery, primary materials and semi-products, the proportion 
brought in by foreign business people for processing and re-export represented from 
20% to 25%. The rest was for the use of Vietnamese business people.43 41
41 Ibid.
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Vietnam exported agricultural produce, fish, clothing, shoes and furniture to Taiwan.
The reason Taiwan became the third largest exporting market was largely that 
Taiwanese business people re-exported their products back to Taiwan; and clothing, 
textiles, shoes, and furniture became increasingly important elements in this trade year
i 44by year.
In 1990, Taiwan began to enjoy a favourable surplus of more than US$ 7 million in its 
trade with Vietnam. Since then the surplus has increased every year except 1998, when 
it experienced some fall-out from the Asian Financial Crisis. In 1999, the surplus 
reached over US$ 1 billion. In some years, the surplus grew by more than 100%; in the 
single year 1990 to 1991 it multiplied tenfold. This trend was greatly related to local 
investment by Taiwanese business people.
In 2000, Taiwan’s investment in Vietnam was mainly in manufacturing industries, 
including shoes, clothing, textile, seasoning, cement and motorcycles, totalling 464 
projects. In addition, there were agriculture, forestry, infrastructure (in the 
export-processing zone and industrial zone), hotels, tourism, etc. 70% of Taiwan’s 4
44 Ibid.
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investment was in southern Vietnam, including Ho Chi Minh City, Dong Nai, etc.
Business people from other foreign countries also invested mainly in Southern Vietnam 
because the infrastructure was relatively good and near their market. With regard to 
Taiwan’s investment, the Tan Thuan Export-processing zone, Chinfon Group and 
Vedan Group are among the most successful in Vietnam.45
Due to Taiwan’s effort in investment and foreign trade in Vietnam from its initial 
opening under the ‘Doi Moi’ Policy up to the end of the twentieth century, Taiwan 
enjoyed a prominent status in both investment and trade with Vietnam. The main 
reason for this situation was investment that pulled in trade. According to the data of 
the Vietnamese government, Taiwan was the third largest trading partner of Vietnam in 
1999. When only imports are considered, Taiwan ranks in second place. Vietnam 
imported goods worth US$ 1,497 million from Taiwan, accounting for 12.9% of its 
total imports amount, US$ 11, 636 million, second only to Singapore’s exports to 
Vietnam, US$ 1,883 million. As regards exports, Taiwan was the fifth largest exporting 
market. Vietnam exported US$ 682 million to Taiwan in 1999, which was 5.9% of its 
total exports, US$ 11,523 million. Taiwan was behind only Japan, China, Singapore 
and Australia. For Vietnam, Taiwan was a major trading partner and one of the most
45 Industrial Development & Investment Centre, MOEA, Investment Guide to Vietnam. Taipei: MOEA,
2001.
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important overseas markets and suppliers.46
7.4.3 Vietnamese Labour in Taiwan
Since 15 November 1999, Vietnam has exported labour to Taiwan. Up to 31 August 
2000, the Vietnam Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei had confirmed 3,810 labour 
contracts, including 10,154 Vietnamese labourers. Among these, 6,025 Vietnamese 
labourers have been working in Taiwan, contributing to Taiwan’s economy. On 28 
August 2002, Mr Wang San-Chong, Vice Chairman of Labour Council of the ROC, 
pointed out that since November 2000, most employers had formed a good impression 
of Vietnamese workers. Therefore, he predicted that more and more Taiwanese 
employers would introduce Vietnamese labourers under the free market system.47
Some Taiwanese business people expressed the view that Vietnamese and Taiwanese 
share similar customs and beliefs, and almost all people from both sides believe in 
Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, so the cohesion between the two nations is 
relatively high. In addition, Vietnamese labourers can usually pick up Mandarin easily, 
whereby they can communicate with Taiwanese effortlessly.48 However, all this 
happened because Taiwanese business people could make profits in Vietnam in general.
“ Ibid.
47 Interview with L, Vietnam Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei, 27 June 2002.
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On the whole, the advantages of employing Vietnamese labourers have been that they 
are more disciplined, easily organized, highly pliable, hard-working and more efficient, 
and they hardly ever run away. Many of them were trained to be fishermen because 
there are over three thousand miles of coast in Vietnam. Therefore, they made good 
sailors for Taiwan. They are also present in large numbers in the following industries:* 49
(1) . Production: electronics, rubber, and metallurgy.
(2) . Construction: moulding, carpentry, and cement laying.
(3) . Service: maids, caretakers, etc.
7.5 International Pressure, Enterprises, States and Institutions
7.5.1 International Pressure
Businesses in China, Vietnam and Taiwan are also subject to pressures from the 
international system. For example, there is a trend for customers from western 
countries to make certain demands with regard to the human rights of factory workers 
when placing orders in Mainland China. Similarly Pou-Chen, a leading OEM company 
for famous western brands of footwear, was reluctant to set up a factory in Vietnam but 
eventually did so under pressure from Nike, which believed that the political economy
*' Interview with S in Taichung 3 March 2002.
w Ibid.
238
of China was not stable and urged Pou-Chen to spread its risk and invest in Vietnam and
Indonesia.50 Fortunately, since the US granted Vietnam most favoured nation (MFN) 
status, Pou-Chen has benefited greatly.51
In Vietnam and Mainland China, when the customers are from western countries, the 
human rights of the employees in the factories are essential to their order; this is a new 
trend. Like those with China, the relations between Taiwanese business people and 
Vietnam are conditioned by factors of the international system. Trainers-companies 
like Nike, Adidas, and Reebok, and casual shoe-companies like Timberland and 
Rockport, are all customers of Pou-Chen, which is one of the leading OEM companies 
for these famous Western brand shoes companies. Nike was embarrassed at being 
condemned by Time magazine and the International Labour Organisation for the 
practice of its OEM supplier, Pou-Chen.52 In 2001, even though Pou-Chen occupied
50 Initially, China was the only Asian country outside Taiwan where Pou-Chen invested. Pou-Chen was 
an OEM company for Nike, Reebok, New Balance, Adidas, Timberland, Skechers, And 1, Asics, 
Avia/ASG, Saucony, Converse, Puma, Airwalk, Hi-Tec, Lotto, LA Gear, Etonic, Mitre, Ryka, etc. 
Interview with J in Lugang in 2002.
51 http://archive.cw.com.tw/88 86 February 2001. Furthermore, to meet the necessity of North America 
Free Trade Agreement, Pou-Chen also established companies in Mexico, abiding by the advice and 
meeting the need of its customers, especially Nike. It was the reason why Pou-Chen’s CEO asserted that 
he learned horn Americans.
52 In 1997, a female Taiwanese manager in Vietnam’s Pou-Chen factory compelled 56 female workers to 
run around the building complex because the shoes they wore were against the regulation, thus leading to 
twelve female workers fainting and being sent to hospital afterwards. Time magazine reported this as an 
’abusing employees’ incident. In order to conciliate the anger of people, Pou-Chen fired the female 
manager in the end. Later, Pou-Chen reinforced its flexible management. Now, the weekly menu has to 
be passed by the cuisine committee elected by the employees. Even a portion of the annual bonus has to
ffl.doc/157848897.16.htm
be d iscussed  and decided  by the em ployees, h ttp ://archive.cw .com .tw /88 86 /90*E 02 M M  237
2 5 9
15% o f  the world market, w hich  m ade it the largest single O EM  com pany in the world.
it had to bow to pressure and increase its efforts to improve the welfare of its employees. 
Pou-Chen used to treat its workers in an authoritarian way, which could be deliberately 
harsh from the perspective of Vietnamese people.
Other companies, great and small, have had to make similar changes in response to 
similar pressures from international lobbyists for human rights, working through 
western customer companies such as Nike. Therefore, it is obvious that customers from 
the Western international brand companies have had a great influence on their OEM 
businesses in East Asia, whether small or great, even like Pou-Chen.53 Although these 
improvements have been made under pressure, companies like Pou-Chen have 
experienced benefits in the form of better relations with their host countries.
In such situations, companies like Pou-Chen have to pay close attention to international, 
especially American, pressure. However, its chief executive officer, Cai Nai-Feng, has 
not always been correct in his analysis of American motives and intentions. This was 
especially true when Pou-Chen decided to invest further in Vietnam. The general 
manager of Pou-Chen, Mr Cai Nai-Feng, analysing the psychology of Americans, said
33 Interview with W in Taipei on 31 May 2002.
260
that they wanted to invest in Vietnam in order to improve the economy of Vietnam and
restore American-Vietnamese relations after the disastrous Vietnam War period. 
Another strong motive was to build up a defence chain of Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Taiwan, Japan and Korea. Therefore, the CEO asserted that the American customer 
(Nike) was guided by both strategic and economic considerations, and that Pou-Chen 
had retained a portion of land for expansion purposes when it built its industrial park in 
Vietnam in 1997 as soon as the US granted Vietnam MFN status and lowered the tariff 
on Vietnamese imports from 20% to 3%. Thus, Pou-Chen could meet the new needs of 
their American customers. Cai Nai-Feng went on to say that America is the ‘Dragon 
Head’ of the global economy; and consideration of its politics, economics, and security 
will guide its commercial behaviours so we can surely have a vision of opportunities if 
we follow its needs.54
However, Cai Nai-Feng was incorrect when he mixed the motives of Nike and those of 
the American government. The US government might have a national strategic 
purpose in granting Vietnam MFN status to link the defence chain for containing China, 
but Nike would never contain China by demanding that Pou-Chen build companies in 
Vietnam. Nike would simply spread its risk and take advantage of Vietnamese MFN
14 http://archivc.cw .com .tw /88 8 6 / 9 0 02 MM 237 M .doc /157848897 .16.htm
261
status granted by the US. Before this, Nike could still share Vietnam’s unlimited quota
in Europe because China’s exports of shoes to Europe are limited by quota but Vietnam 
can sell as many shoes as it likes to Europe without quota. Coincidentally, Cai 
Nai-Feng made a right decision, but with fallacious reasoning.
7.5.2 Pou-Chen’s Experience in China and Vietnam
The practice of Pou-Chen in Vietnam was based on its experience in Taiwan and China. 
The Nomura Soken (a Japanese Research Institute, had said that Pou-Chen’s
success was a result of the advantage it gained from its vertical integration of up-stream 
shoe manufacturing. Pou-Chen, together with its coordination factories (Xielichang t t  
that produced shoe-material and glue, has formed a petal-type industry, which 
has collected and integrated all the knowledge from different places, thus forming a 
new type of industrial structure. This way of combining and utilising skills helps the 
company to maintain its competitive advantage. Pou-Chen’s reputation for effective 
management has enabled it to expand its coordination business. For example, 
Pou-Chen’s branch in Vietnam, Pou-Chen, acquired a coordination factory, Israeli 
Orisol, because Israeli Orisol was impressed by the reputation for efficient management 
gained by the Pou-Chen branch operation in China. A Pakistani manager said that the 
reason he cooperated with Pou-Chen was because Pou-Chen occupied a large share of
262
the w orld’s market.
Another example of Pou-Chen’s efficiency in winning the company a valuable 
reputation is provided by its relations with the Chiya company from Singapore. Some 
parts of shoe-material can easily catch fire, and, because of poor management, Chiya’s 
branch factory in Zhong-Shan, China, had burnt down and had had to be rebuilt. In 
Vietnam, Chiya rents its factory from Pou-Chen. Inflammable shoe-material is stored 
separately from other operations on the floor with distinct operation lines. Moreover, it 
is a strict regulation that any employee coming into the factory with a lighter will be 
dismissed. Therefore, nobody has to live in constant fear of fire any more. Chiya has 
benefited from Pou-Chen’s excellent management and experience, and Pou-Chen’s 
reputation has been further enhanced.
Because Pou-Chen has been able to assemble the best coordination factories in China, 
Indonesia and Vietnam, it has become the largest OEM company in the world, with 
many different world-renowned brand customers.56
Cai Qi-Rui points out that a single level of OEM production can be replaced easily by *54
55 http://archive.cw.com.tw/88 86/90 *  02 M W  237 W.doc/157848897.16.htm 2002/10/8
54 Ibid.
33
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competitors, but the OEM production of multi-layer petal-type can resist challenges.
For example, Pou-Chen, after running in China for years, has not only produced no 
enemies but has also cultivated a cadre of talented middle-ranking employees whom 
they have subsequently appointed to positions in their operations in other countries. 
After running over ten years in China, Pou-Chen has employees in that country who are 
hard-working, capable and happy to be sent overseas. When they go abroad with much 
better pay (three times as much as the pay in China), though only one-third of that of 
their Taiwanese counterparts, they become a resource in Pou-Chen’s global strategy.
Likewise, Pou-Chen has learnt important lessons in Vietnam, which it is applying in 
other countries, including China. Vietnamese people are assertive and sometimes 
stubborn and have not accepted Pou-Chen’s traditionally patriarchal management 
practices (e.g. compulsory haircuts for female workers whose performance was 
unsatisfactory).
The company modified its management style in response to Vietnamese anger 
following an incident in which female employees were forced to run round the 
perimeter of their complex.57 Ironically, another result was that Pou-Chen also changed
57 h ttp ://archive.cw .coni.tw /88 86/90*E 02 M  M  237 MU .doc/157848897 .16.htm
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its managem ent sty le  in C hina to m eet international criticism . For exam ple, there are
now very strict standards regarding even the distance between beds and other facilities 
of the Pou-Chen dormitory in China. Nowadays, Pou-Chen has met international 
standards in all its branch factories and has improved its relations with all the 
governments and people in the host countries.38
7.5.3 States and Institutions Still Matter
In general, the Vietnamese government holds a fair and unbiased attitude towards the 
Taiwanese business people. Because there were more and more foreign business 
people, the Vietnamese government passed a law to allow foreign people to organise an 
association in 1998. Taiwanese business people had privately organised an association 
in 1994, and in 1998 this was transformed officially into the Council of Taiwanese 
Chambers of Commerce in Vietnam, including seven branches in Hanoi, Hai Phong, Da 
Nang, Ho Chi-Minh City, the Tan Thuan Export-processing zone, Binh Duong and 
Dong Nai. By April 1999, 368 Taiwanese enterprises had become members. By early 
2003, there were already roughly 1000 members. Therefore, the expansion was very 
fast.* 59
51 Interview with Pou-Chen’« cadres.
59 Telephone Interview with E, Assistant of the Council of Taiwanese Chambers of Commerce in
263
Although Chinese represent no more than 2% of the population in Vietnam, their
economic strength might account for 20% of the Vietnamese economy.60 It is
noteworthy that most Taiwanese business people in Southeast Asia have been able to 
make close networks with local Chinese.61 By contrast, the Taiwanese business people
in Vietnam do not link closely with local Chinese. Interaction between them is rather
rare. Some of the research indicates that the export-led Taiwanese enterprises do not 
want to cooperate with local Chinese.62 However, others expressed the view that
because local Chinese in Vietnam did not enjoy high political privilege, no advantage
was to be gained by Taiwanese business people from seeking closer links with them. In
addition, local Chinese might use their advantage and encroach on Taiwanese business
people’s rights. For example, initially Vietnamese law stipulated that only joint
ventures between local people and foreigners were allowed for FDI. That is, Taiwanese
business people could not run an enterprise on their own. Local Chinese thus became 
figureheads in the beginning. However, in the end, local Chinese took advantage of
their position and seized the property. Therefore, Taiwanese business people gradually
Vietnam, 28 January 2003.
60 Gong Yi-Jun, The Economic Achievement and Cross-Border Network of Chinese in Southeast Asia. 
Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1997, p. 11.
N o.6 .1997)
“  Hsiao Hsin-Huang & Gon Yi-Jun, The Business Network Between Taiwanese Business People and 
Chinese in Southeast Asia. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1998, p. 11. fr  W W A
No. 17,1998. p. 11) *198
61 Chen Homin & Liu Meng-Chu, “Noneconomic Elements of Taiwan's Foreign Direct Investment” in 
Chen Tain-Jy, ed., Taiwanese Firms in Southeast Asia: Networking Across Borders. Glos: Edward Elgar,
1998, pp. 101-105.
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began to keep their distance from local Chinese on the principle of ‘once bitten, twice
shy’.63 Also, unlike other countries in Southeast Asia, the overseas Chinese alumni 
from Taiwan did not usually go back to Vietnam, because it was a closed Communist 
country. Otherwise, these alumni were more familiar with both Vietnam and Taiwan, 
and thus might have helped Taiwanese business people.
7.6 The Role of Taiwanese Companies in Vietnam Diplomacy
7.6.1 Chinfon’s Role in Vietnam
The Chinfon Group found Vietnam had great potential in 1989, especially in the 
motorcycle market. Therefore, it dispatched many investigators to do research on 
Vietnam’s market and established connections (Renmai Guanxi, A flR PP). Initially, 
Chinfon invited Vietnamese officials, including deputy ministers, to visit Taiwan. 
However, the Taiwanese Foreign Minister, Dr Fredrick F. Chien, pointed out that the 
US had imposed sanctions on Vietnam and that Taiwan should show respect for 
American foreign policy. Therefore, Chien expressed the view that Taiwanese 
businesses had better not take on large-scale investment in Vietnam.64
However, business people followed only business opportunities, and the Taiwanese
63 Interview with n . United Daily News (Vietnam Office) on 3 April 2002.
64 Interview with X on 28 May 2002 in Taipei.
267
government did not categorically forbid Vietnamese investment. Because it also found
that Vietnam could not produce motorcycle components, Chinfon wanted to establish a 
factory there. In 1992, Chinfon got the investment licence. Chinfon also helped 
Taiwanese officials meet their Vietnamese counterparts in order to set up the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Office in Vietnam. In 1993, it began to produce motorcycles. 
All these things happened before the Taiwanese government found that the ‘Go West’ 
trend had gone increasingly wrong and thus proclaimed the Southward policy. Chinfon 
opined that the Southward policy did not influence it at all.
At the same time, Chinfon found that investment in motorcycle production involved 
complicated large-scale measures, laws and policies. Chinfon provided copies of the 
Taiwanese laws on motorcycles to the Vietnamese government and translated them into 
English and Vietnamese. Chinfon again invited a number of Vietnamese economic 
officials to visit Taiwan and to understand the successful experience of Taiwan’s 
motorcycle development. Therefore, Chinfon persuaded the Vietnamese government 
to introduce Taiwanese capital and techniques in order to develop a component industry. 
Chinfon also persuaded the Vietnamese government to protect Chinfon as the first 
Vietnamese motorcycle production company, initially in order to cultivate Vietnamese
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competitiveness in motorcycle industry. Therefore, during the first three years.
Chinfon was the only motorcycle company in Vietnam.65
The brand of its motorcycles was VMEP and was mainly for the domestic market. Its 
share of the market soon reached roughly 15%. In order to meet the demands of the 
Vietnamese government for the setting-up of a full manufacturing industry (not just 
assembly), Chinfon also induced some middle-stream and down-stream components 
suppliers (coordination companies) to move from Taiwan to Vietnam. Thirteen 
companies cooperated with Chinfon. They also acted as original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM), producing motorcycles to Japanese designs in order to expand 
market in Vietnam.66
It also set up a branch of the Chinfon Bank in 1993. Soon there were two branches, in 
Hanoi and Ho Chi-Minh City. Customers were still Taiwanese business people. 
Moreover, Chinfon Cement started up in 1997 and soon became the largest provider in 
Northern Vietnam, producing 1.4 million kilotons per year. Chinfon also expanded into 
raising livestock, fish farming and producing forage. In addition, Chinfon became
45 Honda joined the competition afterwards. Interview with X, 28 May 2002 in Taipei.
44 http://www.gcbn.net/Economic/new/vietnam09.htm Also interview with X, 28 May 2002 in Taipei.
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involved in insurance in association with a Canadian Manulife company.67
Chinfon also provided the Vietnamese police with driving training in the Sanyang 
Safety Training Driving Centre. Up to 2002, sixty policemen had come to Taiwan for 
training. In addition, Chinfon also offered two hundred motorcycles as gifts to the 
Vietnamese government. Chinfon’s CEO had access to the Vietnamese Prime Minister, 
which none of the Taiwanese officials had. Chinfon built very good connections with 
both the central and local governments of Vietnam.68
In addition, for business purposes, Chinfon sometimes had to serve as a middleman 
between the governments of the two countries. Chinfon helped the Taiwanese 
Economic Minister, Chiang Pin-kung, meet for the first time with the Vietnamese 
Minister of Planning and Investment, Do Ngoc Xuan. The Chairman of Chinfon 
Global Corporation, Mr Huang Shi-Hui, was the Chief Delegate of the Taiwanese 
Delegation to the Annual Joint Business Council Meeting between CNAIC (Chinese 
National Association of Industry and C o m m e r c e , a n d  VCCI 
(Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry), where minister-level officials and 
representatives of both countries meet regularly. Mr Harrison Wu-Hsiung Liu, the
47 Ibid.
44 Interview with X, 28 May 2002 in Taipei.
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Director of Chinfon Global Corp., was the secretary general of the meeting. In 2001
Lin Hsin-I, the Taiwanese Economic Minister, met with a Vietnamese minister, Tran 
Xuan Gia, and former Deputy Prime Minister, Doan Duy Thanh. Through the annual 
meeting, the official was able to arrange the gathering of higher-ranking officials. 
Vietnamese officials were able to meet the Taiwanese president and premier but 
because of the pressure of the Beijing government, Taiwanese officials could only visit 
the Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister.
Through the official contact, the Taiwanese government offered financial training to the 
Vietnamese financial officials and also some other training to Vietnamese customs 
officials. This was because only the Taiwanese government could offer this kind of 
training.
Chinfon achieved many firsts in Vietnam. In Vietnam, Chinfon was the first foreign 
FDI motorcycle company, the first FDI cement company, the first Taiwanese bank, the 
first 100% FDI company with an insurance licence, and for a time the largest Taiwanese 
investor. The Chairman of Chinfon, Mr Huang Shi-Hui, won the first Vietnamese Third 
Grade Labour Medal. In addition, Chinfon paid regular taxes, won prizes for its high 
quality products, participated in charity activities, etc. Chinfon played one of the major
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roles in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. When the Taiwanese government concluded
the investment guarantee agreement and double-taxation agreement with the 
Vietnamese government, it served as only a subsidiary in Taiwan’s economic 
diplomacy.69
7.6.2 Vedan
Vedan also arrived in Vietnam during the early stages of Doi Moi. After a short time it 
was producing monosodium glutamate (MSG), mainly for the domestic market, and 
only secondly for the foreign market. Vedan captured 70% of Vietnam’s MSG market. 
In 1998, its revenue was nearly US$ 200 million. Recently, it has also invested in 
cassava starch, modified starch, hydrochloric acid, amino acid, glutamic acid, lysine 
and other primary materials, which have not only helped to reduce the production cost 
of MSG but also provided for the domestic market. It was estimated that Vedan had 
invested US$ 350 million in Vietnam. Vedan found Vietnam a good place to invest 
because of its vast domestic market, consumer habits and abundance of agricultural 
products that could be used as primary materials. Nevertheless, Vedan faced many 
difficulties. To make itself and its products known to the Vietnamese public required
69 For some years, Chinfon did not earn profits, so it did not pay taxes. But afterwards, it had to pay 
double taxes in Vietnam and Taiwan before the two governments concluded the agreements. In addition, 
without the agreements, neither could Chinfon enjoy the privilege of MFN. Interview with X, 28 May 
2002 in Tkipei.
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huge expenditure on advertising and public relations. However, because Vedan came to
Vietnam very early, with a large amount of advertisement, it became well respected and 
enjoyed a great share in the market.70
7.6.3 The Tan Thuan Export-Processing Zone
Among the many successful Taiwanese businesses, the Tan Thuan Export-processing 
zone was one of the most outstanding. It was built by the CT&D Group, set up in 1989 
for international development and investment in Vietnam after evaluating various 
countries in the world and finding that Vietnam was the best for investment. Initially, 
the Taiwanese government provided talented people, techniques and advice based on its 
own experiences, all of which were very beneficial to the export-processing zone 
because the CT&D was a Kuomintang Party business. However, at this time, the 
Taiwanese government still had no clear policy towards Vietnam. It was long before 
the beginning of the Southward Policy of the Taiwanese government.
One of Taiwan’s most successful experiments during its period of rapid economic 
development was the setting up of export-processing zones. The first one was 
established in Kaohsiung in 1966, and the model was later introduced to Vietnam. The
70 Interview with B, Vedan (Vietnam) Enterprise Corporation Limited, 7 June 2002.
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Tan Thuan Export-processing z o n e  was set up in 1991 according to the blueprint o f
Taiwanese Export-processing zones, to offer Taiwanese business people investment 
opportunities and promote economic exchanges between Taiwan and Vietnam. In 2002, 
there were 163 businesses in Tan Thuan, 48% of which were Taiwanese and 33% 
Japanese, employing nearly one hundred thousand local people and with a capital 
investment of US$ 1 billion. The overseas market of Tan Thuan included more than 80 
countries and regions, totalling US$ 5 billion in exports and imports. Tan Thuan not 
only provided good infrastructure, communication systems and high-tech software but 
also took the initiative in supplying information and necessary assistance, thereby 
producing more added value for the businesses in the zone. Tan Thuan had already 
reached breakeven point after three years of running. At that time, it was the most 
successful export-processing zone out of six in Vietnam. It was also the only 
Vietnamese member of the world organisation for export-processing zones. In 1999 the 
Corporate Location Magazine elected Tan Thuan as the best export-processing zone in 
Asia. Tan Thuan thus became the propaganda model of the Vietnamese government. 
When American President Clinton and the Japanese Prime Minister V  H) visited
Vietnam, the Vietnamese government escorted them to see Tan Thuan.
The effort of the CEO of the CT&D Group (Mr Ding Shang-Li) was crucial. Ding was
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in charge o f  the building o f  the Tan Thuan Export-processing zon e and negotiating w ith
the Vietnamese government. In the end, the Vietnamese government agreed that if the 
military, police and customs officials, etc. entered or left the export-processing zone, 
they had to do so together with zone control bureau staff. Therefore, the zone could 
avoid administrative red tape and requests for bribes and thus attract many foreign 
business people.
The Vietnamese government helped the CT&D Group establish the zone and provided 
the businesses in the zone with many tax benefits, a ‘single window’ service, 
export-processing zone regulation, procedure-simplification and a security squad, but it 
regarded the zone as a ‘foreign area’, so that the goods it produced were subject to taxes 
if sold in Vietnam. So, as regards domestic sales, the zone was at a competitive 
disadvantage. However, because of its excellent performance, the Vietnamese 
government used it as a flagship of economic reform.
Most of the primary materials and semi-products the zone processed were imported 
from Taiwan. In addition, the Tan Thuan Corporation also participated in many 
Taiwan-Vietnamese economic seminars, supplying advice to companies wishing to 
invest in Vietnam. It is also interesting that the Tan Thuan Corporation expressed the
275
view that both the Southward Policy and the Policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ had very
little influence on it. On occasion, the Tan Thuan Corporation provided the venue for 
the officials of Taiwan and Vietnam to meet together. Therefore, by providing 
employment, promoting the economy of the local area, improving Vietnam’s balance of 
payments and enhancing the international mage of both countries, Tan Thuan played a 
good role in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy.
In addition, Taiwanese business people also invested in insurance, banking and trading, 
etc. Because of Vietnamese law, the Taiwanese companies in the insurance sector had 
at first to cooperate with Vietnamese companies. After undertaking the business in 
Vietnam, they also re-insured in parent companies in Taiwan. With regard to banking, 
the customers were usually foreign business people, especially Taiwanese business 
people. The banks operated as offshore banking units (OBU), offering to parent 
companies with headquarters in Taiwan services such as offshore finance for investing 
in Vietnam. Regarding trading, over ten companies were looking for Vietnamese 
customers on behalf of parent companies in Taiwan. Some of them also offered 
services such as maintenance of equipment, technical guidance, marketing, etc. 
Several trading representative offices were also in charge of buying agricultural
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produce in Vietnam.71
7.7 Conclusion
In a country like Vietnam, Taiwanese businesses have been leading the Taipei 
government to ‘Go South’. They serve as pioneers, middlemen of Taiwan’s economic 
diplomacy in Vietnam, promoters of régionalisation in East Asia and promoters of 
globalisation. Compared to China, Vietnam enjoys its privilege of a European market. 
Although its size is relatively small, it still has its own domestic market, cheaper labour 
and copious raw materials. Therefore, Taiwanese business people have alternatives 
other than China. This is also the reason Vietnam becomes the only one country in 
Southeast Asia that can parallel China when China absorbs most Taiwanese investment.
States and institutions still matter. Vietnam’s ‘Doi Moi’ Policy has transformed the 
country into an open, market-oriented and globally integrated model, suitable for 
Taiwanese businesses to survive. In the end, the ‘Doi Moi’ Policy benefits both Taiwan 
and Vietnam. The Taipei government followed the steps of the Taiwanese businesses to 
‘Go South’. Vietnam has been included in the Southward Policy of the Taipei 
government. In addition, the Taiwanese government concluded international
71 http://www.gcbn.net/Economic/ncw/vietnam09.htm 14/03/2003
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agreements with Vietnam to protect Taiwanese business people. In terms of this
protection, the Taipei government cannot conclude international agreements with 
China.
On the other hand, although the Vietnamese government tried to improve its national 
image, avoiding ‘exporting girls’ to Taiwan, the Taiwanese economy proved to be a 
strong force in strengthening the trend of ‘importing’ Vietnamese brides. Taiwanese 
investment in Vietnam is closely linked with Taiwan’s trade with Vietnam. Taiwan 
exports raw materials and semi-products to Vietnam for processing and re-exports 
products back to Taiwan and other countries. Further, Taiwan imports Vietnamese 
labourers, who are cheaper and harder working.
Taiwanese businesses play a crucial spearheading role. In a country like Vietnam 
where the role of the state and institutions is important in setting the basic framework, 
business has nevertheless taken the initiative and led state and institutions in serving the 
interests of the businesses.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.0 Introduction
After a brief review of the methodology that I used, I conclude by reviewing the 
original hypothesis and highlight my contribution in terms of how this work has 
modified the original hypothesis. This general discussion of my contribution is 
followed by a succinct summary of the research contribution. Then I turn towards 
the future, by highlighting ‘lessons’ for two groups of actors and by giving some 
future research directions
8.1 Methodology
Thinking in terms of three levels of analysis is now firmly established as part of 
international relations theory. It has proven to be a powerful and useful heuristic tool, 
even though the concept of ‘levels’ itself has still not been adequately clarified in its 
own right. Levels of analysis have defined a way of thinking about the international 
system that has dominated theory in this discipline for several decades. It has thus 
shaped the work of several generations of academics.1
Waltz’s restriction of the levels of analysis debate to the confines of the
1 Barry Buzan, “The level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, ed„ 
International relations Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 214-15.
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reductionist/holist alternatives had serious distorting effects. His theory is also too 
narrow, in part because it is confined to the international political sector, and — 
within that restriction — to his definition of ‘structure’. Both Ruggie and Cox argue 
for the need to incorporate social and economic factors into the analysis.2 Waltz was 
fully aware that structural causes could never provide more than a limited explanation 
of international outcomes. The crucial issue in international relations theory 
concerns which units o f analysis and which sources of explanation are best able to 
help us to come to terms with any given event or phenomenon. No one level of unit 
or source of explanation is always dominant in explaining international events. The 
international system perspective gained a boost from the Cold War, because its 
concern with polarity (viz. the structural effects of the number of great powers in the 
system) in general; and Waltz’s statement in particular that bipolarity was a desirable 
structure echoed with the world events going on around the theory.3 In the wake of 
the Cold War, it is easier to assert arguments from other levels. Fukuyama’s famous 
(now notorious) writings about the triumph of the liberal state, and the supposed ‘end 
of history’, start from the unit level,4 5and build on an argument made much earlier by 
Gourevitc, that potent states project their domestic characteristics out into the 
international system.3
The question of which level is most important is really of interest only to the extent
1 Ibid. 209.
1 Ibid. pp. 208-13.
4 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin. 1992.
5 P. Gourevitch, "The second image reversed: the international sources o f domestic politics”, 
International Organisation. Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 881-912.
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that it relates to some specific phenomenon requiring explanation. In international 
relations, generally all the levels are simultaneously and powerfully in play. The 
important theoretical question is this: If two or more units and sources of explanation 
are operating together, how are the different analyses offered by each to be assembled 
in order to produce a comprehensive and coherent understanding of the whole? 
Waltz’s position, probably extensively shared, suggests that explanations on different 
levels can be added together and assigned relative weights in relation to any given 
analysis. But it is not clear how this weighting must be carried out, or even whether 
it is methodologically sound.6 For example, it is difficult to maintain the general 
proposition that Taiwanese business people should weigh more heavily because the 
contradictory policies of the Taiwanese government counteract one another and are 
thereby rendered ineffectual. In this particular case of Taiwan’s economic 
diplomacy, Taiwanese business people have indeed played a major role. However, 
during the peak of the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis, for example, when the PRC 
employed missile exercises against Taiwan, Taiwanese business people could do 
nothing to relax the simmering tensions across the Taiwan Straits. In this case, only 
international intervention proved effective (when the US intervened and the crisis died 
down).
* Barry Buzan, "The level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, ed.. 
International relations Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 213.
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8.2 The Hypothesis: Original, Modified and the Contribution
8.2.1 Original Hypothesis
The original hypothesis was that, since the beginning of the 1990s, Taiwan’s 
economic diplomacy has achieved significant international space. Taiwan uses 
foreign trade, foreign investment and foreign aid to break through diplomatic isolation 
and obtain international recognition. Although this has not resolved the question of 
sovereignty, Taiwan’s international standing has been ameliorated to a certain degree. 
At first, the Taipei government tried to improve bilateral trade and economic 
cooperation, and then endeavoured to cultivate political connections, frequently 
making use of Taiwan’s entrepreneurs as intermediaries in setting up the links. The 
China External Trade Development Council (CETRA) and the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (MOEA) are usually the initial people to associate with foreign government 
officials or non-official partners.
As Robert Gilpin puts it, “In every area of international economic affairs, economic 
and political issues are deeply entwined”.7 Françoise Mengin adds that there is an 
interweaving of the economic and political spheres in the nature of the 
decision-making mechanism at the national level.1 After the establishment of 
economic relations, many countries find that these ties evolve naturally into political 
links with Taiwan.
7 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987, p. 24.
'  Françoise Mengin, "The Prospects for France-Taiwan Relations”, Issues & Studies. Vol. 28, No. 3, 
March 1992, p. 46.
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At the international system level, as the Cold War ended and the structure of the 
global system fundamentally changed, the debacle of international communism meant 
that Western countries became more concerned about their general domestic 
unemployment and declining military-industrial complexes rather than with security 
issues. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) declining political leverage in the 
international society was enhanced by the coincidental Tiananmen Massacre, which 
betrayed its non-compliance with international humanitarian norms. Meanwhile, the 
prominence of economic issues offered Taiwan a good opportunity to deploy its 
accumulated wealth as a tool to achieve its international space. The easing of 
tensions across the Taiwan Straits led foreign countries to re-evaluate their relations 
with Taiwan, because the PRC’s ‘engagement’ with Taiwan — the second major 
investor in Mainland China — undermined its attempts to stop other countries from 
having full official contacts with Taiwan. The growth of ‘Greater China’ made 
Taiwan a good partner for Japan and Western countries, whose advanced level of 
technology and global brands promised to match well with Taiwan’s capital and 
management expertise and the cheaper labour, abundant land and massive market of 
China.
Taiwan has also been able to use foreign aid as a means of enlarging its network of 
relations with friendly countries. It is noteworthy that despite the growing affluence 
of the world, the existence of mass poverty has not substantially changed. 
According to World Bank figures, the proportion of people living in poverty has
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scarcely decreased — 29.4 per cent of the world’s population lived on under $1 a day 
in 1993, compared with 30.1 per cent in 1987. In the late 1990s nearly 90 countries 
were worse off than they had been ten years before, according to the United Nations 
Development Programme’s (UNDP) human development index. This provides the 
setting for Taiwan’s role as an aid donor in the effort to tackle poverty in the 
developing countries. Since the late 1980s, Taiwan’s foreign aid programme has 
been more large-scale than before. Technical and agricultural assistance projects are 
still part of aid projects, but financial loans, grants and contributions to multilateral 
organisations have also been included.
Some scholars and politicians believe that integrating the PRC in the international 
system is the best strategy for maintaining international order. Proponents of this 
view include John King Fairbank, Michael Oksenberg, Andrew Nathan, Robert B. 
Zoellick, Richard Nixon and Edward Heath. This point of view will contribute to a 
more cautious attitude towards Taiwan and is apparently unfavourable to Taiwan’s 
economic diplomacy.
At the state level, the pragmatic diplomacy of Taipei has pushed for dual recognition 
and a substantive relationship between Taiwan and other countries without official 
relations. Since the 1980s, Beijing’s diplomacy in economic issues has become 
increasingly more pragmatic through coexistence with Taipei within international 
organisations, such as Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC). The démocratisation of Taiwan has promoted its image and
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justified its interaction with Western countries, which often take democratic progress 
and respect for human rights into account when dealing with bilateral relations.
In order to break through its diplomatic isolation, Taipei has used its economic 
strength to win friendship because of its great financial resources and economic clout. 
The ‘Six-Year National Development Plan’ (1991-96) — which involved investments 
of US$300 billion — has temporarily attracted many suitors, including foreign 
companies and high-ranking visitors. Consequently, many countries competing for 
economic favours have been upgrading their Taipei trade offices, which was the 
legacy of the fleeting ‘bubble diplomacy’.
Foreign aid is a technique of economic statecraft whereby aid is used as an instrument 
of policy in order to achieve certain goals. Foreign aid implies a relationship 
between two actors, who may be designated on the one hand as ‘donor’ and on the 
other as ‘recipient’. In a nutshell, foreign aid may be regarded as a form of power 
relationship. Hence, the donor must possess a capability that can be converted into 
an aid relationship. The exact political functions served by aid relationships are not 
always easy to specify. The most apparent political function of aid will be clear 
from an examination of the conditions as laid down by the donor. Foreign aid 
relationships can also serve a coercive function. Once a reward has been offered and 
accepted, the donor has the power to punish the recipient by withdrawing the reward 
in the future. Because the aid relationship exists over time, the opportunity for the 
donor to assume an intrusive and even coercive role vis-à-vis the recipient will
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increase. Moreover, the donor may attempt to link the aid relationship with other 
foreign policy issue areas.
In 1961, the Committee of International Technical Cooperation (CITC) of the ROC 
was established to provide agricultural technical assistance to African and Latin 
American countries. In 1988 Taipei’s government set up the International Economic 
Cooperation Development Fund of the Republic of China (IECDF) (amounting to 
about US$1.2 billion) to assist friendly developing countries in their economic 
development and to intensify bilateral economic co-operative relations. Offered 
through the IECDF, Taiwan’s economic assistance package consists largely of loan 
extensions, technical assistance on a project basis, and technical training. In addition, 
Taiwan has been providing international disaster relief aid since 1981. Recently in 
particular, there has been a large surge in Taiwanese humanitarian contributions since 
the International Humanitarian and Relief Fund was formally established in 1990. In 
the period from 1990 to 1995, the Taiwanese government had contributed a total of 
US$124 million in humanitarian aid to disaster areas in more than 60 countries. The 
offer of aid has helped secure diplomatic relations with several states in Africa and in 
Latin America.
Since the late 1980s, Taiwan's foreign aid to the Asia-Pacific region has been 
concentrated on countries that have formal relations or substantive relations with 
Taiwan. In Southeast Asia, only Brunei, Laos and Cambodia have not received 
Taiwan’s aid.
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Taiwan’s foreign aid programme rests in the decision-making process of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). 
Although the assumption is that both the MOFA and the MOEA hold joint jurisdiction 
over decision-making, each ministry regards the issue of aid from a slightly different 
perspective. The MOEA regards it more from an economic viewpoint, examining 
aid proposals carefully in order to ensure efficient and effective use of money. 
However, the MOFA is more concerned with aid as a diplomatic lever — without, of 
course, denying the necessity of wise planning of aid dispensations for the economic 
interest and development needs of recipients. Aid programmes are sometimes used 
as an expedient political instrument to win diplomatic favours, thereby taking 
advantage of changing international circumstances or sustaining relationships with 
countries deemed ’politically correct’ and important to Taiwan. Recently, the MOFA 
has played a more important role than the MOEA in the decision making process.
On the other hand, in order to avoid Taiwan’s economic over-dependence on 
Mainland China — and to ward off the possibility of Beijing initiating unfavourable 
measures against Taiwan — as well as to create a suitable environment for Taiwan’s 
investment, Taiwan has adopted a ‘Southward Policy’. Also, foreign aid helps Taipei 
to both realise its Southward Policy objectives (through economic cooperation with 
the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, etc.) and to compete with Beijing in a 
peaceful way. When the central bank chairmen of Southeast Asia held a summit 
meeting in Indonesia in February 1998, Taiwan also promised to offer a loan to the
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enterprises in Southeast Asia in order to tide them over during the financial crisis.
Therefore, Taiwan’s southward policy is not only a means, but also an objective in 
itself. Taiwan has used its economic diplomacy to realise its southward policy. 
Southeast Asia has been the top priority of Taiwan’s foreign aid programme due to its 
geographical closeness, cultural affinity and recent economic vitality. However, no 
country maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan in this area — an area in which 
Taiwan has been trying to develop ‘substantive’ relations. Partly because geographic 
proximity to Mainland China makes them subject to Beijing’s pressure, it is difficult 
for Taipei to develop official ties in this region. It is noteworthy that both in 
Southeast Asia and Latin America, Taiwan’s aid and investment are apparently 
complementary to each other. Aid forwards the expansion of Taiwan’s outward 
investment.
Clearly, Taiwan has been pragmatic and has not stipulated the precondition that new 
friends must first sever relations with the PRC since Chiang Ching-kuo was in power. 
In cases where direct aid has been politically unsuitable, Taiwan has donated to 
international organisations. Taiwan is also willing to accept dual recognition. 
Although some countries are not keen on the idea of official recognition, the 
Taiwanese government is still willing to employ aid to further augment official 
contact between Taiwan and other countries.
Although, since the end of 1980s, Taipei has also offered aid to the Mainland in cases
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of floods and natural disasters in order to further the goodwill of the Beijing 
government and the people of the Mainland, the idea of Taiwanese independence is 
completely intolerable to the PRC. Beijing’s obstructionism is the main reason that 
Taipei has been excluded from many international organisations and that many states 
have refrained from maintaining normal diplomatic relations with Taipei.
For instance, Taiwan’s initial offer to provide assistance for the military operations in 
the Persian Gulf in the early 1990s was around US$100 million. This was turned 
down by the United States because of its concern with the PRC’s critical vote in the 
UN Security Council. In September 1990, Taiwan decided to donate US$30 million 
to help Jordan, Egypt and Turkey, who were all hurt by the Gulf Crisis. Although 
Foreign Minister Fredrick F. Chien said that Taiwan expected ‘nothing in return’ for 
its financial aid to countries in the Middle East, Turkey and Egypt hesitated to accept 
the offer in the face of the PRC’s pressure and preferred that Taiwan offer the aid 
through some private organisations. Consequently, Taiwan terminated the aid. 
Taiwan also suspended a loan of US$8 million to Belarus after Belarus had received 
US$1 million in humanitarian aid. This was because Belarus — responsive to 
pressure from the PRC — was reluctant to improve its relations with Taiwan.9
On the one hand, Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP) shrank from US$272 billion 
in 199S to US$269 billion in 1998. Its economic confidence has now been *195
’ Linjun Wu, “Does Money Tklk? The ROC's Economic Diplomacy”, Issues & Studies. December
1995, pp. 22-35.
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undermined to a certain degree, leading to the declining effectiveness of its economic 
diplomacy. On the other hand, since the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1995-96, Beijing 
has been more alert to Taipei’s economic diplomacy and taken a tougher stance 
against it. Obviously, Beijing is increasingly sensitive to the gains which Taipei has 
made recently. President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University made Beijing 
believe that Taipei’s economic diplomacy crossed the bottom line it had set. 
Accordingly, the PRC held missile exercises in order to force Lee to back down and to 
prevent him from achieving greater international presence. Thus came the Taiwan 
Straits Crisis of 1995-1996. The Beijing government will continue to be a major 
factor in Taiwan’s foreign relations, and it is still difficult for other countries to cross 
the bottom line set by the PRC.
The PRC is the only bilateral aid donor in the world whose per capita gross national 
product (GNP) is lower than that of some of the recipients. The declared purpose of 
the PRC’s foreign aid is to help the recipient countries become more economically 
self-reliant. This is welcomed by most of the developing countries. However, its 
foreign aid is also an instrument of foreign policy — albeit rather more ‘pragmatic’ 
than before.
The strategic and political interests of the donor — as well as an historical 
relationship between the donor and the recipient — are emphasised. The PRC 
announced that it would use all the economic and diplomatic resources available to it 
to reward countries that were willing to isolate Taiwan and to punish ‘hostile foreign
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forces’ which encourage Taiwanese independence. Beijing asserted that it would use 
the PRC’s restricted resources to hamper the development of intimate relations 
between Taiwan and other countries in case the economic ties became political ones.
At the individual level, the entrepreneurs and political elites in Taiwan are also 
crucial elements of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. The entrepreneurs serve as 
pioneers to cultivate countries with whom there are no official relations. In Taiwan, 
many well-established private trade associations have been encouraged by the 
government to hold conferences and sign agreements with foreign business 
organisations. These associations include the Chinese National Association of 
Industry and Commerce, the Euro-Asia Trade Organisation, the General Chamber of 
Commerce of the ROC, and the ROC-USA Economic Council.
Although Taiwan is classified under the ‘Asian’ model (typically presumed to be very 
different from the ‘Western’ capitalist model), where the state plays a more active role 
and takes necessary measures to sustain political stability and confidence in the 
economic future,10 Taiwanese business people have gradually regained their power in 
the political arena since the early 1990s. The Taiwanese government has been 
bargaining with companies to locate their operations within Taiwan and attempting to
10 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State -  The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 74. Susan Strange also maintains that governments must now 
negotiate not only with other governments but also with funis or companies. On the other hand, 
companies now negotiate with governments and with one another. Therefore, the nature of 
competition between states has changed, as there now is greatly intensified competition among states 
for world market shares. See Susan Strange, “Rethinking Structural Change in the International 
political Economy: States, Firms, and Diplomacy", in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, ed.. 
Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1994, pp. 103-15.
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persuade them not to move to Mainland China — at least not entirely. Strange also 
argues that if wealth for the state (as for the company) can be obtained only by selling 
on world markets, then foreign policy should now start to take second place to 
industrial policy.11 For example, Wang Yung-ching (a Taiwanese tycoon) can 
manipulate governments on both sides of the Taiwan Straits by means of the 
Hai-Cang Project. In the wake of political démocratisation and economic 
liberalisation, the domestic elites have begun to take control of political and economic 
resources. Unlike in the past, when strong men dominated Taiwan, the state and the 
business sector are now forced to compromise and to co-operate with one another, 
thereby reallocating political resources.
Taiwan graduated from the generalised system of preferences (GSP) of the United 
States (US) in 1989. The change of comparative advantage of Taiwan’s economy 
forces its enterprises to relocate overseas, largely to Mainland China. This is partly 
because Taiwanese businesses can share the export quota and most-favoured-nation 
treatment of the PRC.
The Taipei government proclaimed the policy of ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ in 1996. 
Increasingly, Taiwanese business people investing in Mainland China were curbed, 
against uncertainties, by the political leaders of Taiwan, in order to avoid economic or 
political absorption by the PRC. The capacity of ROC leaders to negotiate and *
"  Susan Strange. The Retreat of the State -  The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 74
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compromise is also important. In the 1990s, President Lee Teng-hui and Premier 
Lien Chan (later Vice-President) visited foreign countries to enhance Taiwan’s 
international standing, although this has been regarded as provocative as well as 
constructive.
In this work, three levels of analysis have been employed to analyse the achievements 
and restrictions of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy (including foreign aid, foreign trade 
and foreign investment) since the beginning of the 1990s. The relationships between 
the government and the business people have been assessed. The effectiveness of 
economic diplomacy in different areas in the world has also been compared. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 contain the essence of my contribution to Politics and 
International Studies as a discipline.
8.2.2 What I Have Achieved -  Modifications to the Original Hypothesis
I have established in this thesis that the original hypothesis needs to be revised in 
certain important respects. It is an overstatement to conclude that, since the 
beginning of the 1990s, Taiwan’s economic diplomacy has achieved significant 
international space. It is often asserted by scholars of this subject that, since the end 
of the Cold War, Taiwan has used economic-related techniques to achieve its foreign 
policy objectives. It is also frequently claimed that the effectiveness of this 
economic diplomacy depends not only on wealth, but also on the global environment 
and the capacity of the Taiwanese government to negotiate and compromise. 
Furthermore, scholars have also noted that, because Taiwan’s economic leverage is
293
decreasing and Beijing’s sensitivity is increasing, the Taipei government will need all 
the statesmanship and leadership potential it has at its disposal if it is to implement its 
economic diplomacy effectively. Finally, it is claimed that economic diplomacy has 
helped Taipei survive as an actor in the international community and that, in the 1990s, 
Taipei has played this game better than in the past.12 The fruits of ‘Pragmatic 
Diplomacy’ are often cited by various scholars.
Although Lee Teng-hui’s leadership has led the Taipei government to expand its web 
of international relations, all these have focused solely on small and micro states as 
friends. For example, Taiwan established or re-established official ties with some 
small states in swift succession, including Grenada (1988), Belize (1989), Liberia 
(1989), Guinea Bissau (1990), Lesotho (1990), Nicaragua (1990), the Central African 
Republic (1991), and Niger (1992), but it lost diplomatic relations with Uruguay 
(1988), Saudi Arabia (1990) and South Korea (1992),13 which are more important 
than the friends the Taipei government has made. It is also emphasised that the 
frequency and ranking of official exchange visits between Taiwan and other countries 
was much greater in the early 1990s than in the period 1972-1987. For example, the 
year 1992 alone witnessed more than one hundred visits by foreign officials at or 
above vice-ministerial level.14 *195
12 Linjun Wu, “Does Money Talk? Taiwan's Economic Diplomacy”, Issues & Studies. December
1995, pp. 22-35.
11 ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs Report: Foreign Relations and Diplomatic 
Administration. Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Co., 1993, p.233.
2 Su Chi, “International Relations of the Republic o f China During the 1990s”, Issues & Studies. 
September 1993, pp. 1-21.
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However, all these are only the illusions of Taipei’s ‘bubble diplomacy’,15 and 
ultimately — and inevitably — the bubble finally burst. The failure was marked by 
two events. First, in late 1993, Premier Lien Chan had to cut the budget of the 
‘Six-Year National Development Plan’ (1991-1996), which had been used to attract 
the major companies and governments of the Western countries. For a short while, 
this strategy had been successful, because companies seeking contracts in Taiwan had 
lobbied their own governments in Taiwan’s favour. However, this strategy lost its 
force when the development budget was cut. A sign of the failure is that, since this 
event, scarcely any high-ranking Western officials have visited Taiwan.
The other failure came when in 1997 Taiwan’s International Economic Cooperation 
Development Fund ceased to aid the countries in Southeast Asia. It had started in 
1988 with an appropriation of US$1.2 billion of economic aid for Third World 
countries. This has been aimed at not only feeding back to the international 
community, since Taiwan had been an aid recipient a few decades ago, but also at 
breaking through China’s diplomatic blockade in the international arena. The fund 
had succeeded in securing for Taiwan some temporary friends among the poorer 
countries. However, when the funds ceased to aid those countries, which had no 
official relations with Taiwan,16 some of these countries simply turned their backs on
15 The term is borrowed from ‘bubble economy’ which was used to describe the economy of some 
Asian countries, especially Japan.
“  Before 1996, the MOEA played a leading role in distributing the funding to other countries, thus 
emphasising the economic function of the funding. Since July 1996, the MOFA replaced the MOEA 
and has administered the International Cooperation Development Fund (ICDF), thus offering aid only 
to those countries with official relations with Taiwan. (Telephone interview with CC on 11 June
2003.)
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Taiwan. Most of the fund has rushed into Southeast Asia, especially the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Vietnam. However, in the case of the Philippines and Indonesia, 
Taiwan has suffered a setback.
The Philippines not only opposed Taiwan’s entry into the United Nations (UN) but 
also unilaterally abolished its aviation agreement with Taiwan. The repeated 
negotiation over the aviation agreement produced no resolution before the end of Lee 
Teng-hui’s tenure in 2000,17 thus discouraging Taiwanese business people from 
investing in the Philippines. On the other hand, Indonesia has been infamous for its 
people’s anti-Chinese complex, even though Taiwan has offered several aid 
programmes for it. In the riots of 13-15 May 1998 in Indonesia, an estimated 1,200 
people were killed and over 150 ethnic Chinese women systematically raped during 
the riots. Taiwan’s officials were compelled to scrap plans to aid and to suspend 
talks with Indonesia temporarily. Therefore, it is essential to find out what went 
wrong in Taiwan’s Southward Policy, or whether, perhaps, the policy was essentially 
right but was hampered in practice by bad luck or bad implementation, or conditioned 
by external factors. In this connection, it is noteworthy that Wang Chi-kang, 
Minister of Economic Affairs, asserted that the Southward Policy should be 
re-evaluated and halted, while Dr Pin-kung. Chiang, Chairman of the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), insisted that the suspension of flight
17 The Philippine government insisted on taking measures to protect its airliners against Taiwanese 
ones because Taiwanese airliners were more competitive. The Philippine government asserted that 
Taiwanese airliners could not pick up passengers from the Philippines, stopped in Taiwan and flew to a 
third country because this would damage the interests of the Philippine airliners. This made the 
Taiwanese government unwilling to compromise.
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links between Taiwan and the Philippines should not become entangled with Taiwan’s 
‘Go South’ investment policy.
Teh-chang Lin argues that the foreign strategy of the Taiwanese government towards 
Southeast Asia was to develop bilateral relations, mainly through the development of 
economic relations and under the framework of a separation of politics and economics. 
According to Lin, the Taiwanese government provided economic aid to some 
countries in Southeast Asia largely in order to strengthen substantive relations with 
these countries, thereby forging an appropriate environment for the investments of 
Taiwanese businesses. Therefore, the Taiwanese motives of political economy were 
clear-cut.18 However, many Taiwanese business people feel that they cannot benefit 
at all from the Southward Policy. Thus, we can see that scholars — and the Taipei 
politicians themselves — have overstated the extent of the glory of the ‘bubble 
diplomacy’ of the Taipei government in the early 1990s.
In addition, the double-track decision-making process of the Taipei government has 
made the politics of Taiwan even more confusing. The APROC Plan, initiated by the 
Executive Yuan, needs three links (commerce, mail and shipping between China and 
Taiwan) as subsidiaries, which is against the ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ Policy launched 
by the presidency. The Southward Policy is parallel to the ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ 
Policy but is opposed to establishment of the three links with China. Amazingly, all
"  Teh-chang Lin. A Comparative Study of the Foreign Aid Policies across the Taiwan Straits. Taipei: 
Zheng Wen, 1999, pp. 322-23. On 11 June 1994, the IECDF proclaimed that the Philippines,
Indonesia and Vietnam were the main countries that were recipients o f  foreign aid in order to 
implement the Southward Policy of the Taiwanese government.
297
these inconsistent and mutually contradictory policies managed to co-exist in the 
Taipei government. Therefore, the Taipei government has not been very effective in 
leading the diplomacy of Taiwan. All these propositions constitute part of my 
dissertation’s original contribution to the field.
When industries from upstream, middle-stream and downstream gather together with 
their satellite factories, all the Taiwanese factories are complementary with one 
another. Cluster condensation thus forms. Vietnam is inferior to China in terms of 
cluster condensation because the range of component-manufacturing factories is less 
comprehensive. Therefore, China is much more attractive to Taiwanese business. 
However, to a certain extent, Vietnam also has potential attractions when Taiwanese 
business people consider the European market because, whereas China needs quotas 
to enter the EU market, Vietnam does not. Therefore, until the WTO abolition of 
quotas comes into effect, Vietnam still has a distinct advantage in this respect.
While the Beijing government bids for the loyalty of Taiwanese business people, the 
Taiwanese businesses in China have been more vulnerable than the Taiwanese state. 
However, their presence and their influence did help to relax the tense relations across 
the Taiwan Straits. On the other hand, the Vietnamese government only asks 
Taiwanese business people not to interfere with Vietnam’s politics. In both cases, 
the Taiwanese business people served as pioneers and surrogates of Taipei’s 
diplomacy.
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It is the Taiwanese business people who have been most proactive and independent in 
pursuing foreign trade and investment, and this has resulted in the useful by-product 
of helping the Taipei government break through diplomatic isolation and make friends 
on the international stage, even when formal recognition was denied. We can 
therefore conclude that Taiwanese business people have played the major role in 
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. The Taipei government has merely followed in the 
steps of the business community in order to further its own agenda.
At first, the Taipei government tried to improve bilateral trade and economic 
cooperation, and then endeavoured to cultivate political connections, frequently 
making use of Taiwan’s entrepreneurs as surrogates and intermediaries in setting up 
the all-important links. Taiwanese business people are usually the first to make 
friends with foreign government officials by their own networking, very often through 
overseas Chinese connections. The China External Trade Development Council 
(CETRA) and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) are usually the second 
group of people to associate with foreign government officials or non-official partners. 
When Taiwanese business people ‘Go West’, they have been regarded as hindrances 
to economic diplomacy by the Taipei government. However, Taiwanese business 
people have proven instrumental in the easing of tensions across the Taiwan Straits, 
usually ‘root enterprises in Taiwan’, as well as bring money back to Taiwan while 
running the risk of losing money in China and Southeast Asia. Almost all the time 
they have acted on their own initiatives, without the help of the Taipei government. 
Not only when ‘Going West’ but also when ‘Going South', they have been proactive
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rather than at the beck and call of the Taipei government.
The Taipei government has been trying to employ Taiwanese business people as a tool 
in its economic diplomacy. However, this attempt has usually proven futile. 
Taiwanese business people always invest where profits are available. Even Taiwan’s 
state enterprises and the Kuomintang party’s enterprises have acted according to this 
rule. Money-losing industry cannot last for long, and Taiwanese business people 
have been reluctant to invest in Indonesia and the Philippines; the very unstable 
political economy in these two countries since the late 1990s has made it difficult to 
make money in them. So although Taiwan has offered foreign aid to Indonesia and 
the Philippines, these two countries have turned their backs on the Taipei government. 
In the Indonesian case, this took the form of initially refusing the proposed visit of 
Taiwan’s vice-president, Annette Lu. In the case of the Philippines, it took the form 
of unilaterally ending air-transport between the two countries and opposing Taiwan’s 
entry to the UN. In both cases, Taiwan’s Southward Policy suffered a severe setback. 
The process can be summed up like this: Instability in Indonesia and the Philippines 
led to a lack of Taiwanese investment; and the resultant attenuation of Taiwanese 
business people’s presence and influence led to developments inimical to Taiwan’s 
economic diplomacy.
Although Taiwan’s economic minister, Lin Yi-Fu, called for Taiwanese business 
people to invest only in those countries whose governments are friendly with the 
Taipei government, Taiwanese business people simply cannot afford to follow this
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advice.
In the early nineties, Taiwan’s foreign minister. Dr Fredrick F. Chien, discouraged the 
Chinfon Group from investing in Vietnam because there were American sanctions at 
that time, and Taiwan ‘should’ respect American foreign policy. Chinfon, however, 
went on investing in Vietnam as it wished. In the end, the Taipei government needed 
the help of Chinfon to serve as intermediary when it came to the realisation that there 
should be connections between the two governments, as there were no official ties at 
that time. This state of affairs came about because Taiwanese business people had 
been successful in making profits in Vietnam and thus ultimately served as pioneers, 
surrogates and intermediaries in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy with that country. 
These same business people are also crucial promoters of the régionalisation and 
globalisation of East Asia, including China and Vietnam.
On the other hand, the state level is of course not always irrelevant; the government 
and its institutions are still important. The Taipei government’s actions are not 
always in vain. When the government concludes double taxation agreements and 
investment guarantee agreements with the governments of other countries, Taiwanese 
business people are protected and are thus more willing to invest in those countries. 
It is also interesting that Taiwanese business people express a view that Taiwan should 
preserve the status quo. This is because only for as long as Taiwan is separate from 
China can Taiwanese business people be regarded as people with significant 
politico-economic leverage. Observing the process and transition of Hong Kong’s
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status, they have found that the rights of Hong Kong business people have been 
ignored to a much more significant extent by the Chinese government since Hong 
Kong was handed over from Great Britain to the PRC.19
When Taiwanese business people established a Taiwanese presence in other countries, 
the home government’s diplomatic policy aims were furthered. Conversely, when 
Taiwanese people declined to establish themselves in a country, the government’s 
diplomatic plans suffered. But in either case, the business people followed their own 
commercial agenda and did not set out either to further or to frustrate the 
government’s aims. Therefore, we can see that Taiwanese business people play a 
major role in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy, the Taipei government itself playing only 
a subsidiary role with respect to the former.
My original hypothesis emphasised the possible effectiveness of Taiwan’s foreign aid 
programme as a tool of diplomacy. My thesis, however, ignores this aspect because 
it has been the subject of a recent book, which expatiates on this topic at length.20 
Lin has expressed the view that foreign aid is an instrument to create a favourable 
environment for Taiwanese business people and to avoid over-dependence on China, 
on the one hand, and to further the Southward Policy by aiding the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Vietnam, on the other. However, Taiwanese business people actually 
do not significantly benefit from Taiwan’s foreign aid policy towards Southeast Asia.
19 Interview with C on 21 May 2003.
20 Lin, Te-Chang, A Comparative Study of the Foreign Aid Policies across the Taiwan Strait. Taipei:
Zhengwen, 1999. 1999)
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8.2.3 Summary of the research contribution
After I enrich ‘levels of analysis’ by emphasising the roles of Taiwanese business 
people in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy, this thesis thus makes significant 
contributions to international relations as a discipline beyond the account of Hollis 
and Smith. The bottoms up momentum of Taiwanese business people in post-Cold 
War era should not be curbed. Chapter 7 of this thesis extends the theory of Shaun 
Breslin on régionalisation and globalisation to Vietnam and East Asia as a whole. 
This thesis, therefore, also contributes to globalisation as a general rule. This is 
another important contribution to international political economy on the whole.
This thesis has also contributed to analyse Taiwan’s diplomacy from an economic 
perspective, thereby making up for the insufficiencies of those conventional 
approaches which have tended to focus exclusively on the political and military 
dimensions. Looked at from the bottom up, explanations in terms of the decisions 
and actions of Taiwanese business people seek to understand their influence on the 
international political economy beyond Taiwan per se. The activities of Taiwanese 
business people entail significant economic implications, thus becoming a special 
object and source of explanation and analysis. Taiwanese business people are a 
distinct source of shoving and shaping forces, playing alongside those at the structural 
level. This also demonstrates that it is not sufficient to carry out one’s analyses 
exclusively from the perspective of states and political elites. The bottom-up 
influence of Taiwanese business people cannot be ignored. Conversely, no analysis
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that concentrates exclusively on the activities of Taiwanese business people can hope 
to provide a sufficiently comprehensive picture of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. 
Only a study that combines all three levels of analysis can hope to provide a truly 
comprehensive panorama.
This dissertation is the first study in international relations to integrate an analysis of 
the international system, decision-making at the state level, and the initiatives of the 
business community in the development of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. For this 
reason this thesis makes an important research contribution to a study of Taiwan’s 
economic diplomacy and Southward Policy. In so doing, the thesis contributes an 
important empirical study to the literature and also contributes to the development of a 
theoretical framework of economic diplomacy by employing a combination of all 
previous approaches. Three levels of analysis are employed: changes in the 
international system, contradictory decision-making at the governmental level, and the 
efforts of political elites and business networks. It thereby creates a new approach to 
current studies of political and economic practices in Taiwan’s diplomacy. 
Furthermore, the thesis demonstrates how awareness of political economy can relate 
to the understanding of the inconsistent and auxiliary roles of governments (while 
admitting that go famous Western brands and marketing, raw materials from all over 
the world, Taiwanese capital and management, and cheap labour and land in China 
and Vietnam.
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8.2.4 W hat d o  w e learn from  Taiwan?
In the post-Cold War era, the developmental state theory discussed in Chapter 2 needs 
to be modified. The role of the state is sometimes limited and not dependable. 
However, Taiwanese business people are more clear-sighted. The state should not 
mobilise Taiwanese business community and ask them to follow the agenda of the 
state. Nor can official relations and high politics, including security, be the only 
consideration. The state must recognise that the Taiwanese business people play a 
major role in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy, and provide information, infrastructure 
and business opportunities to the Taiwanese business community. The Taipei 
government can only warn Taiwanese businesses where the risks are, but not forbid 
them to go anywhere.
In terms of cross-Straits relations, Taiwanese businesses can serve as a buffer and an 
intermediary. Taiwanese business people can also pass messages for national leaders 
on both sides in order to keep information transparent and lessen the extent of 
misunderstanding and conjecture on the two sides. Relations across the Taiwan 
Straits should not follow a set model, but should wade across the river by feeling for 
the stones
In the future, the Taiwanese government should try to meet the needs of the Taiwanese
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business community and take initiative in concluding double taxation agreements, 
international trade agreements, and investment guarantee agreements. Foreign aid to 
other countries ought to be evaluated in terms of individual projects. Foreign aid 
should also be assessed from the perspective of economics and be based on loans that 
can be recycled and used again in the future. Thus, foreign aid plans will be feasible 
in the long term.
8.3 Towards the Future
8.3.1 The lessons of this thesis
What lessons does this thesis offer, and for whom? Firstly, all business people — 
especially, of course, Taiwanese business people. They complain with a sigh that the 
Taiwanese government has been sleeping and does not help at all.21 Even in these 
discouraging circumstances, they should not flinch from their primary purpose — 
making profits — in spite of a governmental system whose policies vis-à-vis the 
business community have seemed to combine neglect and even hindrance. They 
should not be too timid to pursue their ambitions, even when these ambitions are 
against the policy of the government. Only when they can make profits can the 
businesses be competitive and further their long-term aims. Although this is clear to 
most business people, many of them are diffident when they are accused by the 
government of failing to adhere to its policies and directives.
Secondly, there is a lesson for decision-makers — especially the elites of the Taipei
11 Interview with S on 3 March 2002 in Taichung.
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government; they ought to adopt a more liberal attitude towards the business 
community, since networks made up of enterprises and business people are becoming 
increasingly more important economically than states. Only when the interests of 
business people are maximised is the national interest best fulfilled. The institution 
of the Taiwanese government has to be consistent, which also means that double-track 
or multi-track decision-making has to be avoided.
8.3.2 Future Research Directions
This thesis comprises only an initial and limited study, which needs to be developed 
further in the future. In terms of the three levels of analysis, very few scholars have 
enquired about how these levels relate to the practice of dividing the international 
system up into political, economic, military and societal sectors. The discussion of 
three levels of analysis contained herein is centred mainly on the political and military 
fields, and thus ignores possible connections with other increasingly important bodies 
of international relations research areas (e.g. the international political economy, 
historical sociology) that deal with the economic and societal fields. Although this 
thesis has been the first attempt to place emphasis upon the economic perspective 
among the three levels of analysis (business people — individual level; economic 
policies — state level; and prominence of economic issues in the Post-Cold War 
era — international system level) in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy, much remains to 
be done; other core issues and concepts are still poorly understood, and many serious 
questions remain unanswered.
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In order to complement the findings of this study, further research on the practices of 
economic diplomacy in the Philippines and Indonesia in particular would be essential. 
China and Taiwan are now members of the WTO.22 China is now engaging more 
with its neighbours, especially though its relations with the ten-member Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). On 3-4 November 2002, China and ASEAN 
established an agreement to move towards a common Free Trade Area (FTA), with the 
lowering of Southeast Asian tariff barriers spread out between the most developed 
economies (in 2010) and the least advanced (in 2015). What will be the ultimate 
ramifications of these developments? Will Taiwan be marginalized? Or instead, 
will Taiwan benefit and strengthen its role to become an APROC? Taiwanese 
business people are dynamic in China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia, but how will they 
exert their influence and survive in the new economic conditions being created by 
progress towards the FTA? Will they change the pattern of their investment? Some 
Taiwanese business people in Shanghai are changing their identity from Taiwanese to 
Chinese, while stmggling to somehow keep their Taiwanese characteristics.23 To 
what extent and in what way will such developments influence Taiwan’s economic 
diplomacy? The double-track decision-making of the Taipei government very often 
leads to contradictory policies. In this thesis, the author has largely concentrated on 
the contradictions and conflicts between the presidency and the cabinet, but more 
in-depth research on the double-track decision-making of the Taipei government
22 Robert Ash & Heike Holbig, ed„ China's Accession to the World Trade Organization -  National and 
International Perspectives. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. This book includes not only the 
economic impact, but also the political, social and legal implications of Chinese membership o f the 
WTO.
23 Tse-Kang Leng, “Economic Globalisation and IT Talent Flows Across the Taiwan Straits”, Asian 
Survey. Vol. 42, No. 2,2002, p. 233.
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should no doubt be conducted. For instance, Vincent Siew (a former premier) has 
headed a four-member economic advisory panel. This is again another economic 
‘institution’ created under the leadership of President Chen Shui-bian in order to boost 
Taiwan’s economy. Is this institution really necessary? How is this complementary 
or contradictory to the interests and perspectives of the cabinet? Is it necessary for 
Taiwan to overhaul its institutions in order to devise consistent policies? For 
example, the presidency will sometimes make contradictory policies against the 
cabinet. However, the Presidency is not responsible for the Legislative Yuan. 
What kind of system will be beneficial to Taiwan’s diplomacy and political economy 
as a whole? Is it essential to amend the Taiwanese constitution?
Finally, security has recently once again become a crucial issue of international social 
science and policy agendas. States in the past have endeavoured in theory and 
practice to exercise jurisdiction dimensions both within and between their territorial 
borders. However, globalisation is now closely connected with security issues.24 
Taiwanese business people are promoters of régionalisation and globalisation in East 
Asia, involving themselves in cross-border activities. Therefore, it would be also 
interesting to do research on how Taiwanese business people impact security issues in 
East Asia as a whole as well as individual states.
M Christopher W Hughes, “Reflections on Globalisation, Security and 9/11”, CSGR Working Paper No. 
105/02, August 2002.
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